The functions and corresponding powers of a PCC derive from the Act. There can be no dispute about that and he/she has no non-statutory power or function. A cornerstone of Mr Gold’s argument on behalf of the claimant was that the Act brought about a “profound” change by providing, through the role of the PCC, democratic oversight of the police; that the role of the chief constable and his operational independence was a matter of constitutional significance; and that the statute introduced a careful balance between the PCC and the chief constable.

In support of that submission, Mr Gold relied, of course, on the provisions of the statute itself but also on the Policing Protocol Order 2023, issued in accordance with section 79 of the Act. Section 79(6) defines the “policing protocol” as:

The Protocol, therefore, addresses the functions of both a PCC and a chief constable. The PCC must not fetter the operational independence of the police force and the chief constable (see paragraph 18) and paragraph 32 emphasises that the operational independence of the police is a fundamental principle of British policing. Paragraph 37 provides that the PCC and the Chief Constable must work together “to safeguard the principle of operational independence while ensuring that the PCC is not fettered in fulfilling their statutory duty.” Paragraph 38 states:

At the same time, paragraph 23 states that the Chief Constable is accountable to the PCC for the matters there set out and the Divisional Court in R (Crompton) v South Yorkshire Police & Crime Commissioner [2017] EWHC 1349 (Admin) at [78] – [79] recognised that matters relevant to operational independence were not excluded from the scope of the PCC’s powers of scrutiny.

None of this principle was seriously in issue, if in issue at all, but it provided the context for Mr Gold’s submission that the court should scrutinise with care any interpretation of the Act that disturbed the careful balance provided by Parliament in the relationship between a PCC and a chief constable and, as an aspect of that careful balance, any “hiring and firing” not expressly addressed in the Act.

The claimant’s central submissions then seem to me to be as follows:

Taking (i) and (ii) together, Mr Gold’s first submission was that the Act provides for there to be a chief constable and only one chief constable. Again there is no dispute about that. Although the chief constable is suspended from duty and from performing his functions, he still holds the office of chief constable. Accordingly, it was self-evident that there could not be (another) temporary chief constable. That simple argument has a superficial attraction and could lead to a short finding in the claimant’s favour. The argument, however, ignores the fact that the Act itself clearly provides for someone else to perform the functions of the chief constable and the defendant’s submission seems to me to be not that the temporary chief constable is somehow a second chief constable but rather that he is a person who may be lawfully be appointed to perform the functions of the chief constable in certain circumstances.

More importantly, the Act provides a detailed procedure - and one that involves the PCC, the Panel and the public - for the appointment of a chief constable. The Panel has a material role in making a recommendation in respect of any candidate and significant power in its ability to veto the PCC’s first proposed candidate. As the claimant submitted, the PCC is accountable to the electorate in respect of his acceptance or rejection of any recommendation.

Correspondingly, there are statutory provisions that govern the removal of a chief constable (and a deputy chief constable). The claimant submits that such provisions are consistent with respecting the operational independence of the chief constable and serve the purpose of promoting stability in leadership and thus in the police force:

Part 2 of Schedule 8 to the Act provides that a PCC must not call on a chief constable to retire or resign until the end of the scrutiny process. That process includes notification to the chief constable of written reasons for proposing to call for his retirement or resignation; an opportunity for the chief constable to make representations; notification to the Panel; and a recommendation from the Panel before making which they must hold a “scrutiny hearing” (as defined in paragraph 15(9)) which is held in private. The recommendation thereafter must be published. The PCC must consider the recommendation and accept or reject it.

The claimant submits that Parliament cannot have intended some other provision of the Act to confer power on the PCC to make an appointment of a temporary chief constable with no prescribed procedure and which results in the appointment of a person who could be subject to unfettered powers of removal, that is with none of the checks and balances provided for the removal of a chief constable.

