The Claimant, Sahayb Abu, a convicted terrorist serving a sentence of life imprisonment, has been held in a Separation Centre within the prison estate since September 2024. From 12 April 2025, following an attack on prison officers by another prisoner detained in a Separation Centre, until the date of the hearing, the Claimant has been segregated from the other prisoners, save for a period of almost 8 weeks when he was permitted to associate with one other prisoner. The Claimant contends that this treatment of him was, and continues to be, unlawful on a number of grounds.

The claim for judicial review was lodged on 22 August 2025. By order dated 5 September 2025, I refused the Claimant’s application for interim relief, but ordered an expedited “rolled-up hearing” of the application for permission and, if granted, substantive consideration of the Claimant’s claim for judicial review. The “rolled-up hearing” took place on 13-14 October 2025. Further written submissions were produced by the parties after the hearing. These have been taken into account as part of the Court’s consideration of the arguments in this case.

The issues raised by the Claimant involve consideration of, among other things, the meaning and effect of rule 45 of the Prison Rules 1999 (“the Rules”), pursuant to which a prisoner can be removed from association with other prisoners; and whether or not the Claimant’s rights under Articles 3 and/or 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“the Convention”) have been violated.

Section 47 of the Prison Act 1952 provides that the Secretary of State may make rules for, among other things, the “regulation and management” of prisons and for the “treatment” and “control” of prisoners. These rules are currently found in the Rules.

Rule 45 makes provision for a prisoner to be removed entirely from association with other prisoners, commonly referred to as being placed in segregation:

It is clear, therefore, that the initial decision to segregate, and to continue segregation, must be made by “the governor”. Any segregation for a period over 42 days requires the approval of the Secretary of State.

Rule 46 makes provision for Close Supervision Centres (“CSCs”). These are for prisoners who have demonstrated or evidenced propensity to demonstrate violent and/or highly disruptive behaviour in custody. They are kept in small, highly specialised units or specially designated cells.

Rule 46A makes provision for Separation Centres:

Separation Centres were created as part of the response to the review of Islamist extremism in prisons, probation and youth justice led by Ian Acheson from 2015-2016. They were introduced in the Long Term and High Security Estate (“LTHSE”) in April 2017 to allow for greater separation and specialised management of terrorist or terrorist risk prisoners, who present a level of risk that cannot be managed in a mainstream or alternative location. The aim of the Separation Centres is to “prevent prisoners with extreme views from radicalising their fellow inmates, presenting a risk to national security, supporting acts of terrorism or disrupting the good order or discipline of the prison”: see Report on an inspection of Separation Centres by HM Chief Inspector of Prisons 11–22 April 2022. There are currently 12 prisoners held in Separation Centres. Further detail as to the background and aims of the Separation Centre regime is set out in R (De Silva) v Secretary of State for Justice [2025] EWHC 128 (Admin) at [11]-[16].

In De Silva, Hill J stated at [36] that detention in a Separation Centre (referred to by the judge and in some of the correspondence in this case as “SC”) can properly be characterised as “small group isolation””. Further description of the Separation Centre regime was described at [37]:

Prison Service Order (“PSO”) 1700 is a policy document produced by HM Prison and Probation Service. Among other things, it provides staff with information as to how to manage prisoners who are held in segregation, and describes various processes that should be followed. PSO 1700 was revised in April 2022 to give effect to a number of reports highlighting the number of self-inflicted deaths within segregated environments. It was specifically stated that “PSO 1700 now places a greater emphasis on maintaining the safety of prisoners in segregated environments”.

At section 2.3 of PSO 1700 it is noted that “Healthcare visits and assessments (by the doctor and healthcare staff) take place regularly to ensure that there is no reason why prisoners should be removed from segregation on either physical or mental health grounds.”

PSO 1700 refers in some detail to “Promoting and Safeguarding the Mental Health of Prisoners held in Segregation Units”. This includes a discussion of research into the impact of segregation on prisoners:

Reference is also made to the judgment of the Strasbourg Court in Keenan v United Kingdom (2001) 33 EHRR 38 (discussed further below), and the finding in that case that there had been a breach of Article 3 of the Convention. PSO 1700 quotes from the judgment, where it was said that:

It is also stated that:

PSO 1700 contains a list of suggestions as to how establishments can put measures in place to safeguard/promote the mental health of all prisoners held in segregation.

PSO 1700 explains that the initial decision to segregate is made by a governor at the relevant prison. Section 4.2 of PSO 1700 provides that:

The amendments to PSO 1700 made in April 2022 updated the process of “Reviewing and Authorising Continuing Segregation”. It is stated that “The governor has the authority to arrange that a prisoner is to be segregated where it appears desirable for the maintenance of good order or discipline or in his or her own interest”. Reviews of the segregation decision are to be taken by the Segregation Review Board (“SRB”). The decision to segregate is to be made by the Chairperson of the SRB, who must be a competent Operational Manager with powers delegated by the governor to carry out this role. The prisoner must be told when an SRB review will take place and must be given the opportunity to attend and make representations.

Paragraph 2.20 of the amended PSO 1700 provides that:

Under a heading, “Caring for Prisoners Segregated”, it is said that:

The process for continuing segregation beyond 42 days requires completion of a form OT030. Paragraph 3.4 provides that:

The prisoner must be allowed to make representations at this review stage. The decision to renew the segregation is taken by a senior official in the Prison Group Department (“PGD”) of the Ministry of Justice. The purpose of the first review is “to consider whether segregation is appropriate and whether there are sufficient reasons for continuing segregation beyond the 42 day period”.

Further decisions to extend segregation, whether by the SRB, or by the senior official on behalf of the Secretary of State, are also described. The procedure for these decisions is the same as for the initial reviews.

PSO 1700 contains forms for completion by healthcare workers. This includes a health screen and a healthcare algorithm.

The Claimant is serving a discretionary life sentence imposed on 13 April 2021, with a minimum term of 19 years, for an offence of preparation for an act of terrorism contrary to s. 5(1)(a) of the Terrorism Act 2006. The prosecution case was that the Claimant had a violent and extremist mindset, supporting the beliefs, aims and methods of Islamic State (ISIS). He had purchased, or attempted to purchase, items online with a view to committing a terrorist act: a large knife, a smaller knife, combat vest, two balaclavas, fingerless gloves, and a combat hat. He was reported to have paid extra for the double-edged blade to be sharpened before delivery.

Between July 2020 and September 2024, the Claimant was detained with the mainstream prison population. During that time, concerns were raised about the Claimant’s behaviour and his rising influence among other prisoners, with reports suggesting that he was sharing his Islamist extremist ideology with others, producing an environment where others could be subject to radicalisation.

In September 2024, the Claimant was selected for assessment for inclusion in a Separation Centre under Rule 46A of the Prison Rules, on the basis that:

As part of the selection assessment process, an assessment was completed by a Senior Registered Forensic Psychologist. In her report, it was noted that the Claimant had experienced early trauma, which included abuse from his father. She stated that the Claimant had experienced a period of homelessness in France for a few years. During this time, he had used drugs and alcohol. The Claimant had rejoined his family in his early 20s. Two of his brothers are believed to have gone to Syria and lost their lives in support of ISIS. It was also noted that the Claimant had sought mental health support whilst he was in the community, but this had not been provided.

The psychologist concluded her report by recommending a number of actions to “better understand” the Claimant’s risk:

(Emphasis added).

The Claimant was selected for detention in a Separation Centre on 10 December 2024. He was found to satisfy two of the criteria for inclusion in a Separation Centre under Rule 46A. His selection appeared to be desirable:

The Claimant’s inclusion in a Separation Centre has been reviewed quarterly, and the present case does not include a challenge to his placement in a Separation Centre.

As at 12 April 2025, there were two operational Separation Centres within the prison estate: HMP Full Sutton and HMP Frankland. The Claimant was held at the latter facility with 6 other prisoners. The regime within Separation Centres is designed to mirror that which would be available to a prisoner on mainstream location. This includes the ability to associate with other prisoners co-located within the Separation Centre, and to continue to access facilities in the prison, such as the gym, library and other facilities. Ordinarily, therefore, prisoners who choose to participate in the activities offered could expect to spend approximately six to seven hours a day out of cell. The mental health service provision available to prisoners in a Separation Centre is the same as that which is available in mainstream prison.

On 12 April 2025, another prisoner at the Separation Centre at HMP Frankland, Hashem Abedi, attacked a number of prison officers. Mr Abedi threw boiling butter onto one prison officer, and stabbed another prison officer with an improvised blade. Mr Abedi stabbed officers who attempted to restrain him and punched one officer, breaking his nose. Three officers required hospitalisation; two officers required surgery, one of whom also had severe burns injuries covering 24% of his body.

Following the attack, a Separation Centre at HMP Woodhill was re-opened. The Claimant, along with other prisoners, was relocated from HMP Frankland to HMP Woodhill. It is contended by the Defendant, the Secretary of State for Justice, that the Claimant was non-compliant on transfer, requiring restraint, and that he lunged at a prison officer. An adjudication as to what was alleged to have taken place was not proceeded with; and it is not necessary for this Court to say more about it save that (i) on arrival at HMP Woodhill, the Claimant was placed in a segregation cell until 6.16 pm on 15 April 2025 when he was moved to a standard cell; and (ii) the Claimant maintained that he was beaten up by prison officers.

One of the factual issues for determination in this case is whether the decision to segregate the Claimant – strictly speaking, to remove him from association under Rule 45 of the Rules – was made by the Secretary of State (through her

For most of the period discussed in this Judgment, the Secretary of State for Justice was Rt Hon Shabana Mahmood. On 5 September 2025, Rt Hon David Lammy MP became the Secretary of State. I shall use the pronoun she/her when referring to the Secretary of State so as to make the Judgment easier to follow.

officials who act in her name under the Carltona principle) or by the governor of the prisons where the Separation Centres were located. The Claimant contends that the decision was made by the Secretary of State: that she provided a “central steer” which amounted to an instruction. The Secretary of State contends that the decision was taken locally by governors, and that the “central steer” was not binding. In order to assess this matter, I set out the key evidence available to the Court.

Mr Alex Worsman, the Head of the LTHSE, has provided a witness statement in this case. He describes a “temperature check” being carried out by intelligence analysts after the incident at HMP Frankland. This recorded that, as of 15 April 2025, following the transfer of prisoners to HMP Woodhill, it was assessed as “unlikely” that there would be attempts to imitate the incident at HMP Frankland. HMP Woodhill was given a “RAG” rating of “green”. In contrast, HMP Full Sutton (the other Separation Centre) was given a “RAG” rating of “amber”: it was concluded that there was a “realistic possibility” of some form of incident in response to the events that had taken place. Subsequently, the intelligence suggested that the risk from the cohort who had transferred to HMP Woodhill was “possibly elevated”.

Mr Worsman has stated that around 16 April 2025, he had reached the view that:

Mr Worsman’s evidence is that:

In other words, Mr Worsman’s evidence is that initially the decisions to segregate all of the Separation Centre prisoners were made locally by governors. This is confirmed by the evidence of Andrew Clayden, the Head of Function at HMP Full Sutton in his witness statement (I shall refer to him as Governor Clayden).

Governor Clayden explained that he returned to work on 14 April 2025 after a period of annual leave. He decided that there should be a split cohort arrangement of three prisoners unlocked at a time against three locked, in order to increase the staff-to-prisoner ratio while further information on the management of Separation Centre prisoners was awaited. This situation continued on 15 April 2025. On 16 April 2025, Governor Clayden has said that he received emerging information that some individuals located in the Separation Centre were objecting and making verbal threats of violence towards staff. At the same time, there was unconfirmed reporting in relation to an incident at HMP Whitemoor, together with a suggestion that the phrase “Allahu Akbar” had been used by prisoners in the unit at HMP Woodhill when news of the attack at HMP Frankland reached them.

Mr Worsman has stated that although local decisions to segregate had been made, neither of the Separation Centres had taken steps to place their prisoners formally on Rule 45 of the Rules. Accordingly, so as to support them in regularising the situation and bringing them into compliance with policy, an email was sent from the Separation Centre Operational Lead to the two prisons providing template wording for use in any decision to segregate prisoners in the Separation Centres under Rule 45. Mr Worsman’s evidence is that he did not consider this email to have been “a ‘central steer’ as such”.

In response to the email, Governor Clayden wrote to say that he had “completed the Rule 45 paperwork and spoken with all of the SC prisoners informing them of their Rule 45 status due to the current loss of association”. The following day, the Separation Centre Operational Lead wrote to Governor Clayden to thank him for doing that.

Governor Clayden’s evidence is that he completed the Rule 45 forms on his own accord, based on risk assessments that were coming through from the LTHSE leadership, including a counter-terrorism threat assessment report on 15 April 2025, Dynamic Risk Assessment meetings for each Separation Centre prisoner which also occurred on 15 April 2025, and the post-incident “temperature check” referred to by Mr Worsman at paragraph 33 above. On 17 April 2025, Governor Clayden confirmed that all Separation Centre prisoners at HMP Full Sutton had become subject to the Rule 45 process. As a result, they were placed on single unlock with a consequent loss of association.

On 24 April 2025, Mr Worsman emailed colleagues to say that Separation Centres “should now be using Rule 45 to support single unlock . . . If either of your views are different to that please can we discuss that today.” Mr Worsman has said in evidence that whilst he agreed with the decision to limit association, he did not consider his communication to be a “central steer to segregate”.

As for the relevant decisions at HMP Woodhill, where the Claimant was detained, the Court received evidence from Samantha Jordan, who is a Custodial Manager at that prison and was temporarily promoted to Governor during the period between 24 April 2025 and 28 August 2025 (I shall refer to her as Governor Jordan). In that time, she had responsibility for running the temporary Separation Centre as Head of Function. Governor Jordan had no involvement in the initial decisions to segregate the Claimant.

