Contempt by breach of a court order

The law of contempt after Buzzard-Quashie v Chief Constable of Northamptonshire Police [2025] EWCA Civ 1397; [2025] WLR(D) 598, CA (11 November 2025) is explained recently by Fraser LJ (with whom Coulson and Asplin LJJ agreed). The background to the case is explained at [2] – [4] in Fraser LJ’s introduction to the subject of contempt of court especially by a public body (specifically a police chief constable in this case) and as to the extent to which the act of breach of a court order can be treated as a contempt.

The judgment can be read alongside the Law Commission report  on Contempt of Court (Part 1) prepared by a committee chaired by the Fraser LJ himself. (There is also a helpful summary.)

As this post will show, Fraser LJ in Buzzard-Quashie puts in issue the question of whether a finding of contempt requires guilty knowledge in relation to failure to comply with an order as well as the failure to comply with an undertaking. These two questions are very much in issue in Buzzard-Quashie. Meanwhile, as will be shown in a subsequent post, the Law Commission proposes a ‘provisional’ (to be explained) revision and a significant shift in operation of common law (para 3.81) on contempt by breach of a court order or an undertaking. Proof that the defendant had knowledge of the facts that made the conduct a breach of the order.

Buzzard-Quashie: disclosure of material to the Northampton police

In circumstances which are not clear from the judgment – for example why was Ms Buzzard-Quashie (BQ) involved with the police in the first place (I cannot see an answer to this question)? – she sought to hold the Northamptonshire police to account for the circumstances that unfolded on 3 September 2021. She had been arrested and taken into custody. Charges were brought against her but rapidly dropped, says Fraser LJ. She tried to obtain all the video footage recorded at the time on the police officers’ body-worn cameras (BWVs): ie over a period in excess of four years during which her efforts “have been remarkable, given the circumstances” said the court (at [2]).

BQ was not provided with the video footage of her arrest and detention upon her request and indeed, the police persisted in refusal to produce it. She lodged a complaint with the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) and this led to an order by that office dated 1 April 2022 ([15]-[16]) that all the video of her arrest (including the BWV) be produced.

Sporadic production by the police as directed by the ICO followed. Generally the police explanation was either that there was no footage as alleged by BQ, or what there had been was destroyed. The continuing evasion as to production by the police, lead to BQ issuing a claim in the Brentford County Court against the police which, given their continued silence, lead to an order (“the 23 April 2023 order”) of a deputy district judge – the order ought to be made the subject of contempt proceedings – as follows (see [18]):

1 Judgment be entered in favour of the Claimant.

2 The Defendant shall within 28 days disclose all and any video footage taken on police cameras relevant to the arrest and detention of the Claimant on 3 September 2021.

3 If any such video evidence is not available or disclosable, a statement from an officer of a rank no lower than Inspector must accompany the disclosure stating why such video footage is no longer available or disclosable.

4 The Defendant pay the Claimant’s costs summarily assessed at £555 within 28 days.

That order was not complied with, either in respect of production by the police or in respect of the second part of it, namely the witness statement of explanation that was required. No penal notice was endorsed on the DDJ order (the significance of this will be explained later).

Order of circuit judge under appeal to the Court of Appeal

BQ applied to commit the Chief Constable for contempt of the 23 April 2023 order. This order was made in civil proceedings, the application was one for civil, rather than criminal, contempt, though civil contempt can be punished by imprisonment. BQ’s application was heard by HHJ Genn at Central London County Court on 15 March 2024. Witness evidence was lodged with the court on behalf of the Chief Constable which stated, in express terms, that all the BWV that was in existence had already been produced to her. The judge refused to find the Chief Constable in contempt of court, her application failed and costs were ordered against BQ. She was at that point acting in person.

It was HHJ Genn’s order which was under appeal. What was any order capable of being the subject of contempt; and what was the act of a party’s breach. Was any such action ‘contumelious’?

The judge explained HHJ Genn’s decision by reference to eleven paragraphs of her judgement. Fraser LJ’s [51] summary of this this judgment is:

[51] Taking [HHJ Glenn’s decision] collectively, it is therefore clear – encouraged by counsel for the Chief Constable who submitted to her, as recorded at [66] of her judgment above, that there had to be a deliberate or wilful decision not to obey the order, and with a litigant in person before her – that although the judge realised the April 23 Order was clear, unambiguous and had not been complied with, she did not consider that she had the power to find the Chief Constable in contempt.

Fraser LJ’s summary of the judge’s order is at his at [50] to [51] from which he drew the following. HHJ Glenn had drawn particular failings in her approach to the law of BQ’s application. (The judge’s numbering in her judgment as set out buy in Fraser LJ’s numbering are at { }).

  • That the DDJ’s order was against the Chief Constable ({31}).
  • The fact of no penal notice being attached ({61}).
  • Deliberate failure not to obey the DDJ’s order ({66}) did not enable the judge to find the judge in contempt.

Fraser LJ clarified the common law in each of these three areas as listed (see [55]) and in reply to BQ’s grounds of appeal: the nature of the breach (as explained shortly) and leading to any contempt finding; the responsibility of the Chief Constable (or similar office-holder) for acts or omissions of others; and the consequences or any contempt applicant of the absence of a penal notice in the order sought to be enforced.

First, however, Fraser LJ explained the meaning of contempt and of interference with administration of justice in this context.