As I have said, the defendant Commissioner’s case is one that emphasises that the most significant duty of a PCC is to secure that the police force is efficient and effective (section 1(6)). The defendant submits that the power provided in Schedule 1, paragraph 14 to do anything which is calculated to facilitate, or is conducive or incidental to, the exercise of the functions of the PCC should be read broadly to give the PCC the power to do what the Commissioner seeks to do in this case, that is, appoint a temporary chief constable to ensure that he, the Commissioner, discharges his most significant duty.

In pointing to the operational challenges the Staffordshire Police Force faces and the potential deficit in command resilience, the thrust of the defendant’s submission seems to me to be that if the Commissioner is unable to exercise his powers in this way, he runs the risk of failing in his most significant duty. Mr Beggs KC submitted that paragraph 14 provides an express power to do what is necessary in exceptional circumstances. The relevance of reliance on exceptional circumstances must, to my mind, be that, if the Commissioner’s broad powers were used unnecessarily or, as Mr Beggs put it, as a matter of whimsical convenience, the exercise of those powers would be open to challenge by way of judicial review and the implicit limitation of “exceptional circumstances” guards against this risk of misuse.

Although it has to be accepted that the appointment of a temporary chief constable is not something that is expressly found in the Act, so that there is in turn no express procedure for making such an appointment, the defendant submitted that what he intends to do does not undermine the statutory provisions. He has consulted widely; he intends to refer the proposed appointment to the Panel; there is no minimum term of appointment for a chief constable so there can be no objection to a short fixed term appointment of a TCC with the possibility of extension; and the balance in the Act and the Protocol in terms of oversight and operational independence will continue to apply.

Even without consideration of the claimant’s further arguments, I cannot accept the defendant’s position on this issue.

Firstly, having regard to the context of paragraph 14 itself, it is directed towards powers incidental to matters in Schedule 1. That is evident from the two express examples given in paragraph 14(2) – entering into contracts and acquiring/ disposing of property. It would be curious to say the least if Parliament had seen fit to make express that these two matters were included but leave unsaid the rather more striking power to something which flies in the face of the careful and detailed provisions relating to one of the PCC’s primary powers and functions, namely the appointment of the chief constable.

Secondly, paragraph 14(3) expressly provides that the paragraph is subject to the other provisions of the Act and to any other enactment about the powers of PCCs. The powers to which the paragraph is subject must, therefore, include section 38 and Schedule 8. I do not see how a power to appoint someone to a role not referred to in the Act (a temporary chief constable) to perform the functions of a person who is expressly referred to (a chief constable) whose appointment and removal are carefully managed by the Act can sit with sub-paragraph 14(3). Put another way, the appointment of someone to perform the functions of the chief constable must be subject to the provisions of the Act for the appointment of a chief constable.

Thirdly, section 41 which I come to further below, at sub-section (9) provides:

The Commissioner also relied on a number of authorities in support of his interpretation of paragraph 14.

The court was referred to Hazell v Hammersmith and Fulham LBC [1992] 2 AC 1. In that case, the House of Lords was concerned with the meaning of section 111 of the Local Government Act 1972 which provided:

The argument that the local authority’s power to borrow was not a function and that the local authority could do nothing that was only intended to facilitate borrowing was rejected, although the swap transactions that the council had entered into were found not to facilitate borrowing.

Whilst it was submitted that this was a wide interpretation of incidental powers that might assist the court in resolving ground 1, it seems to me of little relevance. Although the wording is in the same terms as paragraph 14, section 111 does not appear in a similar context and the local authority was expressly given power to borrow money to facilitate the discharge of its functions. The PCC is not expressly given power to appoint a chief constable other than in accordance with the Act. As the defendant further submitted, referring to Independent Commission of Investigations v Police Federation (Jamaica) [2020] UKPC 11 at [40], in appropriate circumstances powers may be implied but whether such an implication is possible will depend on the statutory scheme. In the present case, the statutory scheme militates against finding either that the express power in paragraph 14 can be taken to include the power to appoint a TCC or that there is such an implied power.