In her evidence, Governor Jordan has said that following the arrival of the HMP Frankland Separation Centre prisoners on 13 April 2025:

The Claimant was initially placed in a segregation cell within the Separation Centre. On 15 April 2025, he was transferred to a standard cell within the Separation Centre. On 17 April 2025, the Claimant was formally segregated under Rule 45.

Governor Jordan refers in her evidence to the communications from “the Centre” – which for the purposes of this judgment is a reference to the officials working for the Secretary of State under the Carltona principle — about formalising the segregation through the Rule 45 process. On 17 April 2025, the Claimant was informed that he would be segregated under Rule 45, until 20 April 2025. It was explained that:

On 20 April 2025, the Claimant’s segregation was continued by the SRB. The same reason was given as for the initial segregation under Rule 45. As part of the SRB process, an “Initial Segregation Health Screen” was completed by a healthcare professional, and it was noted that as a result of the screening there were no clinical reasons or concerns to advise against segregation at this time. Further, there were no healthcare reasons not to segregate the Claimant at this time.

On 29 April 2025, Governor Clayden sent an email to the Deputy Governor of HMP Full Sutton and the President of the Prisoner Governor’s Association. This followed a meeting the previous day between the Separation Centre Operational Lead concerning unlocking and cohort management. The email stated as follows:

(Emphasis added).

In his evidence, Mr Worsman has commented on this email. He states that:

The reference to the “CSC murder” was to an incident which took place on 13 April 2025, where a prisoner was found dead in a Close Supervision Centre gymnasium following a catastrophic head injury inflicted by another prisoner using a piece of gym equipment as a weapon.

Governor Jordan chaired the Claimant’s SRB reviews at HMP Woodhill from 1 May 2025, until the Claimant’s transfer to HMP Full Sutton. The SRB reviews were attended by representatives from Prison Psychology, Mental Health, the Offender Management Unit, the Independent Monitoring Board (if available), an Imam, and operational staff.

Governor Jordan has explained that the written reasons given within the SRB paperwork were usually quite brief and contained less detail about the Claimant’s threat and background than was discussed at the regular Dynamic Risk Assessment Meeting (“the DRAM”). The DRAM was a multidisciplinary meeting, attended by a Governor, operational unit staff, an Imam, an official from the Offender Management Unit, psychology, Mental Health, a Prison Prevent Lead and Counter Terrorism Unit analysts, to discuss and assess the prisoner's dynamic risk factors: intelligence and behaviour that can change over time, to inform risk management. The information presented included a weekly threat assessment received from the Frankland Counter-Terrorism Department. This set out the intelligence relating to the prisoner, including whether there was a likelihood that the Claimant might assault staff, or if that likelihood would increase under certain conditions and whether the risk was considered low, high, or otherwise.

Governor Jordan has said that she took into account the information discussed in the DRAM meetings when making the decision at the SRB. She has said that she did not regard it as necessary to repeat the DRAM material in the SRB paperwork as she “understood there was already the steer from Central that following the horrific Frankland attack a cautious approach was necessary to protect staff and other Separation Centre prisoners should therefore be segregated.” Governor Jordan also refers to a conversation that she had with the Separation Centre Operational Lead while he was on site at HMP Woodhill: he had indicated that the risk presented by Separation Centre prisoners was so high at this stage that they should remain in segregation.

In her evidence, Governor Jordan has stated that she empathised with the situation that the Claimant and other Separation Centre prisoners were in, given that they had been in segregation for some time and were generally compliant with the regime at HMP Woodhill. This was part of the reason why she decided to extend cohorting and association, in order to bring a greater sense of normality to the prisoners, and with the hope to cease segregated conditions if the cohorting was successful. She explains that she was “encouraged” not to increase cohorting to larger groups, due to industrial action at another site.

Governor Jordan has stated that although some of the prisoners were compliant and followed instructions, the prisoners (including the Claimant) continued to pose a risk to the good order of the establishment. With this particular cohort of prisoners, given their index offences and the conduct that had warranted their designation to a Separation Centre in the first place, there was in Governor Jordan’s opinion always a risk of a copycat attack, even if the prisoners appeared compliant. Accordingly, Governor Jordan stated that she

Governor Jordan has also stated that whilst she agreed with the decision that the Claimant remain segregated,

She says that she was satisfied that the guidance given from the centre was “correct on this point”.

With respect to the situation in May 2025, Mr Worsman’s evidence was that:

With respect to the possibility of “unwinding” the Rule 45 regime and moving prisoners towards cohorting, the Separation Centre Operational Lead emailed Governor Clayden in the evening of 1 May 2025 to say that:

Governor Clayden responded later that evening:

On 2 May 2025, Mr Worsman emailed officials within the LTHSE directorate requesting information relevant to risk for each of the prisoners in the Separation Centres to support the Secretary of State’s review of their ongoing segregation.

On 6 May 2025, the Separation Centre Operational Lead emailed Governor Clayden and Governor Jordan to enquire whether they had begun any work on how they could unwind from Rule 45 status for their Separation Centres cohorts. It was noted that there was no plan at the moment to action, but having something to action when the time came would be required. Governor Jordan responded the following day to say that she had begun to look at the plan to wind down from Rule 45. Governor Clayden responded to say that he was looking at unwinding the current regime with the view to introduce an ‘association’ cohort, but wanted a steer for the prisoners who had come to the prison following the incident at HMP Frankland.

A further email was sent by the LTHSE Operational Lead on 9 May 2025 to provide some wording for the Rule 45 paperwork, noting that “the seg paperwork must be in your own words and a local decision”. At a meeting of the Secretary of State’s officials on 15 May 2025, Mr Worsman notes that one matter that was raised was that prisons were now asking to move to smaller cohorting, which would remove some prisoners from segregation conditions. On 21 May 2025, the Separation Centre Operational Lead emailed Governor Jordan and Governor Clayden, about unwinding the regimes. He asked whether they had “anything to consider in terms of un-winding the regimes, any defensible decision logs and updated risk assessments.” He went on to say: “[r]eally do need this to get approval to move the regimes.”

On 15 May 2025, Governor Jordan chaired the next 14 day SRB review of the Claimant’s segregation. This was authorised until 29 May 2025. In the paperwork, Governor Jordan stated that “Segregation is still desirable due to ongoing investigations into serious incident at HMP Frankland and review of all separation centres ensuring that a full understanding of individual and collective risks are determined, to mitigate, further risk to staff, if association was to be considered.” The Claimant attended the SRB meeting in person (as he had done on the earlier occasion with Governor Jordan, and continued to do subsequently). Governor Jordan reported that the Claimant made representations, including that he had started to struggle with his limited regime and felt it was impacting his mental health (though he was using prayer as a coping mechanism). Governor Jordan said that she considered this. She also noted that the NHS Healthcare Assessment of the Claimant found him fit for segregated conditions and did not raise any concerns.

The risk assessments that Mr Worsman had asked for on 2 May 2025 were provided on 19 May 2025. This included an assessment of the Claimant. A number of risks were identified:

(Emphasis in the original).

Mr Worsman, who gave evidence about the assessment, also noted in his witness statement that:

On 19 May 2025, Mr Worsman emailed Governor Clayden explaining that the authority to apply Rule 45 remains with the prison, subject to the 42 day review. Mr Worsman stated that:

On 22 May 2025, Governor Jordan chaired a DRAM meeting with respect to the Claimant. The minute of the meeting records a number of matters: (a) that the Claimant had to be challenged that week for misusing his kettle. When asked to show staff, as part of his unlock procedure, he said that it contained soup. His kettle was emptied before he was unlocked; (b) the Claimant spent his time on the exercise yard and ran laps; (c) he had “[l]ittle communication with staff” though he would be polite when staff talked to him. He continued to comply with staff instructions; (d) he continued to interact well with his peers through his door and windows; (e) the Claimant had access to in-cell telephony to speak to family; and (f) there were no immediate intelligence concerns and there were no concerns with the Claimant’s individual risk assessment.

The DRAM minutes concluded with the following:

On 25 May 2025, the Secretary of State (through her official, Mr Wilson) granted leave for the SRB to continue the Claimant’s segregation for an additional 42 days. In advance of that decision, Governor Jordan had made a submission in which she noted the reasons for proposing to continue the Claimant’s segregation. She noted issues with the Claimant’s conduct on transfer to HMP Woodhill. She also noted that whilst the Claimant had been generally compliant with staff’s instructions he had on occasion challenged staff on searching procedures and processes. She stated that “[t]here is an ongoing risk of SC prisoners committing a copycat assault on staff and therefore I propose continued segregation until local risk assessments for association are completed ensuring staff safety”.

On 27 May 2025, the Separation Centre Operational Lead emailed Governor Jordan and Governor Clayden, to say that:

At this point in time, therefore, the Centre appeared to be informing the governors that they could make a decision to remove prisoners from Rule 45 based on their own assessment of the risks involved.

The email from the Separation Centre Operational Lead included the intelligence relating to the risk of each of the Separation Centre prisoners. Governor Jordan has explained in evidence that she read this assessment before making decisions about cohorting, but cannot recall whether this influenced her decision as to who to cohort together.

Later that day, the LTHSE Operational Lead wrote to say that “the decision whether to move to cohorts and from R45 is a local one, the main priority is staff safety and you know the prisoners best so we will support you in your decisions. There is no central steer that they must remain on single unlock.”

In his evidence, Mr Worsman stated that:

On 29 May 2025, Governor Jordan chaired the Claimant’s SRB and DRAM meetings. Segregation continued to be authorised until 5 June 2025. The SRB agreed that the Claimant would benefit from a face-to-face mental health appointment. The DRAM minute recorded that the Claimant had been found with excessive amounts (above 10 individual packs) of prison butter, which he had been accumulating daily. This had been removed, leaving the Claimant with 3 portions only. It was also noted that it had been decided to progress the Separation Centre prisoners onto small group unlocks moving forward, and that the Claimant had been risk assessed to be in a small cohort with one other prisoner (Prisoner B) who may have a positive influence on the Claimant. There were no immediate intelligence concerns nor concerns with the Claimant’s individual risk assessment.

On 31 May 2025, the Claimant started associating with Prisoner B. They were permitted 1 hour 30 minutes out of cell together on a daily basis. On 4 June 2025 at 11:13AM the Separation Centre Operational Lead emailed Governor Jordan. He requested that she did not “cohort to 4 until further notice”. It was explained that there were some current industrial relations issues being pressed at HMP Full Sutton. In his evidence, Mr Worsman explained that around this time, the local branch of the Prison Officers’ Association (“the POA”) were raising issues about not having Protective Body Armour (“PBA”).

On 2 June 2025, the Secretary of State agreed with a recommendation that the use of PBA should be mandated in Separation Centres. A press statement was issued on 3 June 2025 which stated that:

A procurement process was subsequently conducted for the provision of PBA. The PBA ordered for Separation Centre staff was not “off the shelf” but made to measure for the size of the officers concerned. This has resulted in a detailed process needing to be completed before orders could be placed. The total requirement for HMP Full Sutton was identified as 73 sets. As at the date of Governor Clayden’s first witness statement (22 September 2025), 27 sets (alongside 20 spares) had been delivered to HMP Full Sutton.

In his evidence, Mr Worsman refers to a meeting that he attended on 5 June 2025 where he explained that as a result of the POA’s position “we were not able to progress with cohorting”. On the same day, however, the Governor of HMP Woodhill had said that this did not appear to be an issue locally at their prison.

A DRAM meeting for the Claimant was chaired by Governor Jordan on 5 June 2025. It was noted that “Mental Health confirmed that he is not yet under [their] care but will be explored. Psychology also thought an IQ test could be helpful”. It was also noted that “As [the Claimant] continues to build staff relations and is more open in his interactions the panel believe there has been a reduction in risk and is appropriately managed on a two officer unlock and appropriately placed on his cohort.”

The SRB meeting was held on the same day. The Claimant’s segregation was continued until 19 June 2025 to mitigate any further risk to Separation Centre staff and to ensure that any further opening of the regime was done in a safe and secure manner. At the meeting, the Claimant stated that he was “feeling down and depressed”; he also described “feeling paranoid about staff”. It was noted that the Claimant declined attendance at Mental Health Wellbeing sessions.

On 10 June 2025, a meeting was held by the Separation Centre Management Committee to carry out a quarterly review the Claimant’s continued detention at a Separation Centre. It was concluded that the Claimant should continue to be detained there. The documentation for the quarterly review contained observations from Governor Jordan (dated 12 May 2025). These included:

The conclusion of the report included the following:

The next DRAM meeting was held on 12 June 2025. It concluded that:

On 17 June 2025, the Separation Centre Operational Lead emailed Governor Clayden and Governor Jordan with respect to the issue of cohorting. They were asked to start planning and developing any risk assessments to mitigate the risk of having more than one prisoner out at any one time. It was stated that at “present the direction I have been given is that the maximum number of prisoners out together is two, and there needs to be RA's and SSOW's for how two prisoners out together is managed safely. (I understand this still evokes R45)”. Mr Worsman said in evidence that the “direction” came from him and was “a ‘central steer’ to the establishments on how to conduct cohorting in a way that could be safely managed and assessed”.

On 19 June 2025, Governor Jordan chaired a further 14-day SRB review of the Claimant’s segregation. The SRB authorised the Claimant’s continued segregation until 3 July 2025, to mitigate any further risk to Separation Centre staff and to ensure that any further opening of the regime was done in a safe and secure manner. Governor Jordan has stated in evidence that she noted that the Claimant was on the waiting list to be seen by the Mental Health Team, however there was no imminent risk of self-harm or suicide and no history of self-harm. The Healthcare Assessment again found the Claimant fit for segregated conditions and did not raise any concerns.