What is contempt as the law now stands

Fraser LJ defined the legal framework the court is dealing with on BQ’s appeal. He explains the form of contempt which the Court of Appeal is dealing with, namely protection of the administration of justice and the extent to which this area of law “arises under the court’s inherent jurisdiction”. It is therefore part of the common law (see [43]). He explains (at [43]) that: “Inherent jurisdiction is a term that refers to the powers of a court arising from the court itself, rather than being conferred upon it by statute”.

The outcome of the contempt proceedings, says Fraser LJ, will be that the court will state its findings as follows:

[45] … That a person has committed contempt will sometimes be expressed by stating that the person has “committed a contempt”, been “found in contempt” or been “held in contempt”. The phrase “guilty of contempt” is also sometimes used. These phrases are essentially interchangeable.

In conclusion: “[45] The court has the power to imprison the contemnor, with the maximum sentence being two years’ imprisonment, or to fine them.”

As Warby LJ explained in explained in Cuciurean v (1) Secretary of State for Transport (2) High Speed Two (HS2) Ltd [2021] EWCA Civ 357 at [10]: the essence of a contempt application in civil proceedings is

“disobedience to an order made in civil proceedings is known as ‘civil contempt’. The contempt proceedings are brought in the civil not the criminal courts…. They are normally brought by the beneficiary of the order that is said to have been disobeyed, whose main if not sole purpose will be to uphold and ensure compliance with the order….”.

It follows, said Fraser LJ (at [49]), that BQ’s claim to HHJ Glenn was for a finding “for compliance with the 23 April 2023 order and a finding of contempt against the Chief Constable, meaning this is part of the civil contempt jurisdiction”. Given judgment had been entered in the County Court proceedings in her favour in the same order, “it is difficult to see what, if any, other levers she had at her disposal to force the Chief Constable to comply with that order of the court”.

(1)       “The nature of the breach”

Of “the nature of the breach” (see [56] et seq) Fraser LJ asserts his view of the law as to intent in relation to interference with administration of justice and in simple terms as follows:

[56] There is no requirement in any of the authorities that breach of a court order must be “wilful, deliberate or contumelious” in order for that breach to render the subject of the order liable in contempt. Such an approach connotes – or at the very least suggests – specific intention to commit a contempt or interfere with the administration of justice is required. That is not the law.

He explains this by analysis of a variety of authority: and to what the act is to base a finding of contempt and as to what is the intent of the alleged contemnor in relation the action of contempt.

What are the facts on which a finding of contempt must be found? First there must be the act – that is a fact which gives rise to the allegation of contempt. Then there must be an intent to commit the breach (akin to actus reus (the act in criminal proceedings) and to mens rea (guilty intent). There is no need for the law to use such words as “contumelious” (whatever that may means. The requirement of the law is in summary:

[56] There is no requirement in any of the authorities that breach of a court order must be “wilful, deliberate or contumelious” [whatever that may mean (says Fraser LJ at [74]] in order for that breach to render the subject of the order liable in contempt. Such an approach connotes – or at the very least suggests – specific intention to commit a contempt or interfere with the administration of justice is required. That is not the law.

[57] In Cuciurean v [above] at [58], Warby LJ reviewed the authorities on this specific point. He helpfully clarified the ingredients of a civil contempt as follows:

“These authorities indicate that… (2) the Court’s civil contempt jurisdiction is engaged if the claimant proves to the criminal standard that the order in question was served, and that the defendant performed at least one deliberate act that, as a matter of fact, was non-compliant with the order; (3) there is no further requirement of mens rea, though the respondent’s state of knowledge may be important in deciding what if any action to take in respect of the contempt.”

(2)       “Responsibility of the Chief Constable”

So who is respondent to BQ’s claim? Having considered the statutory position of the Chief Constable Fraser LJ concluded:

[82] In my judgment, any county police force (because neither the Metropolitan nor the City of London police has a chief constable) is properly sued in the person of the Chief Constable, and it is he or she who is responsible for the acts and omissions of the members of their police force. The judge below erred in law in concluding otherwise.

(3)       “Absence of a penal notice”

A matter of frequent concern which I recall as a practitioner could be caused where a penal notice was not attached to a penal notice to an order. Could an order without penal notice be enforced in by enforcement by committal we often used to wonder?

Fraser LJ has a simple answer to this canard explored by HHJ Glenn. Of course there can be no double standards he said.

[84] I wish to emphasise that there are not two different tiers or classifications of court orders, namely those with a penal notice, and those without. If there were, this would mean that the former must be obeyed because the court would have powers regarding non-compliance, but it would lack those powers for the latter. If that were the case, compliance with the latter could potentially become of the “nice but not essential” type. That is the logical consequence of the submissions made to HHJ Genn on behalf of the Chief Constable at the County Court. The absence of a penal notice was relied upon as effectively rendering the Chief Constable immune from any contempt proceedings for failure to comply with the April 23 Order.

Sanction following a finding of contempt may depend on endorsement of a penal notice; but not the finding of contempt itself.

[87] I agree with the dicta in that case. If someone can be committed to prison for contempt of court in respect of breach of an order without a penal notice – and it is clear that the court has a discretion to do this, admittedly used in rare circumstances – then it cannot logically be a bar to a finding of contempt for breach of an order if there were no penal notice attached. There is no such procedural or substantive bar. The penal notice is relevant to sanction, not to any finding of contempt being made.

The Law Commission report

The Law Commission’s report on the contempt of court issues raised by Buzzard-Quashie will be reviewed in a subsequent post.

Featured image: Photo by Andre Hunter on Unsplash