The defendant further referred the court to R (OWD Ltd. in liquidation) v HMRC [2019] UKSC 30 at [28] and [42]-[49]. The Alcoholic Liquor Duties Act 1979, by amendment and under section 88C, had introduced a regulatory scheme under which wholesalers supplying duty-paid alcohol had to be approved by HMRC. A refusal could be challenged by appeal to the FTT. The first issue before the court was whether, where HMRC had refused an application for approval, they had power to permit the person to carry on trading pending appeal. The wholesalers argued that such a power arose under section 88C or, alternatively, under section 9 of the Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Act 2005. That latter section provided that “The Commissioners may do anything which they think – (a) necessary or expedient in connection with the exercise of their functions, or (b) incidental or conducive to the exercise of their functions” , where function meant any power or duty and any power or duty ancillary to another power or duty (section 51(2)).

At [45], Lady Black concluded that section 9 did not confer such a power:

In the analysis in the following paragraphs, she set out in greater detail the provisions of the statutes that led to that conclusion. It is sufficient to say that this decision does not seem to me to assist the defendant’s argument because, for the reasons I have given, in my judgment, to find that paragraph 14 does give the Commissioner power to appoint a temporary chief constable outwith any statutory scheme does undermine the statutory scheme.

The claimant’s case is also supported by the fact that Parliament has made express provision for what is to happen in the event that the chief constable is unable to perform his functions, including in the event of suspension. These are the provisions of section 41 of the Act set out above.

The defendant submitted that the use of “may” in section 41 leads to the conclusion that the DCC “acting up” is one option but not the only one. It may be the default position but it is not the required one. It is permissive wording not mandatory. The defendant relied on cases cited in Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary 11 th ed. and the discussion of “Discretion and Duty” in Supperstone, Goudie and Walker on Judicial Review.

In this context, however, it seems to me that the word “may” is used to demonstrate that the DCC is permitted to perform the role of the Chief Constable and may exercise any or all of his functions but is not, at all times which may fall within section 41(11), obliged to do so. It may, for example, be the case that the DCC does not need to exercise some of the chief constable’s functions or that, say in the event of illness or vacation, the chief constable continues to perform some functions. The permissive wording allows that practical flexibility rather than prescribing that, in the circumstances set out in the section, the DCC shall or must take over the chief constable’s role in its entirety.

Mr Beggs submitted that that flexibility supported the Commissioner’s interpretation of the Act because it demonstrated that the section was permissive rather than mandatory but, in my judgment, that does not meet the point that the DCC having the power to perform these functions is the intention of Parliament and not some other unspecified person. Indeed, the passage in paragraph 7.4 of Supperstone, Goudie and Walker on which the defendant relied offers this analysis:

The claimant also pointed to the fact that by section 41(10)(b), Parliament has expressly limited the powers of a DCC acting as chief constable. The DCC may not suspend another DCC or an ACC or call on another DCC or ACC to retire or resign. Mr Gold submitted that that was intended to ensure that a DCC could not reshape a police force in terms of its most senior officers when acting as chief constable. Whether or not that was the underlying intention, it is clear that no such limitation would apply to a temporary chief constable. It would again be surprising if Parliament had made express and indeed careful provision for a DCC to act as chief constable but at the same time provided a power that entitled the PCC to appoint someone to take over the role without any such careful provision.

Returning to the claimant’s submission that there can only be one chief constable, even if the appointment of a temporary chief constable to perform the chief constable’s functions would not create a second chief constable, it would still create a second person with power to perform those functions. That shows the further difficulty with the defendant’s position. If the DCC may perform the functions of the chief constable in the circumstances set out but a temporary chief constable is also appointed, there would be a second person entitled to perform those functions. That creates an incoherent situation. To resolve that incoherence, section 41 would have to be read as saying that the DCC may perform the functions of the chief constable but only if there were no temporary chief constable appointed. Unsurprisingly given that the Act makes no reference to a temporary chief constable, section 41 says nothing to that effect or from which that could be implied.