The Claimant had declined to attend the SRB. Governor Jordan has said in evidence that she attended the unit to discuss his reasons for not attending. They met in the exercise yard and the Claimant began to tell her the reasons why: he stated he was not happy with the OTO30 form she had submitted to the Secretary of State seeking leave to continue his segregation. Governor Jordan has said that the Claimant’s explanation halted when Prisoner B nudged him, and she regarded this as evidence that the Claimant could be influenced by his peers and that in turn increased his risk.

The DRAM was also held on 19 June 2025. The conclusion of the DRAM was recorded as:

The next DRAM took place on 23 June 2025. This was chaired by a colleague of Governor Jordan. A number of matters were noted in the minutes: (a) the Claimant, alongside 3 other prisoners, had declined to attend his SRB in protest to what was written in their OTO30 forms, specifically that Separation Centre prisoners still demonstrate a risk to staff and the fears of a copycat attack. The Claimant also raised this with the unit Governor; (b) the Claimant had been “irate” at the news the butter he had ordered was not for issue and he was to be refunded; (c) at the weekend when the regime was changed at short notice, an officer tried to talk to him to explain the situation. The Claimant politely declined and continued in his exercise. This was unusual for the Claimant who would usually talk through his grievances; (d) the Claimant had been bothered by news of the USA bombing Iran; (e) on a separate occasion the Claimant communicated with a prisoner on the CSC and discussed different prisons and that he wanted to buy land in Somalia. This was challenged by staff; (f) the Claimant had been more withdrawn which was seen as an indicator of an increase in risk. Nevertheless, he remained polite and compliant with staff; (g) there were no immediate intelligence or risk assessment concerns; (h) it was recorded the Claimant had been heard on the exercise yard speaking about the USA being at war, the Geneva Convention, and Islamic State being at war. He also complained about MI5 and that they associated him with his family as they have all fought for the cause. He was also heard speaking to another prisoner whilst on unlock outside his door about the bombing of Iran. The other prisoner did not respond. The Claimant again sought to speak to Prisoner B about Iran whilst they were exercising, and was asked to have a quiet conversation after which Iran was not mentioned again.

The conclusion of the DRAM was that:

On 25 June 2025, Governor Clayden emailed Mr Worsman, setting out his intention to introduce a limited “unwind” at HMP Full Sutton later that week. His proposal was that two prisoners would initially be placed together, while the others would remain on single unlock while the situation was assessed over the following week. Later that day, Mr Worsman wrote to Governor Clayden instructing him “Please do not this at present”. Mr Worsman explained that:

Mr Worsman explained in evidence that this communication was “the first ‘central steer’ to an establishment that Separation Centre prisoners should be subject to Rule 45 pending the arrival of PBA. In giving this steer, I was reflecting the serious concerns about risk to staff that had been discussed”. Mr Worsman said that Governor Clayden “chose to accept my advice”. Governor Clayden stated in an email “Just to clarify – i'm holding off on unwinding until we sort PBA?”. From this point in time, therefore, it is clear that the earlier indication that decisions could be taken locally (see paragraph 66 above) had been reversed.

On 30 June 2025, Governor Jordan chaired the next DRAM meeting at HMP Woodhill. The minutes record that the Claimant had been engaging with “prison psychology” and was seen by the mental health team for a wellbeing session. The Claimant had self-reported that his mental health was deteriorating and Rule 45 conditions were impacting him negatively, though during a welfare check the Claimant had stated he was fine. The conclusion of the DRAM included that the Claimant was “struggling with his mental health and has engaged well with a mental health wellbeing session. He has shown a willingness to engage with psychology. The panel agreed that this period has been neither an increase or decrease in risk for [the Claimant].”

On 1 July 2025, the Claimant was placed on an ACCT regime following a complaint he had submitted which raised concerns about his mental state. The complaint had been addressed to the resident Forensic Psychologist at HMP Woodhill. In his complaint, the Claimant stated he had serious mental depression and suffered from trauma and PTSD. He referred to feeling “confined and all prospects of a better future destroyed by SCMC.” He complained that placing him on ACCT would affect his mental health even more as he would be checked on every thirty minutes. The Forensic Psychologist met with the Claimant to discuss his complaint. She noted that she was quite concerned about the thoughts and feelings he had shared. It was important, however, for an ACCT to be opened to assist the prison in determining the amount of support that the Claimant needed.

The ACCT regime involved an immediate action plan to support the Claimant, which provided for hourly conversations and observations of the Claimant and irregular checks to be conducted by staff. A care plan was also put in place which set out a number of support actions, including support sessions with psychology. In addition, a daily review summary was completed by the Duty Governor which noted any changes to the Claimant’s mood, behaviour, level of risk and any identified issues.

The Claimant’s case was first reviewed at an ACCT assessment on 2 July 2025 and thereafter on a weekly basis. The ACCT records show that for the most part the Clamant presented as settled, engaged well with staff and no concerns or issues were raised by staff. The ACCT records also show that while the Claimant had struggled with his emotions at times and had on occasion been reluctant to open up with unit staff, he did not express any thoughts of suicide or any intention of self-harm due to his faith which was a protective factor for him. The Claimant appeared to have a good rapport with the mental health team and psychology staff and preferred to discuss his feelings and mental health with them.

On 3 July 2025, Governor Jordan chaired a further 14-day SRB review of the Claimant’s segregation. The SRB authorised the Claimant’s continued segregation until 17 July 2025 to mitigate any further risk to staff and to ensure that any further opening of the regime was done in a safe and secure manner. The Claimant again declined to attend the SRB. However, he provided handwritten representations, which Governor Jordan has said were considered. In those representations, the Claimant stated that his non-attendance at the SRB was not a protest, but “a loss of hope in the entire process.” He noted an ACCT had been opened for him “due to mental health and for reasons [he had] clearly voiced to” the psychologist. The Claimant further stated in his written representations that he had “no aspirations or any hope of a better future mainly because of [his] situation on the SCMC and Rule 45 and being brutally assaulted in Frankland.”

During the SRB meeting, Governor Jordan noted that the Claimant displayed a low mood, and that as an ACCT had been opened he was subject to hourly observations by staff. Governor Jordan also noted that there had not been any acts of self-harm and the Claimant would be offered low level intervention to support him with mood regulation for a period of eight weeks and that he would be screened for neurodiverse needs. Governor Jordan also considered it relevant that the Claimant was engaging well with the Mental Health team. The NHS Healthcare Assessment again found the Claimant fit for segregated conditions. The NHS health professional noted in the comments “no identified clinical concerns to impede segregation at this time.”

On 4 July 2025, the Secretary of State, through her official Mr Wilson, granted leave for the SRB to continue the Claimant’s segregation for a period of 21 days. The shorter period appears to have been granted to ensure that support was being provided for the Claimant’s mental health. This was in response to a submission that had been made by Governor Jordan which included reference to the Claimant’s expression of concerns about his mental health.

Mr Wilson concluded that the risk to staff following the attack at HMP Frankland was significant, and that to increase the number of prisoners unlocked together before PBA was available to all staff working in Separation Centres (in accordance with the Secretary of State’s announcement) would increase the level of risk to staff. Mr Wilson noted that the use of small cohort groups limits the threats to staff at HMP Woodhill, whilst allowing the Claimant to associate with a peer and access the available regime.

On 7 July 2025, Governor Jordan chaired another DRAM for the Claimant. The minute of the meeting noted that the Claimant had at times appeared in good spirits, however he had expressed feelings of feeling hopeless and being stuck in a rut to the prison psychologist and, as a result, had been placed on an ACCT. It was noted that Governor Jordan had spoken to the Claimant and that he had stated he was depressed as he was still on Rule 45 and was not progressing. The Claimant was not reported to be suicidal or to have any thoughts to self-harm. He was just depressed. It was also noted that the Claimant had been heard saying that he had “revenge in my heart” for officers at HMP Frankland and that if he went back there “he’s going for them”. The DRAM concluded that:

A submission was made by officials to the Secretary of State on 11 July 2025. This described the operational response following the incident of 12 April 2025, as well as the purported justification for the treatment of prisoners within the Separation Centres. It was recommended that segregation should be maintained until PBA was in place. The submission included the following:

The next DRAM was chaired by Governor Jordan on 14 July 2025. The minutes record that the Claimant was on an ACCT and the Mental Health Team had allocated him some intervention work. It was also noted that both Prisoner B and the Claimant talked about Islam being the only true religion, and that everyone that does not follow their customs will burn in hell. It was also noted that the Claimant’s regime had been extended to include wing library and gym sessions. The conclusion of the DRAM was that:

On 17 July 2025, the next SRB review meeting was held, chaired by Governor Jordan. The Claimant attended this review. He refused to comment on his mental wellbeing and stated that he did not want to be on an ACCT. Governor Jordan noted that, during the review, the Claimant presented as agitated and fidgety, and kept looking around him. She perceived this as the Claimant displaying pre-contact cues, but psychology perceived it as the Claimant wanting to say something but did not feel comfortable to. The NHS healthcare provider confirmed that the Claimant remained suitable for segregated conditions, noting in the form “There are nil clinical concerns identified at present to impede [the Claimant] from being segregated at this time.” The Claimant’s segregation was continued.

On 21 July 2025, a DRAM was chaired by Governor Jordan. The minutes record that the Claimant had attended the SRB, that he would not talk about anything which was very odd as he was usually very talkative. The conclusion of the DRAM was that “The risk to staff remains at an elevated stage and [the Claimant]’s moods fluctuations are unpredictable”.

On 23 July 2025, the Separation Centre at HMP Woodhill was closed down, and the Claimant was relocated to the Separation Centre at HMP Full Sutton. Mr Worsman has explained that this was as a result of resourcing issues and the lack of an established and trained Separation Centre group. The decision to close HMP Woodhill was approved by the Secretary of State herself.

The regime that had been applied to the Claimant in the Separation Centre at HMP Woodhill until his relocation on 23 July 2025 was described in Governor Jordan’s evidence. She stated that the Claimant was issued with basic items including essential toiletries, clothing, additional bedding, a prayer mat, prayer timetable, and alarm clock. The Claimant could also make telephone calls, and regularly spoke to his father and step-sisters. The Claimant’s cell (apart from the high control cell where he was placed at the outset) had an observation panel, and there were also windows, which meant that it was possible for the Claimant to see other prisoners, and converse with one another, without necessarily leaving their cells. The Claimant frequently spoke to other prisoners from within his cell and through the doors of other prisoners when he was on unlock.

Governor Jordan explained that, on 25 April 2025, the Claimant was placed on a structured regime. He had around 1 hour 10 minutes time out of cell each day, during which he could shower, exercise and do laundry. On 1 May 2025, the Claimant was placed on Limb 3 protocol. He was only required to prove his kettle was empty, cutlery accounted for, and he would then be subject to a level B rub down search and waved through a metal detector on exit from his cell. On the same day, the Claimant was placed on an enhanced regime by introducing 30 minutes of library time per day, if he wished. From 15 May 2025, the Claimant had an in-cell television. He was also offered distraction material (sudoku, crosswords and colouring materials) but declined these. The Claimant also had access to various personal possessions, including books provided to him by the Imam.

Following the DRAM on 29 May 2025, the Claimant was placed on “2 x Officer unlock”, which meant that there only needed to be two officers present for him to be unlocked. He was also able to access weekly gym sessions and key worker sessions. On 31 May 2025, the Claimant started his cohort regime with Prisoner B and had open access to the exercise yard daily.

Throughout his time at the Separation Centre, the Claimant received daily visits from the chaplaincy team. The chaplaincy team was made up of staff from a range of faith traditions. The Claimant’s preference was to speak only on a general basis (avoiding long or personal conversations) with Imams. The Claimant was also seen by a range of other unit staff and governors. From the first week of June 2025 the Claimant was also allocated weekly sessions with the Mental Health Team and Psychology. On most days, the Claimant was also seen by a GP or member of the NHS healthcare team on their daily rounds.

The Claimant’s medical records report that he was seen by a nurse on 29 April 2025. It was noted that there was “No sign of psychosis or any kind of hallucinatory behaviours noted. Did not express any suicidal ideation or thoughts of self-harm.” It was also noted that the Claimant was being “Seen by member of prison inreach mental health team”.

In his witness statement, the Claimant has described his conditions at HMP Woodhill. He says that he was kept in his cell for 23 ½ hours per day. When he was unlocked, he would go to the exercise yard alone and then take a shower. The Claimant says that his cell has a normal bed and a television.

The Claimant says that he did not get fresh clothes until the middle of May.

The Claimant also says that:

The Claimant has described the period when he was allowed to associate with Prisoner B. He says that they would be taken onto the yard for around 40 minutes:

The Claimant has stated that:

The Claimant was transferred to the Separation Centre at HMP Full Sutton on 23 July 2025. An SRB review was carried out on that day, and it was determined that the Claimant’s continued segregation under Rule 45 remained desirable for the good order of the establishment. In making this decision, the reviewing team chaired by Governor Clayden, noted a comment that had been made by HMP Woodhill which indicated that the Claimant was not happy to return to HMP Full Sutton and may “gain revenge” for a restraint that occurred on transfer from HMP Frankland.

A further review was held on 24 July 2025. The SRB noted explicit threats made by the Claimant against HMP Frankland and HMP Full Sutton staff following his transfer, alongside the ongoing risk to Separation Centre staff following the attack at HMP Frankland, and determined that the Claimant’s segregation should continue for the good order of the establishment. Prison healthcare also determined that whilst the Claimant was on an ACCT he was fit for segregated conditions.

An ACCT review for the Claimant had been booked for the day he arrived. Governor Clayden has stated that the Claimant refused to attend the review and to engage with the health worker. The review was carried out the next day, following which observations of the Claimant were carried out twice per hour. A further ACCT review was carried out on 31 July 2025.