Lastly and for completeness:

As I have indicated already, a significant part of the Commissioner’s evidence and the submissions on his behalf were concerned with the steps the Commissioner had taken to obtain advice on the appointment of a temporary chief constable and the advice that he had been given. This evidence went to the case that the Commissioner was in no way seeking to act inappropriately. At this stage, I proceed on this basis. The issue on ground 1 is one of lawfulness and not irrationality.

The evidence also went to a broader submission that other forces had appointed a temporary chief constable and done so, in most cases at least, without any challenge to the lawfulness of that appointment. That led to an argument that if this court was to conclude that such an appointment was not lawful, there would be consequences for other forces.

The evidence from the Commissioner and the documents was as follows:

The Commissioner’s evidence was that Ms Clayton had also made inquiries with the offices of other PCCs and the feedback was consistently that a TCC could be appointed and that, as the role was temporary, it was not necessary to hold a public confirmation hearing.

The Commissioner also said that, on 5 August 2025, Ms Clayton and Ms Slimmon met to discuss in more detail how to run a TCC process. Ms Slimmon’s advice included that the appointment should be for a six month maximum period with any extension to be confirmed by the Home Secretary.

There can be no doubt that the Commissioner sought advice and guidance from appropriate bodies and individuals and that the guidance he consistently received was that he could appoint a TCC. However, the issue is whether that advice was right and not whether it was given. Evidence that there was a common understanding of what could be done and even a related practice cannot change the position in law.

In the course of argument, I asked on a number of occasions whether any of these bodies or people had identified the legal basis for their views, whether in writing or otherwise. I gained the clear impression that no basis had been identified and that there had just been an assumption that such an appointment could be made, not least because a temporary or interim chief constable had been appointed elsewhere on previous occasions. As Mr Basu KC submitted, this may have been an understandable misapprehension because all ranks other than that of chief constable could be held on a temporary basis but it was a misapprehension nonetheless. Even though Mr Beggs had emphasised that the Commissioner only sought to take this approach because of exceptional circumstances, the other examples I was taken to (tabulated in the defendant’s solicitors’ letter dated 20 October 2025) did not bear out that other forces had only appointed a temporary chief constable in exceptional circumstances.

The only indication of legal analysis of the basis for such an appointment was in Ms Slimmon’s email of 31 July which referred to the Police Act 1996. Section 12(4) of the Police Act 1996, as originally enacted, did contain such a provision and section 12(5) provided that no person should be authorised to act by virtue of such designation for more than 3 months without the consent of the Secretary of State. However, section 12 in its entirety was repealed by the Police, Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011.

Although I have set out this evidence in some detail, and done so with a view to representing the Commissioner’s position fairly, it did not, in my view, assist on ground 1 which turned on the legal position and not on what it may have genuinely been thought to be.

As I have said, concern was expressed that if this court decided ground 1 in the claimant’s favour, other forces might be affected. Mr Gold’s answer to that was that existing “temporary chief constables” would be de facto office holders so that their past acts would not be affected. He relied on the principle that a person may be a de facto officer where they have the reputation of being the officer they assume to be, despite that not being good in law - see R v Corporation of Bedford Level (1805) 6 East 356 . Their future acts would similarly, he submitted, not be affected or the court could decline to quash any of their decisions. It is not necessary for me to decide this issue of fact and law because it does not arise in this case. If it was intended to be argued that this court should not, in its discretion, quash the decision to seek to appoint a temporary chief constable because of the impact on other previous appointments, I would not accept that as a good argument. It would have the effect that the mere assumption that such appointments were lawful, and the practice of making them, would defeat the legislation and that would never be changed.

Accordingly, I find in favour of the claimant on ground 1 and I find that the defendant’s decision to recruit and/or any forthcoming decision to appoint a temporary chief constable is unlawful.