The Claimant stated that he did not need to be on an ACCT and was “massively against the process”, feeling that constant observations were not helping his mental health and were putting him more on edge due to his mistrust of staff. Mental Health representatives were present during the case review and stayed afterwards to carry out a mental health assessment. This resulted in the Claimant being placed under the caseload of the Mental Health team and he was allocated a Mental Health Nurse.

On 25 July 2025, the Secretary of State (through her official) carried out a review. It was recognised that the Claimant was no longer associating with another prisoner due to “the smaller unit size . . . and different circumstances in place” at HMP Full Sutton. Leave was granted for 28 days:

On 27 July 2025, the LTHSE Security and Intelligence Team circulated updated intelligence on the Separation Centre prisoners. The intelligence recorded against the Claimant was as follows:

On 1 August 2025, according to the Claimant’s medical records that have been referred to in the reports produced by experts for these proceedings, a mental health assessment took place. It is said that:

On 7 August 2025, there was a further SRB review. Governor Clayden has stated that whilst the Claimant’s submissions challenging the segregation regime were considered, it was determined that due to the ongoing risk to Separation Centre staff following both the attack at HMP Frankland and several other attacks on staff in the LTHSE, and that protective body armour had been mandated but not provided to separation staff, the Claimant’s segregation should continue for the good order of the establishment.

A further ACCT review was carried out on 7 August 2025. Governor Clayden has stated that during the review the Claimant presented as agitated and was reluctant to engage. He did not express any desire to hurt himself, but the healthcare worker at the review suggested that the Claimant may benefit from counselling to overcome his issues with trauma. The Claimant appeared to be reluctant to submit a referral for this. He was also reassured that he had been accepted on to the mental health team caseload, and that they would work closely with him.

On 14 August 2025, the Claimant had an Offender Management in Custody session, where he expressed frustrations with the lack of mental health support he had received. On 21 August 2025, a further review was carried out by the SRB. Unlike the two previous occasions, the Claimant did not attend the review meeting, but provided representations. The Claimant expressed his concern about hearing voices commanding him to hurt himself. The SRB concluded that, as a result of the ongoing risk to Separation Centre staff, until such time as the mandated equipment was available to staff, the Claimant’s continued segregation remained desirable for the good order of the establishment.

On 21 August 2025, the Claimant sent a letter to the Unit Custody Manager threatening to self-harm with his knife, fork, spoon or kettle. These objects were removed from the Claimant and observations were increased. The mental health, healthcare and chaplaincy teams all visited the Claimant (with the mental health team arranging future meetings and screenings for the coming weeks), and he was placed on twice hourly observations.

On 22 August 2025, a psychologist working at HMP Full Sutton introduced herself to the Claimant as his new Separation Centre allocated psychologist. She explained that she would be working with the Claimant going forward if he chose to engage. In her notes, the psychologist wrote that “From my perspective, Mr Abu appeared to be processing information slowly (delayed responding). Consequently, and so not to overload him, I reassured him that the focus of today was just to hear names and see faces in order to facilitate an initial introduction.”

The Claimant’s cutlery was returned to him on 23 August 2025. This was an error as staff had been advised not to return it to him. On 24 August 2025, part of the blade of the Claimant’s plastic knife was found missing. He asserted that he had swallowed it. Searches were completed and the Claimant’s body scanned and found to be clear. In the DRAM report dated 1 September 2025, it is noted that on 26 August 2025 an Incident Report recorded that the Claimant was “apologetic about his claims of swallowing a knife, noting he only swallowed it so mental health would go and see him the same day. He then spoke of swallowing it in order to cut his intestines.” A report from a prison officer on 26 August 2025, stated that:

On 26 August 2025, the Claimant was seen by a General Practitioner who was carrying out her ward round. The medical notes record that “Reports no acute physical or mental health issues/concerns . . . physically he feels well with no health concerns. . . Fit to remain on Separation unit”. On 27 August 2025, he was seen by a nurse and the medical notes record that: “Looks well clinically . . . No signs of low mood or anxiety . . . Fit to remain in segregation”.

On 27 August 2025, the Claimant was seen by Dr Salman Afzal, a Consultant Forensic Psychiatrist employed by the Humber NHS Foundation. Dr Afzal works alongside the mental health team at HMP Full Sutton. The medical notes produced by Dr Afzal state the following:

Governor Clayden has stated that, on 29 August 2025, the Claimant told his custodial manager that he was under Dr Afzal and the Mental Health team and he was discussing medication and that was helping him. He also stated to the custodial manager, upon being asked whether he felt like self-harming or taking his own life, that he had a bad week, and that he had had some thoughts to kill himself recently but that he had not acted on these thoughts, and that he would speak to staff if needed. On 31 August 2025, and 1 September 2025, three per hour observations continued, and the ACCT records state that the Claimant seemed to be in good spirits and was speaking to staff.

On 22 August 2025, the Claimant’s segregation for a further period of 28 days was authorised by the Secretary of State (through officials). The same language was used for the decision as in the review of 25 July 2025.

On 4 September 2025, a further review was carried out by the SRB. The Claimant attended this review and engaged with members present. Governor Clayden has said that the Claimant presented with several behaviours that were noted by members of the SRB team: ranging from a perception of being low in mood to sharing / cracking a smile during some areas of discussion. An ACCT review was also carried out. This involved trying to work through with the Claimant the points raised in a report from Dr Cohen (described further below), which had highlighted Dr Cohen’s grave concerns for the Claimant’s wellbeing. This was regarded as contrasting with what the team and the visiting Psychiatrist (Dr Azfal) had observed. Governor Clayden has said that the Claimant did not wish to go through all the points noted in Dr Cohen’s report, and requested to leave the review and return to his cell. The SRB review concluded that the current management of the Claimant remained appropriate.

The health screen assessment that was completed on 4 September 2025 did not answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’ on the algorithm question – “Has this prisoner self-harmed in this period of custody”. The answer ‘yes’ was marked in answer to the question ‘Is this prisoner on an open ACCT plan?’ and whether the prisoner was being prescribed medication. The answer ‘no’ was marked in response to the question “Do you think the prisoner’s mental health will deteriorate significantly if segregated?”.

On 8 September 2025, the Claimant had a psychology session with his allocated psychologist. She reported that the Claimant engaged well, asked for a session the following week and identified actions for the next week. The psychologist recorded that she had no concerns “re self harm raised in appointment”. On 9 September 2025, the Claimant had a session with the mental health team. He reportedly engaged well, and no concerns, or thoughts to harm himself or others were observed or reported.

On 18 September 2025, the Claimant was seen by healthcare, chaplaincy, and had a session with the psychologist. The psychologist described him as being appropriate and engaged throughout the session, and they discussed future work plans. An ACCT review for the Claimant was held on this day, and due to ongoing settled behaviour, he was reduced to 1 x hourly observations. The ACCT notes record that the Claimant indicated that he was happy with the outcome of the review.

A further review was carried out by the SRB on 18 September 2025. The Claimant attended the review meeting, and also provided written submissions. Consideration was given to the Claimant’s current state of mental health, considering his ACCT records, as well as the recent reports provided by Dr Cohen, Dr Azfal, and Dr Veisi (discussed further below). The SRB concluded that the current management of the Claimant’s mental health remained appropriate and that, as a result of the ongoing risk to separation centre prison staff, until such time as this mandated equipment was available to staff, the Claimant’s continued segregation as a prisoner currently should continue.

On 19 September 2025, the Secretary of State (through officials) authorised the Claimant’s segregation for a further period of 28 days. The previous day’s SRB was taken into account. With respect to the Claimant’s mental health, it was noted that:

The decision to authorise the continuation of segregation was explained as follows:

On 2 October 2025, a further SRB review took place. Governor Clayden noted changes in the Claimant’s behaviour and attitude since the last review: (a) the Claimant took part in the regime when he felt like it. Sometimes he wants to go on the exercise yard, other times he declines; (b) he had been talkative with some staff, including having long discussions whilst he exercises or uses the CV room. He spoke fluidly and coherently; (c) his compliance with unlock protocols had improved; (d) the Claimant appeared to “significantly adjust his body language and demeanour depending who he is engaging with”, ranging from jovial light-heartedness, to poor eye contact and ‘rocking back and forth’ which was said to be more prevalent when the Claimant was in a professional setting.

The reports of Dr Cohen, Dr Latham and Dr Veisi had been considered at the Claimant’s ACCT review, alongside clinical input from the local Mental Health Team and Dr Afzal (the treating Psychiatrist). The conclusion reached was that the Claimant’s current management remained appropriate. With respect to Dr Veisi’s suggestion concerning placing the Claimant on a Healthcare wing for the purposes of closer observation, the ACCT concluded that should further support be needed in the future, equivalent provision to that in a healthcare wing could be replicated in a Separation Centre setting. In conclusion, it was decided that it remained desirable for the Claimant to be segregated pending the availability of mandated PBA.

In his second witness statement (dated 10 October 2025) Governor Clayden noted that the observations he had made in the SRB meeting about the Claimant’s body language, demeanour and interactions were consistent with the possibility of him “malingering”. He kept an open mind as to whether this was a possibility in the Claimant’s case, but said that he took all concerns regarding the Claimant’s wellbeing very seriously. He did not consider, however, that “the risk to the Claimant’s mental health was at a level that was acute and/or cannot be appropriately managed within the Separation Centre, such as to outweigh the good order and discipline based (risk) rationale to continue to segregate”.

Governor Clayden also took issue with a comment made by Dr Cohen that the health screens were “superficial tick box forms”. He considered that the mental health nurses conducting the Claimant’s health screens “diligently take into account the Claimant’s real-time presentation”.

The regime at the Separation Centre at HMP Full Sutton that the Claimant experienced was described by Governor Clayden. He stated that the prison as a whole had been required to implement a reduced regime due to staff shortages. Within the Separation Centre the practice was to unlock two prisoners at a time. However, the prisoners were not permitted to associate directly with one another for safety reasons. In practice, this meant that one prisoner was escorted to an outside exercise yard, where he could take fresh air and physical activity, whilst another remained within the unit, where he could make use of the showers, laundry equipment and undertake general domestic tasks. During these periods, prisoners also had opportunities to communicate with other prisoners through the cell doors.

Governor Clayden also stated that the Claimant had other opportunities for interaction and contact. The Claimant would interact with a governor and a healthcare professional on a daily basis, and with chaplaincy nearly every day, and had other interaction with staff or external professionals in connection with statutory processes, such as reviews under Rule 45 or assessments under the ACCT procedures. When confined to his cell, the Claimant was able to converse with other prisoners who are unlocked at the time and able to approach his door. The Claimant’s cell has an observation panel, and there are also windows, meaning it is possible for him to see other prisoners, and converse with other prisoners, without leaving his cell. The Claimant has access to an in-cell phone where he can make both social and legal calls. Governor Clayden confirms that generally the Claimant makes at least one call a day from this phone. The Claimant also has a television and DVD player in his cell, and can access both the library and exercise equipment in the yards when he is out of his cell. Confidential discussions with the Claimant have generally taken place in his cell, which is his preference, but on occasion in the interview room. Governor Clayden has stated that:

The Claimant has described the conditions at HMP Full Sutton. He says that he is always accompanied by officers:

With respect to his mental health, the Claimant has said that:

As at the date of the hearing, the Claimant remained in the Separation Centre at HMP Full Sutton, and he continues to be held there. From 16 October 2025, the Claimant has been permitted to associate with one other prisoner for one hour per day. Mr Clayden has explained that staff working with the Claimant were wearing the newly available PBA.

Mr Clayden has commented that “Supervising staff noted that the Claimant was ‘jovial’ when interacting with his peer as they continued to walk ‘laps’ around the exercise yard. The Claimant’s presentation towards staff was not as cheerful, however no significant concerns were raised”. Governor Clayden has explained that the Rule 45 process will continue “as a precautionary measure pending the Court’s judgment in this case”.

According to the notes of the SRB meeting that took place on 16 October 2025, the Claimant had attended a meeting with his allocated psychologist, during which he gave his consent for a cognitive functioning assessment, and had attended and engaged with his ACCT meeting. The Claimant continued to be visited on a daily basis by the Duty Governor, Healthcare and a member of the Chaplaincy team.

On 17 October 2025, the Secretary of State (through an official) approved the Claimant’s segregation for a further period of 28 days for the good order of the prison from the risk of violence to staff, stating that “This period gives oversight and monitoring while Mr Abu . . . associates with another prisoner”. Reference was made by the official to the observation made about the Claimant following his latest SRB that:

In his witness statements for this claim, the Claimant has described his mental health. In his first witness statement, he has stated that he has struggled with mental health issues for many years. The Claimant refers to an earlier period of segregation at HMP Full Sutton from December 2022 to March 2023, which followed a fight that he had had with another prisoner, for which he received an adjudication. He explains that:

The Claimant says that his struggles with mental health worsened when he entered the Separation Centre system. He says that he discussed the issues he was experiencing of “paranoia and flashbacks” with the psychologist and mental health nurses. Since his segregation, the Claimant says that his

The Court has been provided with reports from three experts, and some comments from Dr Afzal (in addition to what he set out in the medical notes described above). On 28 August 2025, the Claimant had a 2-hour video-link assessment with Dr Juliet Cohen. Dr Cohen is a Forensic Physician, specialising in examination of victims of torture, domestic violence and trafficking for servitude and prostitution. In a letter written later that day, Dr Cohen stated that in her opinion, the Claimant

Dr Cohen described how the Claimant had attempted suicide on 23 August 2025 by swallowing 2 drawing pins and a broken-off piece of plastic cutlery. He described his intention as wanting to end his life. Dr Cohen described the Claimant’s presentation as:

Dr Cohen stated that:

On 1 September 2025, the Claimant gave consent to share his medical records with the Secretary of State.

Dr Afzal was provided with a copy of Dr Cohen’s letter and, in a meeting with Governor Clayden and some lawyers from the Government Legal Department on 3 September 2025, he was reported to have said that he was unable to comment on it as he was not in a position to give an opinion on other people’s reports. He did say, however, that in his opinion the Claimant did not require transfer to hospital and did not require any immediate changes in his position on the Separation Centre. Dr Afzal was reported to have considered that “there seems to be a decline in the Claimant’s mental wellbeing from what he has seen and (as compared to) the Claimant’s psychiatric and overall health records”. Dr Afzal was also reported to have stated that “there were appropriate measures to deal with the decline of a prisoner within prison, and these included access to the Mental Health in-reach team, the ACCT process, access to a psychiatrist, and interventions beyond that, depending on the assessment of those individuals”.

Dr Cohen wrote a further letter on 4 September 2025, following a second 2-hour video-link assessment with the Claimant. She expressed her opinion that the Claimant’s risk of suicide was unchanged. “He continues to express thoughts of suicide and despair, profound hopelessness and that he sees his end as coming closer and closer, and that ending his life would be a relief from his suffering.” Dr Cohen noted that in his presentation, the Claimant had more “stimming” movements than previously, and his auditory and visual hallucinations had become more intense. Dr Cohen did not consider that the Claimant was fabricating his mental health conditions.

The Secretary of State instructed an expert, Dr Mehdi Veisi, Consultant Forensic Psychiatrist to assess the Claimant, which he did on 10 September 2025, reporting on 16 September 2025. Dr Veisi had previously held the position of Clinical Director and then Executive Medical Director of Barnet, Enfield and Haringey Mental Health NHS Trust which caters for inpatient forensic care and mental health input into 6 prisons, the Fixated Threat Assessment Centre, and other services. Dr Veisi reviewed the Claimant’s medical records, including the records from his time in the Separation Centre and on segregation there. Dr Veisi also reviewed the two letters that had been written by Dr Cohen.

Dr Veisi expressed his opinion as follows:

Dr Cohen produced a report based on her two assessments of the Claimant. She explained that she maintained her view that unless the environment changes, the Claimant is “an imminent, and high, risk of suicide”. Dr Cohen also sought to address the opinions expressed by Dr Afzal, and explore what she described as “inconsistent assessments which have been documented by nursing staff in [the Claimant’s] health screens.” In her opinion, the Claimant has “PTSD and severe depression with panic attacks and psychotic symptoms. He has psychotic symptoms of auditory and visual hallucinations and intense feelings of paranoia” (emphasis in the original). Dr Cohen points out her concern at the ability of the prison authorities to treat the Claimant: there is a pattern where a need for a review or further treatment is recognised, but this is not followed up. Dr Cohen also expressed her concern that the threshold for identifying a person as unfit for segregation is “extraordinarily high”:

Dr Cohen’s interpretation of the psychological evidence was that the Claimant has “re-experiencing symptoms, avoidance and numbing symptoms and hyper-arousal symptoms”. The Claimant also meets the diagnostic criteria for post traumatic stress disorder, and has symptoms of depression. He also has symptoms of hearing voices and of visual hallucinations. He describes the fear that he is being possessed by a “djinn”. Dr Cohen states that:

Dr Cohen also considered that the Claimant displayed indicators of neuro-divergence, and stated that the delay in making this assessment was a “serious concern”. The Claimant has “predisposing vulnerability factors to developing psychosis, including experiences of trauma and severe abuse in childhood, probable neuro-divergence, abuse of drugs and alcohol, and PTSD”. Dr Cohen did not consider that the Claimant had a severe psychotic illness such as schizophrenia, but she was concerned that his mental state was “vulnerable to further deterioration”. Dr Cohen considered that there was “no indication of malingering”.

In Dr Cohen’s opinion, it was “highly likely that the prison is unable to protect him from further harm”. This was due to a number of factors, including:

The impact of continued segregation was described by Dr Cohen as follows:

In a letter dated 24 September 2025, Dr Cohen took issue with a number of matters set out in Dr Veisi’s report.

A Consultant Forensic Psychiatrist, Dr Richard Latham, was instructed by the Claimant. Dr Latham’s clinical experience included many years of working in prison mental health teams. He issued a report on 24 September 2025, following 2 video-link assessments for a total of 3 hours. Dr Latham provided, in summary form, a chronology of the Claimant’s mental health from the records that he had seen:

Dr Latham considered that the Claimant’s mental health problems should

Dr Latham was of the view that the Claimant’s PTSD was not based on one traumatic event. It was more likely that recent trauma had led to a situation of re-traumatising. “The onset of PTSD in his case, appears to have been triggered by new traumatic experiences, as a victim of violence in the prison system and his increasing segregation”. The Claimant’s PTSD was “best described as complex”. The Claimant’s depression was placed by Dr Latham in the “moderate or severe category”. The Claimant’s “anxiety and panic” are associated with “depression, PTSD and his circumstances rather than as a separate mental disorder.”

Dr Latham expressed the view that the voices heard by the Claimant should be regarded as a “psychotic symptom”. They were “more likely associated with trauma, depression and isolation but cannot be directly or reliably attached to one of these three causes (they all contribute).” As for the Claimant’s paranoia and fear, this was

Dr Latham considered that it was unlikely that the Claimant was “feigning symptoms. He has a documented history of depression and anxiety, he has referred to childhood trauma and being a victim of violence before recent events.” According to Dr Latham:

Dr Latham considered that there was “clear evidence of higher suicide risk now. . . The impact of his current circumstances also, increases the suicide risk. That is, the isolation, lack of personal support and high levels of distress and fear.” Dr Latham regarded the current treatment of the Claimant as being “quite limited”. No recognised psychological therapy was being offered, and Dr Latham suspected that there was “no realistic prospect of his mental health improving with therapy whilst he is subject to the current regime. Medical treatment with medication might offer some relief of some symptoms but structured psychological therapy would still be necessary”.

Dr Latham did not consider that the Claimant needed to be subject to compulsory treatment under the Mental Health Act. The current problem was that “necessary treatment in an environment where treatment is likely to be effective has not been provided”. According to Dr Latham,

Dr Latham addressed Dr Afzal’s opinion as follows:

Dr Latham addressed Dr Veisi’s opinion as follows:

Dr Veisi produced an addendum report on 1 October 2025. The instructions to Dr Veisi asked him to engage with the reports from Dr Latham and Dr Cohen. To inform his report, Dr Veisi assessed the Claimant by video link on 26 September 2025. Dr Veisi’s opinion and recommendations were as follows:

Dr Latham produced an Addendum Report on 3 October 2025, to clarify his opinions after receiving the addendum report from Dr Veisi, and on learning that the Claimant would remain in conditions of segregation. Dr Latham maintained his view that there was an increasing risk of suicide by the Claimant. Dealing with the “deliberate gesture” performed in front of Dr Veisi, Dr Latham stated that it was “a false dichotomy to suggest his self-harm is either communication/protest or an indicator of increase suicide risk. It is both, because any self-injury is known to be associated with an increased likelihood of suicide”.

With respect to the Claimant’s hallucinations, Dr Latham stated that he agreed that these were

Dr Latham stated that he had not diagnosed autism.

Dr Latham stated that he agreed with Dr Veisi that:

Dr Latham observed that the decision not to move the Claimant was “apparently a decision based on risk, which he might pose to other people”. He noted that all experts recommended that he should be moved for reasons such as “increased distress, continuing harm, prevention of adequate assessment and treatment, and increased suicide risk”. Dr Latham stated that the decision to leave the Claimant in current conditions

Dr Cohen also responded to the Addendum report of Dr Veisi in a letter dated 3 October 2025. She disagreed with the conclusion about the Claimant’s “self-harm behaviours being episodic and used as a means of communication and protest and not consistent with an irresistible drive towards suicide”. Dr Cohen disagreed with Dr Veisi’s conclusion about the voices being “typical of trauma-related intrusive experiences. The voice he hears does not reference his past trauma experiences or involve re-experiencing those past traumas.”

Dr Cohen provided a response to Governor Clayden’s second witness statement by letter dated 13 October 2025. Dr Cohen addressed the suggestion that the Claimant may be fabricating his presentation by saying that she did not find any likelihood of this. With respect to the completion of the health screens, Dr Cohen stated that these were not “completed in privacy and do not comprise an active assessment of mental health”, the notes were “generally completed at the person’s cell door”, and there was an “absence of any parallel contemporaneous clinical information in the medical records, for example with details of a mental health assessment conducted at the same time as the segregation health screen”.

Dr Latham has provided two further addendum reports. In a report dated 14 October 2025, he stated that the Claimant’s “mental health and associated risk has not been adequately recognised or addressed”, and reiterated his opinion that segregation was “making his mental health worse, whatever the institutional needs”.

The Secretary of State put in evidence an unpublished report carried out by Mr Jonathan Hall KC, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, delivered on 29 August 2025. The terms of reference for Mr Hall KC’s review were published on 22 May 2025:

The Claimant had a number of criticisms of the use of this report in evidence. First, it was said that Mr Hall KC was not an expert. Second, it was said that the report was only available at the end of August 2025 and so could not, in any event, have formed part of the decision-making which led to the initial segregation of the Claimant, and the other Separation Centre prisoners, or their continued segregation until the date of publication. It seems to me that the latter criticism is well-founded. The key decisions in this case pre-dated the completion and presentation of the report from Mr Hall KC, and so the assessment made by Mr Hall KC of the Separation Centre regime could not have influenced those decisions. In any event, many of the points that Mr Hall KC made about the cohort of Separation Centre prisoners are addressed elsewhere in the evidence and so I did not rely on Mr Hall KC’s report when making my decision in this case.

The Claimant seeks to challenge the Secretary of State’s decision and actions on five grounds. The first four grounds were set out in the Statement of Facts and Grounds. The fifth ground was added in advance of the “rolled up hearing”, but no objection was made to the amendment and so permission to amend was granted by me. The grounds are as follows:

At the “rolled-up hearing”, the Claimant was represented by Tim Owen KC, Tim James-Matthews, Catherine Arnold and Zoe Brereton. The Secretary of State was represented by Lisa Giovannetti KC, Myles Grandison, Victoria Ailes and Anisa Kassamali.

At the outset of the hearing, the Claimant made an application to transfer grounds (2) and (3) to the King’s Bench Division pursuant to CPR rule 54.20, and to proceed there as if those grounds had been brought under Part 7. This application was resisted by the Secretary of State. I refused the application. My reasons for refusing the application were as follows.

The trigger for the Claimant’s application was the service by the Defendant of the second witness statement of Governor Andrew Clayden. It was said that this statement (i) challenged the expert evidence of Dr Cohen and Dr Latham as to the Claimant’s historic fitness for segregation; and (ii) purported to contradict Dr Cohen’s opinion as to the adequacy of the processes in place within the prison to monitor the Claimant’s mental health, in particular the use of the segregation health screens and assessments that fed into decisions taken by the SRBs.

It was contended that transfer to the King’s Bench Division would allow for the process of cross-examination to take place; and the issues raised by Grounds 2 and 3 could be converted into private law claims: negligence (Ground 2) and under the Human Rights Act 1998 (Ground 3). Further, these claims could easily be severed from the remainder of the public law claim.

I refused the application to transfer. There had been no indication until the commencement of the hearing before me that the Claimant was seeking cross-examination of the witnesses. There were areas of dispute between the experts which the Claimant had not asked to explore by way of cross-examination, and it seemed to me that, on an initial reading, the evidence in Governor Clayden’s second witness statement could be addressed in submissions without the need for cross-examination. Governor Clayden was not an expert witness, and insofar as his evidence went to any of the medical issues that needed to be determined by the Court submissions could be made as to the reliability of his evidence. In any event, if the Claimant wished to cross-examine any of the experts, or any of the witnesses, an application could be made for that as part of the judicial review proceedings.

Further, as a matter of the overriding objective, I did not consider that it was a good use of Court resources to sever the claims in the way that the Claimant suggested. There was bound to be overlap in the factual issues that lay behind Grounds 2 and 3, and the other grounds. In addition, the claim had been expedited and it was in everyone’s interests for the issues to be determined as soon as possible, given that the Claimant remained in segregation when it was argued he should not be.

The parties made detailed submissions with respect to each of the grounds of challenge both in writing and orally. I will highlight the main points in this judgment.

This ground is put in a variety of ways. First, the Claimant submits that the Secretary of State has operated a secret, unpublished policy – embodied in the “central steer” – that all Separation Centre prisoners would be segregated under Rule 45, and would remain segregated, irrespective of the individual risk posed by each prisoner. This is said to be inconsistent with the Secretary of State’s published policies, which provide that “A decision to continue the segregation of a prisoner under Prison Rule 45 … is taken by a Segregation Review Board … having regard to the individual circumstances of the prisoner concerned”: (PSO 1700 at 4.2). This approach is unlawful, contrary to the principle articulated in Lumba that an individual subject to an administrative decision has a right to know the nature of any policy applied by the executive in relation to the taking of that decision.

The Claimant contends that the “central steer” satisfies the test set out by Fordham J in R (Riverside Park Limited) v. Secretary of State for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities [2023] EWHC 2937 (Admin), as (i) it concerns the exercise of an external decision-making function affecting third parties outside the executive (i.e., the prisoners in the Separation Centres); and (ii) it has been communicated in a “proscriptive instrument” (i.e., by way of internal correspondence) which constrains the exercise of individual discretion. The communications from the LTHSE to local prison Governors had the effect of constraining, and promoting consistency in, the exercise of decision-making in relation to the Rule 45 segregation of Separation Centre prisoners. On the facts, the Claimant submits that the “central steer” constituted, and was understood as being, a mandatory instruction.

Second, the Claimant submits that the decisions to segregate were not taken independently by the Governor, and were therefore ultra vires Rule 45. Rule 45 differentiates between the role of the governor, who “may arrange for the prisoner's removal from association”, and the Secretary of State who must “grant leave” if removal is sought for more than 42 days.

Third, the Claimant submits that the decisions involved no individualised assessment of risk, and this is required as a matter of the proper construction of Rule 45. The decisions to segregate were in substance taken by the Secretary of State pursuant to the “central steer” and without regard to factors personal to the Claimant.

With respect to construction, the Claimant contends that the plain language of Rule 45 of the Rules calls for consideration of the individual circumstances of the specific prisoner, even if facts external to the prisoner can also be considered. The references to “a prisoner” and “the prisoner” are singular, and the question posed to the decision-maker is whether there is something about the risks inherent to “a prisoner’[s]” association “with other prisoners”, which makes it “desirable, for the maintenance of good order or discipline or in his own interests” that that prisoner should be removed from association. The language of Rule 45 cannot be read so that references to “a prisoner” and “the prisoner” are to “all prisoners within a particular cohort”. This is also consistent with the Secretary of State’s own policy which recognises “[t]he importance of treating prisoners as individuals and taking into account their personal circumstances when making decisions” (PSO 1700 at paragraph 4.1), and other references within PSO 1700.

Fourth, the decisions to segregate the Claimant on the grounds that it was “desirable for the maintenance of good order or discipline” were irrational: (i) the relevant SRB decision-makers identified no reasonable basis for believing that the attack at HMP Frankland by Mr Abedi reflected any increase in the Claimant’s individual risk, such that his segregation was “desirable, for the maintenance of good order or discipline”; (ii) even if (which the Claimant did not accept) the attack by Mr Abedi may have generated uncertainty about the level of the Claimant’s risk to staff, such that it legitimately required re-assessment, that would still provide no rational basis for the Claimant’s segregation for such a protracted period; and (iii) the Secretary of State’s position in relation to the need to obtain PBA does not justify the protracted segregation.

The Secretary of State resists this ground on the basis that (1) there is no “secret unpublished policy”, and no failure to publish information to which the Claimant was entitled. The decisions continue to be taken in accordance with Rule 45 and PSO 1700. The attack at HMP Frankland led to a greater appreciation of the threat posed by prisoners held in the Separation Centres, including the Claimant, and the security weakness that necessitated urgent remedial action to safeguard staff. The fact that the segregation decision was being made in light of the attack at HMP Frankland and in the context of requiring PBA for prison officers was well known to the Claimant. The Secretary of State contends that if a breach is found by the Court, the outcome would not have been substantially different if the conduct complained of had not occurred and so relief should be refused: section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981.

As for (2), the Secretary of State agrees that the decision to segregate under Rule 45(2) must be taken by a Governor. That is what took place here. The Governor, as chair of the SRB, took the final decision as to whether to segregate the Claimant. In making that decision, the SRB was entitled to place weight on information or advice provided by the Secretary of State. This is one of those cases where the Secretary of State was best placed to identify a threat to staff of such gravity that it would require individual circumstances of commensurate weight to displace the conclusion that segregation is appropriate. In the instant case, there were no individual factors that were of such commensurate weight.

As for (3), the risk assessment of the Claimant was inherent in his placement in the Separation Centre which has not been challenged. Further, the Claimant’s risk had to be considered as part of the overall cohort of prisoners who are held in the Separation Centres. The Claimant’s individual risk could only be assessed properly by looking at him in the context of the group of which he was a part. There was a dynamic between them which potentially underpinned the attack at HMP Frankland. It was contended that until the dynamic of the group had been properly assessed, along with the measures that were necessary to provide mitigation of the risk posed, it would be futile trying to assess each of the prisoners individually and in a vacuum. This situation could be contrasted with that of a prisoner who had acted with two or three others in the mainstream part of the prison, where the prisoner could be removed from the others and his individual risk could be meaningfully assessed.

As for (4), the attack at HMP Frankland justified a reassessment of the risk posed by all prisoners in the Separation Centres. Furthermore, measures needed to be taken in light of the attack to protect prison officers from further attacks by a population who could not be discounted from either instigating or cooperating in further attacks. Until those measures were put in place, via the procurement of the PBA, segregation of all the cohort needed to be maintained.

The Claimant submits that the dangers of prolonged segregation for prisoners’ psychological integrity are well known to the Secretary of State, and are inherent in the legislative scheme. Reference was made to the evidence from the solicitor Gareth Pierce about the impact of segregation and to observations made by Hill J in De Silva at [52], where it was stated that “Research indicates that small group isolation regimes can produce serious and adverse psychological effects similar to solitary confinement”.

Accordingly, the impact of segregation on a prisoner’s mental health is a mandatory relevant consideration for a decision-maker under Rule 45. This was fortified in the instant case given that it was well known to the Secretary of State that the Claimant had a history of mental health issues. Further, during the course of his segregation it was, or ought to have been, obvious to decision-makers that the Claimant’s mental health was deteriorating, even to the point when he engaged in acts of self-harm.

In the circumstances, it was contended that the Tameside duty required the decision-makers to make further inquiries into the Claimant’s mental health before repeatedly approving his prolonged and indefinite segregation, and they unreasonably failed to do so.

The Secretary of State resists this ground and contends that the question for the Court is whether, at each stage, on the basis of the advice from the clinicians involved in the Claimant’s care, the decision-makers could have agreed to segregate the Claimant under Rule 45, without asking for more information about the Claimant, including a comprehensive report. It is said that the Claimant is essentially criticising the governors for their purported failure to doubt the thoroughness and accuracy of the clinical assessments that have been carried out on him, in circumstances where there has been no recommendation from any of the medical professionals involved in his care for the Claimant to resume association on medical grounds. The Secretary of State points out that the threshold for a Tameside challenge is a high one: see R (Fridman) v H M Treasury [2023] EWHC 2657 (Admin) at [67], and that threshold is not met here.

The Claimant contends that in considering whether Article 3 of the Convention has been contravened, the principles set out in Ahmad v United Kingdom (2013) 56 EHRR 1, endorsed by the Supreme Court in Shahid v. Scottish Ministers [2016] AC 429, should be applied. It is submitted that the ongoing segregation of the Claimant reached the threshold of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3 through the cumulative impact of (i) the severity of the conditions and length of time for which the measure has been imposed; (ii) the feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority it has caused the Claimant; (iii) its arbitrary nature, being imposed in the absence of effective procedural safeguards; and (iv) the lack of appropriate mechanisms within his detention to consider and care for his vulnerabilities.

The conditions and regime to which the Claimant has been subjected went well beyond the degree of hardship which is unavoidable in detention, or segregation. The Claimant has been subject to distress or hardship of an intensity which is incompatible with respect for his human dignity. The segregation was implemented in a manner which caused the Claimant “feelings of fear, anguish or inferiority” (see Ahmad at [148]).

The Claimant accepted that the aim of protecting prison staff in the face of a risk of elevated harm is a legitimate aim, but this is not an aim that can be pursued at any or all costs. The procedural safeguards provided for by the Rule 45 process were carried out in form but not in substance; it was said that they were “little more than window-dressing”. The mechanisms in place to monitor the Claimant’s welfare were wholly incapable of considering his vulnerability or giving him the opportunity to express how he has been affected by segregation.

The Claimant submits that the expert medical evidence supports the conclusion that his prolonged segregation had had a profound adverse impact upon his mental health. The material conditions and regime of the Claimant’s segregation have been impoverished. Whatever its justification, the Claimant’s evidence has been experienced by him as arbitrary and punitive. The segregation is, as a matter of domestic public law, unlawful and is to be regarded as “arbitrary” for the Article 3 analysis. There have been fundamental defects in the standard of medical care provided to the Claimant throughout. The circumstances of the Claimant’s case are comparable to that in Keenan, where a violation of Article 3 was found to have occurred. It is contended that the Claimant’s mental health deterioration was unlikely to have occurred had his mental health been adequately monitored.

The Claimant submits that there has also been a contravention of his Article 8 rights. There is a clear interference with the Claimant’s Article 8 rights by the segregation, and this cannot be justified. First, as the segregation is unlawful on public law grounds and so the segregation was not “in accordance with the law”: De Silva at [286]-[289] (c.f. R (ADL) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] 4 WLR 63 at [217] and [221]). Second, the segregation was not rationally connected to the objective it purported to pursue, and was therefore disproportionate. Third, the segregation failed to strike a fair balance between the Claimant’s rights and the interests sought to be protected: the physical safety of staff and other prisoners.

The Secretary of State resists this ground. It is submitted that the high threshold for an Article 3 challenge is not met on the facts of the case. The medical evidence does not support a finding of a violation, especially as the mere deterioration of a prisoner’s condition or even a risk of suicide is not sufficient to satisfy the test: see e.g. Kudla v Poland (2002) 35 E.H.R.R. 11.

In any event, the Secretary of State submits that the Claimant’s state of health is only one factor to be considered. Other important factors are that (i) the Claimant is not held in segregation with the intent to debase or humiliate him; nor was the measure premeditated or taken to break his resistance or will. The impact of his segregation is consistently monitored by a range of professionals, and any decision to maintain segregation is given anxious consideration by those professionals; (ii) the regime does not amount to “solitary confinement”; (iii) the segregation has a legitimate aim, and the decisions to segregate are not “arbitrary or made in bad faith”. When risk assessed to do so, the Claimant has been permitted to cohort with another prisoner, and this will be resumed now that PBA is available to safeguard staff; and (iv) segregation is frequently reviewed.

With respect to the medical evidence before the Court, Miss Giovannetti KC submitted that it was well recognised that it is harder for a Court to reach a clear view on a psychiatric assessment than in respect of a condition which is amenable to diagnostic tests. She pointed out that opinions may legitimately differ. Psychiatric assessments are based to a higher degree on self-reporting, and this may include deliberate falsehoods, as well as perception and memory. In the instant case, there was a degree of situational reporting, and a range of opinion from the experts as to how much of the Claimant’s presentation was situational: whether it was a means of protest, or a means of achieving an end. It was important, in these circumstances, for the Court to have regard to information from those who have been in regular contact with the Claimant, including his treating clinicians. Their assessment was that the Claimant was being appropriately managed within the segregation regime.

Reference was made by the Secretary of State to Maslak v Slovakia (No. 2) (2022) 75 EHRR 13, in which the Strasbourg Court reaffirmed that being placed in solitary confinement does not, in itself, amount to a breach of Article 3. In that case, the Strasbourg Court distinguished between a prohibition on contact with other prisoners for security, disciplinary and protective reasons (which does not in itself amount to inhuman treatment or punishment) and “complete sensory isolation, coupled with total social isolation” (which cannot be justified by the requirements of security).

With respect to Article 8, the Secretary of State accepts that the Claimant’s rights have been interfered with. The key issue is whether interference with the right was justified. The continued segregation of the Claimant has a legitimate aim and is proportionate, and the decisions are in accordance with the law. Even if the decisions are found not be “in accordance with the law”, and a violation of Article 8 is made out, an award of damages is not required to ensure just satisfaction: see Shahid at [90]; and R (Dennehy) v The Secretary of State for Justice [2016] EWHC 1219 (Admin).

The Claimant submits that the relevant decision-makers failed to discharge the PSED at any stage when making the segregation decisions. The Secretary of State was required in the exercise of her functions to have “due regard” to the matters set out at section 149(1)(a)-(c) of the EqA: (a) in the formulation of any general policy/“central steer”/ “central view” that all Separation Centre prisoners should be segregated; and (b) in taking the segregation decisions in the Claimant’s case.

There was a particularly good reason for giving proper consideration to equalities concerns in the present case given that every single prisoner segregated as a result of the policy or decision that all Separation Centre prisoners should be segregated is Muslim. In that context, it was particularly important to consider whether segregating a cohort disproportionately comprised of Muslim prisoners was discriminatory, especially as the decision was extraordinarily consequential: resulting in prisoners being placed in solitary confinement, and ceasing their engagement in education. It was necessary for the Secretary of State to ask whether this decision was consistent with “the need to … eliminate discrimination” (section 149(1)(a)), “the need to … advance equality of opportunity between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it” (section 149(1)(b)), and “the need to … foster good relations between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it” (section 149(1)(c)).

There is no evidence whatsoever that the PSED was discharged in connection with: (a) in the formulation of any general policy/“central steer” / “central view” that all Separation Centre prisoners should be segregated; and (b) in taking the segregation decisions in the Claimant’s case. The fact that the Separation Centre Operating Manual requires the prison service and governors to have due regard to the PSED does not mean that that was complied with here.

In oral submissions, Mr James-Matthews made reference to more granular matters, including some of the matters referred to in the intelligence reporting concerning the Claimant, which it was contended ought to have been considered through the lens of the PSED. As an example, it was mentioned that the Claimant was learning the Qur’an, and this was being used as potential evidence of his radicalisation. Having due regard to the PSED would have resulted in a sense-check of the more granular material; questioning whether the wrong inference was being drawn from that reference, given that learning the Qur’an is a normal activity for those who practice Islam.

The Secretary of State resists this ground, contending that what constitutes “due regard” is context specific. Reliance is placed on R (End of Violence against Women Coalition) v Director of Public Prosecutions [2021] 1 WLR 5829 at [86], where it was stated that the PSED “does not require an elaborate structure of secondary decision-making every time a public authority makes any decision which might engage the listed equality needs, however remotely. The court is not concerned with formulaic box ticking, but with the question whether, in substance, the public authority has complied with section 149”.

The Secretary of State contends that particular attention has been paid to the PSED both at the policy and operational level. There has, for instance, been appropriate reflection on the need to be fair to prisoners across the prison, and that units such as the Separation Centres that may have disproportionately Muslim residents are not disadvantaged. With respect to the segregation decision, this involved the identification of a risk or threat, and then a decision as to what to do about that risk or threat. These were factual questions or evaluations which colour the extent to which the Secretary of State could have regard to the PSED. Furthermore, the segregation regime did enable the Claimant to have access to an Imam, to read the Qur’an, and to have access to media which included programmes relating to Islam.

The Secretary of State contends that, in any event, if a breach of the PSED is found to have occurred, the outcome would not have been substantially different if the conduct complained of had not occurred and so relief should be refused: section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981.

The Claimant submits that even if the relevant decisions as to his segregation were taken locally by prison Governors, those decisions were procedurally unfair as the decisions were taken on intelligence –principally set out in the DRAM minutes – which was not disclosed to him and upon which he had no opportunity to make representations. Reliance is placed on R (Bourgass) v Secretary of State for Justice [2016] AC 384, in particular at [100], where Lord Reed explained that: “The imposition of prolonged periods of solitary confinement on the basis of what are, in substance, secret and unchallengeable allegations is, or should be, unacceptable”.

The Claimant contends that a further procedural error arose in the decision-making process of the Secretary of State. None of the material in the DRAM minutes was disclosed as part of that process, and so the Secretary of State’s review decisions were taken in apparent ignorance of the material considered by the local decision-makers and without the benefit of the Claimant’s representations on that material. The Secretary of State’s decisions were taken, therefore, on a false basis.

The Secretary of State concedes that in each of her seven Rule 45 decisions, Governor Jordan took account of information known to her from the DRAM meetings which was not disclosed or “gisted” to the Claimant. It was accepted, therefore, that the Claimant was deprived of the opportunity of making representations on matters which had been taken into account. With respect to five of the decisions (29 May to 17 July 2025), it is submitted that this was not procedurally unfair or the outcome would not have been substantially different, had the relevant matters been disclosed or “gisted” as association was authorised (the Claimant was allowed to associate with Prisoner B). Further, with respect to all of the decisions to segregate made by Governor Jordan, the Secretary of State submits that it is highly likely that the outcome for the Claimant would not have been any different had Governor Jordan made her decision without having any regard to the DRAM material. As Governor Jordan has said in evidence, she regarded the central steer on segregation to be correct. With respect to the decisions by Governor Clayden, there is no evidence that he took account of the information provided to the DRAM when he made the segregation decisions with respect to the Claimant.

As for the decision-making by the Secretary of State, it is contended that the fact that the intelligence disclosed to the DRAM was not referred to in the submissions to the Secretary of State can only have benefited the Claimant, rather than prejudice him. There is, therefore, no unfairness.

I should say at the outset that each of the grounds of challenge made by the Claimant are arguable and so permission to proceed with the judicial review is granted. Each of the points made by the Claimant raise points of principle or argument on the facts to which there is no “knock out” blow. I will set out below my judgment on whether any of the grounds prevail.

The starting point for determining this ground is to consider what the law requires for a decision to segregate a prisoner, and then to consider the particular facts of the segregation decisions in the Claimant’s case in light of the requirements for a lawful decision.

Rule 45 provides authority for “a governor” to arrange for a prisoner’s “removal from association”. In Syed, the Court of Appeal held at [32]-[33] that

As for who makes the decision to segregate, Rule 45 of the Rules provides for two decision-making tracks. First, the initial decision to segregate – that is, “removal from association” – as well as the continuation of that decision for more than 72 hours, and then for a period of 14 days, and for subsequent 14 day periods, must be taken by “the governor”. In practice, pursuant to the operating arrangements set out in PSO 1700, the decisions to continue segregation after 72 hours and for the 14 day periods are taken by a “governor” in their capacity as chairperson of the SRB.

Second, where the period of segregation exceeds 42 days, leave to authorise segregation must be obtained from the Secretary of State; and the Secretary of State may grant leave for subsequent periods of up to 42 days. The latter decision can be taken by an “official from outside the prison”: see Bourgass at [88]-[90]. In practice, pursuant to the operating arrangements set out in PSO 1700, the decision is taken by a senior official within the PGD.

The basis upon which a decision for a prisoner’s “removal from association” or segregation can be made is “Where it appears desirable, for the maintenance of good order or discipline or in his own interests”. This language allows for a considerable degree of judgment or evaluation by the decision maker as to the circumstances that call for segregation in any particular case.

In Bourgass, Lord Reed observed at [92] that:

The Claimant accepts that “cohort risks” can be taken into account when making a segregation decision under Rule 45. This concession is appropriate. The language of Rule 45 does not preclude such consideration. Indeed, as a matter of commonsense, it can be seen that the “maintenance of good order” within the prison estate, or a particular part of the estate, could be jeopardised by the actions or threatened actions of a group of prisoners. This does not mean, however, that the circumstances of individual prisoners who form part of that group, or are associated with that group, can be ignored.

In my judgment, the decision to segregate must involve some consideration of the circumstances of the prisoner, or each of the prisoners, who are removed from association. This is called for by the language and structure of Rule 45 which focuses on the individual prisoner.

Rule 45 refers repeatedly to “prisoner” in the singular, and in the context it is clearly intended to refer to the prisoner as a specific individual. Thus Rule 45(1) provides that “a prisoner should not associate with”; “the governor may arrange for the prisoner's removal from association”. Rule 45(2B) refers to “more than 42 days starting with the date the prisoner was removed”. Rule 45(3) provides for “discretion for a prisoner removed under this rule”. Rule 45(3A): “any recommendation that the prisoner resumes association”. Rule 45(4): “This rule shall not apply to a prisoner the subject of a direction given under rule 46(1).” Where the Rule seeks to refer to more than one prisoner, it does so by using the plural “prisoners”, and that is in the context of either removing the individual prisoner from association with others, or by allowing the individual prisoner to resume association with others.

Rule 45(3) only makes sense if the individual circumstances of a particular prisoner are being referred to. That provision specifically requires the governor in making all segregation decisions, other than the initial decision under paragraph 1, as well as in exercising the discretion to allow for the resumption of association under paragraph 3, to consider fully “any recommendation that the prisoner resumes association on medical grounds made by a registered medical practitioner or registered nurse working within the prison.” This must be referring to the “medical grounds” relating to a particular prisoner, rather than something generic.

This construction is also supported by the way in which the Secretary of State has understood the segregation power to work, as the operating procedures for the application of the rule – PSO 1700 – speak expressly about individual assessment.

This construction is also supported by the overall framework of law which ensures that there are procedural safeguards for the individual prisoner. As a matter of common law, procedural fairness would require that an individual has the right to know why he is being segregated and to have meaningful input in that decision, which must include his individual circumstances: see Bourgass. Similarly, under the Convention, Article 8 – which is plainly engaged by a segregation decision — calls for a case by case justification, and therefore requires some form of individualised assessment.

Indeed, the Secretary of State in her submissions accepts that individualised assessment is called for, contending that a general decision about a particular cohort of prisoners can be departed from in an individual case if there are sufficiently persuasive reasons for doing so.

Even where the Rule 45 regime applies, the governor has the discretion to allow “a prisoner removed under this rule to resume association with other prisoners at any time”. In other words, the prisoner does not have to be segregated entirely from other prisoners. It is open to the governor to permit the prisoner to associate with one or more prisoners.

Against this background, I consider the decisions in this case and the way in which they are challenged by the Claimant.

The first way in which this ground of challenge is put by the Claimant is the Lumba argument: that the Secretary of State operated a secret, unpublished policy – embodied in the “central steer” – that all Separation Centre prisoners will be segregated under Rule 45, and will remain segregated, irrespective of the individual risk posed by each prisoner, and this was inconsistent with the Secretary of State’s published policies which provide for an individualised assessment. I do not consider that this point is well founded. There was no such secret, unpublished “policy”.

In making this argument, the Claimant relies on Fordham J’s discussion of what is a “policy” in Riverside Park. That case did not concern a secret, unpublished “policy” which is said to be inconsistent with a published policy. Rather, it was concerned with whether there was a “policy” at all (“embodied in the May 2011 Paper read with the May 2011 Note”: see Riverside Park at [73]), which could not be departed from without good reason. This was described by Fordham J as “the Policy Non-Adherence Basis” argument.

To that extent, therefore, the reference to Riverside Park is somewhat inapt. Nevertheless, insofar as it is helpful in considering what a “policy” is at law, I will look at Fordham J’s analysis. At [77]-[78], Fordham J stated that:

In the instant case, the “central steer” that the Claimant refers to is that all Separation Centre prisoners should be subject to Rule 45 segregation. This is not a “policy” in the sense described by Fordham J in Riverside Park, but an operational decision. At most, it could be said to be a “policy decision”. Whilst it does satisfy the first part of Fordham J’s test, in that it concerns the exercise of an external decision-making function affecting third parties outside the executive (i.e., the prisoners in the Separation Centres), it does not satisfy the second part of the test. There is no document which “viewed objectively, serves as a prescriptive instrument for that function”, in the sense of “providing a set of criteria or considerations whose purpose is to promote consistency and foreseeability in the discharge of the decision-making function”. The “central steer” that the Claimant refers to provides no criteria or considerations at all. Indeed, in the Claimant’s own characterisation, the “central steer” is actually a mandatory instruction.

The second way in which the Claimant puts his challenge under this ground is that the decisions to segregate were not taken independently by the Governor, and are therefore ultra vires Rule 45. I agree with the proposition that if the decisions to segregate were not taken by the Governor, but were decisions made by the Secretary of State which the Governor was merely implementing, then this would be ultra vires Rule 45. As I have already observed, certain of the segregation decisions have to be taken by the Governor, and these are to be distinguished from the “leave” decisions that have to be taken by the Secretary of State.

It is necessary to consider, therefore, the segregation decisions that were made with respect to the Claimant. The initial decision to segregate the Claimant at HMP Woodhill, following his transfer from HMP Frankland on 13 April 2025, was due to the pending charges for his behaviour on transfer. He was placed in a segregation cell in the Separation Centre. This segregation was permitted by Rule 53(4) of the Rules which provides that “A prisoner who is to be charged with an offence against discipline may be kept apart from other prisoners pending the governor’s first inquiry or determination under rule 53A”.

The Claimant was then moved to a standard cell within the Separation Centre at HMP Woodhill, which was subject to a single unlock regime, which meant he had no association with other prisoners. This was the same regime that had been applied to the other prisoners who had transferred from HMP Frankland following the attack. This was a decision made by the Governing-governor in light of the seriousness of the attack at HMP Frankland and the unknown risks arising from this, and not a decision made by the Secretary of State. That is the evidence of Governor Jordan, and there is nothing to suggest otherwise.

The first decision that was formally taken under Rule 45 was made on 17 April 2025, following a meeting of the SRB. The Claimant was notified that he would be segregated until 20 April 2025

This language was provided by the Separation Centre Operational Lead. The Separation Centres, including the one at HMP Woodhill, were also prompted by officials of the Secretary of State to formalise the segregation regime under Rule 45. I do not consider, however, that by itself this means that the decision to continue the Claimant’s segregation from 17 April 2025 until 20 April 2025 was not made by the Governor, but was made by the Secretary of State.

Whilst the Court does not have direct evidence from the Governor at HMP Woodhill about this decision, the inference that I draw from all the materials is that there was still a great deal of uncertainty about the risks arising from the Separation Centre prisoners, including those who had transferred in from HMP Frankland, where the attack had taken place, and the most appropriate decision to make until the situation became clearer was to continue with the decision that had already been made: that is, to continue the segregation of the prisoners. That inference is supported by the fact that the Healthcare Assessment provided to the SRB was that there were “No clinical reasons or concerns to advise against segregation at this time”. This is also supported by the evidence of Governor Clayden, who was making decisions with respect to Separation Centre prisoners at HMP Full Sutton and was in receipt of risk assessments coming through from the Centre. This inference is not displaced by the fact that segregation of the Separation Centre prisoners was also supported by officials working for the Secretary of State. It was seen by all concerned as the appropriate response in the circumstances.

The same applies to the decision taken on 20 April 2025, following the SRB, that the Claimant’s segregation should be continued until 1 May 2025. The SRB was chaired by a different governor at HMP Woodhill, but there is nothing in the evidence to suggest that this governor’s reasoning was any different from that of the initial governor.

Governor Jordan had responsibility for making the continuation decision (following the SRB review) on 1 May 2025, and for the remaining segregation decisions that were taken for the Claimant until his transfer from HMP Woodhill at the end of July 2025. Each of these decisions was nominally taken by Governor Jordan, and she has said in evidence that she agreed with those decisions. She has said that she “always considered that the decision to segregate was correct. Staff safety had to be the priority until the nature of the risk was better understood”. Nevertheless, in my judgment the reality is that, for the majority of the time (see paragraph 251 below), the decisions nominally taken by her were made by the Secretary of State and not the governor; these were not local decisions that happened to accord with the view of the Centre. Rather, they were central decisions that, as Governor Jordan has candidly said in evidence, were “implement[ed]” locally.

This conclusion is also supported by some of the contemporaneous materials. The correspondence referred to in the witness evidence demonstrates that local decisions with respect to “unwinding” the regime and “cohorting” of prisoners were subject to the approval of those at the Centre. This was reflected in the email of 29 April 2025 from Governor Clayden (see paragraph 46 above), in which he referred to “the direction”, and which Mr Worsman constituted a “central steer” from LTHSE leadership.

In his evidence, Mr Worsman has said that the final decision remained with the Separation Centre, and that this measure did not prevent the governor from making a decision to bring Rule 45 to an end. That is not, however, how the matter was understood by Governor Clayden. It is also inconsistent with the evidence of the further instruction to Governor Clayden in late June 2025, when the governor proposed to introduce a limited “unwind” – for two prisoners to be placed together – but was asked not to do so by Mr Worsman.

Based on the chronology of the correspondence that I have set out above, I consider that there was a short window of time — from 27 May 2025 to 25 June 2025 — when the decisions were, in reality, made locally. On 27 May 2025, Governors Jordan and Clayden were written to from the Centre to say that “Removal from R45 is a local decision” (paragraph 66 above). This autonomy was removed, however, on 25 June 2025 when the “central steer” was given that prisoners should not be removed from segregation until PBA had arrived (paragraph 86 above). Although that communication was sent to Governor Clayden, it is likely that the information it contained was shared with Governor Jordan.

I consider that each of the decisions taken by Governor Clayden to segregate the Claimant following his transfer to HMP Full Sutton in late July 2025 were nominally taken by the governor, but in reality constituted an implementation of the “central steer”. Although Governor Clayden has not expressly said as much in his witness statements, it is clear from the contemporaneous materials – including the communication to him on 25 June 2025, referred to above that it was not really open to him to make any other decision without the approval of the Secretary of State.

Accordingly, the Claimant’s second contention under ground 1 is correct: the decisions taken to segregate the Claimant from 1 May 2025 (when Governor Jordan made her first decision to continue segregation) were in reality taken by the Secretary of State and not the governor as required by the legislation. I shall deal at the end of this section of the judgment with whether this made any difference.

The Claimant’s third contention under this ground is that the decisions involved no individualised assessment of risk, and that is unlawful because such assessment was required as a matter of the proper construction of Rule 45 of the Rules. It is said that the decisions to segregate were in substance taken by the Secretary of State pursuant to the “central steer” and without regard to factors personal to the Claimant’s individual risk.

As already explained, I agree with the Claimant that lawful decision-making required the relevant governor when making the local decision, and the Secretary of State when making the ‘leave’ decision, to look at the individual circumstances of the prisoner and that this should include an assessment of his risk. I disagree, however, with the contention that this did not actually take place. It is clear from the evidence that the Claimant’s individual circumstances, and an assessment of the risk that he posed, were taken into account both by the governors at the local level and by the Secretary of State. The circumstances of the Claimant and the individual risk posed by him did not alter the decision, however, that segregation should continue.

The risk assessment of the Claimant was inherent in the fact of his placement in the Separation Centre. Further, in light of the attack at HMP Frankland, the Claimant’s risk had to be considered as part of the overall cohort of prisoners who are held in the Separation Centres. The Claimant’s individual risk could only be assessed properly by looking at him in the context of the group of which he was a part. There was a dynamic between them which potentially underpinned the attack at HMP Frankland and this dynamic applied in the post-attack period. That cohort assessment was kept under review throughout the period, and the risk posed by the cohort and by every individual within that cohort (including the Claimant) remained sufficiently severe that segregation needed to be continued until the measures to mitigate the risk – the PBA – had been provided to the prison officers working with the cohort.

The fourth way in which this ground is put is that the decisions to segregate the Claimant on the grounds that it was “desirable for the maintenance of good order or discipline” were unreasonable/irrational. I reject this basis for challenge.

The attack at HMP Frankland justified a reassessment of the risk posed by all prisoners in the Separation Centres. Measures needed to be taken in light of the attack to protect prison officers from further attacks by a population who cannot be discounted from either instigating or cooperating in further attacks. The assessment made was that the risks could not be appropriately managed other than through segregation until appropriate protective equipment had been provided to prison staff who engage with prisoners in the Separation Centres. This was an evaluation made by senior officials with responsibility for managing the prison estate, and approved by the Secretary of State. There is no evidential basis for the Court to go behind such an evaluation.

The conclusion under this ground is, therefore, that the decisions to segregate the Claimant from 1 May 2025 (save for the decisions made between 27 May and 25 June) were unlawful because those decisions were in substance made by the Secretary of State and not by the governors at the prison where the Claimant was held. There is no doubt, however, that the outcome would have been the same had that not been the case, and the decisions had been taken by the governors themselves.

The evidence of Governor Jordan is clear that she agreed with the decision to segregate and to continue the Claimant’s segregation. There is no reason to go behind her evidence. She was candid in admitting that she regarded the real decision to segregate as having been made by the Secretary of State, and that adds considerably to her credibility as to what she would have done in any event.

Although the evidence of Governor Clayden does not contain the same explicit statement that he would have made the same decision, this seems highly likely from what he has said. Governor Clayden has not indicated any disagreement with the approach taken by the Centre to the segregation decision. The areas of disagreement reflected in the correspondence set out above went not to segregation itself – that is, whether the prisoners should be subject to the Rule 45 regime at all – but to the question of associating with one or more prisoners within the cohort, but under the overall regime. Furthermore, Governor Clayden has provided a detailed account of the reasoning that he did apply to the various segregation decisions made by him, and there is nothing to suggest that this reasoning was not what he truly believed.

As a result, and in accordance with section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981, I refuse relief on this ground as it was highly likely that the outcome would not have been substantially different had the “central steer” not applied and the governors had made the decisions with respect to the Claimant’s continued segregation on their own account.

The Tameside test is derived from Lord Diplock’s dictum at p1065B that: “the question for the court is, did the Secretary of State ask himself the right question and take reasonable steps to acquaint himself with the relevant information to enable him to answer it correctly?”. The test was discussed by the Court of Appeal in R (Balajigari) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] 1 WLR 4647 (CA) at [70], referring to the summary provided by Haddon-Cave J in R (Plantagenet Alliance Ltd) v Secretary of State for Justice [2015] 3 All ER 261, [99] – [100]:

There is no doubt that the state of a prisoner’s health, including his mental health, is a relevant consideration for a decision-maker called upon to decide whether to segregate or continue to segregate a prisoner. It is well known that segregation, and in particular prolonged segregation, may have a deleterious effect on a prisoner’s mental health. This is reflected in the research described in PSO 1700, and in the operating procedures for monitoring a prisoner and for completion of, among other things, the SRB review of segregation.

The possibility that a prisoner’s health, including their mental health, is relevant to decision-making about segregation is also a feature of Rule 45 of the Rules itself. Paragraph 3A (as already discussed) provides that:

As well as this general information about prisoners who are segregated, in the instant case, it was known to those working in the Separation Centres that the Claimant may have mental health issues. The Psychology Report prepared in November 2024 for the Claimant’s assessment for the Separation Centre system highlighted that he had experienced trauma in his early life, and recommended that he be provided with “Trauma work related to childhood and adolescent trauma”. This report was known to Governor Jordan, who had observed on 12 May 2025 (as part of the quarterly review) that whilst it was not clear what the Claimant’s mental health concerns were, this may be linked to “prior trauma”. Governor Jordan had identified that it will be “important to address this”.

In these circumstances, obtaining further information about the Claimant’s mental health condition and ensuring that an assessment was carried out with some expedition was not merely “sensible or desirable”; it was essential. It was obvious that segregation, and in particular prolonged segregation, could make the Claimant’s mental health condition worse. An assessment was required to gain a full and proper understanding of his mental health condition and to ensure that the treatment required to address that condition could be provided, as well as to ensure that decision-makers (the governors and the Secretary of State) could make fully informed decisions as to whether segregation (either total removal from association with other prisoners, or association with a small cohort) would exacerbate the Claimant’s mental health conditions and whether any form of segregation was appropriate for him.

In my judgment, against this background, no reasonable decision-maker could have failed to seek out that further information from shortly after the Claimant had been put on the segregation regime. The unreasonableness of the decision-maker’s failure to obtain that information only increased with the passage of time as (i) the period of segregation increased, and (ii) the Claimant began to manifest symptoms of stress.

I accept that, throughout this period, the Claimant’s full medical records were not available to decision-makers, the Claimant’s mental health was monitored, and he was visited regularly by mental health nurses engaged by the NHS Trust which had responsibility for providing mental health support to the prison, and these nurses contributed to the SRB assessment process. Further, that the Claimant had contact with psychologists who worked within the Separation Centres, and he appears to have had some form of mental health assessment on 1 August 2025. Nevertheless, that assessment does not appear to have been a formal or structured assessment of the Claimant’s psychological needs. Furthermore much of the contact that the Claimant had from the mental health team, which usually involved brief interactions and was not face-to-face, was not a proper substitute for obtaining full information about his mental health condition and the impact on his mental health of the segregation that the Tameside duty required.

I do not consider that the visit to the Claimant from Dr Afzal satisfied the Tameside obligation. Dr Afzal’s first visit to the Claimant was on 27 August 2025, within a matter of days after his attempt at self-harm, but almost 4 ½ months after the Claimant had been moved from HMP Frankland, and over a month following his move to HMP Full Sutton where he was removed from association with any other prisoner. Dr Afzal did not carry out a full assessment of the Claimant’s mental health condition at this point in time, but said that he wanted to see him again to explore his symptoms and background further. In other words, further information was required.

Article 3 of the Convention provides that:“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” This is an absolute prohibition and no derogation is possible. The Claimant’s contention is that the application to him of the segregation regime has subjected him to “inhuman or degrading treatment”.

Whether or not Article 3 has been contravened is a question of fact. The burden of proving a contravention rests with the Claimant. As for the standard of proof, this was discussed by the Court of Appeal in R (ASK) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 1239 at [72]:

In determining whether Article 3 has been contravened, the Court is guided by the principles set out in Ahmad, endorsed by the Supreme Court in Shahid. Shahid was a case involving the segregation of a prisoner for his own safety following threats from other prisoners: he had been convicted of the racially aggravated abduction and murder of a 15 year old boy. He was segregated when remanded in custody pending his trial, and subsequently following his conviction. The total period of segregation was 56 months. He contended that his treatment during segregation amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment in contravention of Article 3 (as well as a violation of his Article 8 right to respect for his private life).

The relevant facts were set out by Lord Reed in his judgment at [33] and [36]:

In the course of his judgment, Lord Reed referred at [31] to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights with respect to the circumstances in which the solitary confinement of prisoners will violate Article 3, as reflected in the case of Ahmad v United Kingdom (2012) 56 EHRR 1:

Lord Reed considered that the treatment of the prisoner in Shahid did not reach the minimum level of severity required for a contravention of article 3. Lord Reed stated at [37] that:

In Ahmad, the Strasbourg Court also set out some general principles about Article 3 that are important for this Court to bear in mind at [201] to [205]:

The judgments in Ahmad and Shahid were among the cases discussed by Singh J in R (Dennehy) v Secretary of State for Justice [2016] EWHC 1219 (Admin). The claimant in that case was a female prisoner, who was serving life imprisonment, and had been segregated for almost two years. In the course of his judgment at [113], Singh J made reference to the Strasbourg Court’s decision in Ramirez-Sanchez v France (2007) 45 EHRR 49, at [118]:

At [119] in Dennehy, Singh J also referred to the Strasbourg Court’s language of not subjecting the prisoner “to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention” (emphasis added).

Singh J also referred to the case of Keenan v United Kingdom (2001) 33 EHRR 38. The case was described as follows at [119]:

Singh J went on to apply the principles derived from the authorities to the facts of the case before him, finding that a number of features were of particular importance:

Singh J concluded that a violation of Article 3 had not been made out.

I also bear in mind the judgment in Kudla, a case not concerned with segregation, but the detention of a prisoner with pre-existing psychological conditions, where the Strasbourg Court held at [99]:

On the facts of that case, the Court had noted that:

It is clear, therefore, that the mere fact that a prisoner was suffering from a mental health condition, and that detention may have exacerbated “to a certain extent” his feelings of “distress, anguish and fear” was not sufficient to amount to a contravention of Article 3.

Against this background, and looking at the criteria identified in Ahmad at [209] as being applicable to the question of whether Article 3 contravened – that is, “the particular conditions, the stringency of the measure, its duration, the objective pursued and its effects on the person concerned” —my findings are as follows.

The particular conditions, the stringency of the measure, its duration: The conditions in which the Claimant has been held since he was transferred from HMP Frankland on 12 April 2025 have been austere, and the measure applied to him – the segregation regime – is strict. The Claimant has been locked in his cell for more than 22 hours per day: at HMP Woodhill, the Claimant was allowed out of his cell for 1 hour 10 minutes to 1 hour 30 minutes per day, during which he could shower, exercise and do laundry. For a period of more than four months (from 12 April 2025 to the date of the hearing, other than from 31 May 2025 to 23 July 2025), the Claimant has not been able to associate with any other prisoner in any meaningful sense: whilst it has been possible for him to speak or shout to others from his cell, he has not been able to talk with other prisoners face to face or with any privacy, he has not been able to walk alongside, touch, or share active experiences with them such as exercising together or praying together. The Claimant has had direct human contact with others – prison staff, mental health nurses, chaplains (including an Imam) – but this has been very restricted in time. The Claimant has had no opportunity to take part in education classes or in work activities. In his cell, the Claimant has had access to a television and the opportunity to make phone calls.

The objective pursued: The segregation regime has not been applied to the Claimant in order to punish him, debase or humiliate him, nor has it been applied to break his resistance or will. The segregation has had a legitimate aim – to ensure the good order of the prison following the attack at HMP Frankland so that the risk of the Separation Centre cohort of prisoners can be monitored pending the arrival of PBA for prison staff working with the prisoners – and has not been imposed for arbitrary reasons. The segregation has also been kept under review, and the necessity of maintaining the Claimant’s segregation as part of the cohort has been explained, and there is a rational basis for it.

The effects on the Claimant: the segregation regime has exacerbated the Claimant’s mental health conditions and has caused him distress. The Claimant was a prisoner with, what Dr Veisi described as, “a longstanding history of trauma and instability that pre-dates his current imprisonment”. Dr Veisi states that the records document “episodes of low mood, anxiety, panic attacks, claustrophobia, and trauma symptoms over several years”. Whilst all of this history was not known to those making decisions about the Claimant until the expert reports were provided, it is clear that they knew that there had been “prior trauma”, that there had been mental health issues in the past, and that trauma work with the Claimant had been recommended even before he entered the Separation Centre regime.

There is considerable consensus from the psychiatrists (Dr Veisi and Dr Latham) who have given evidence to the Court about the impact of the segregation regime on the Claimant. Whilst there is some disagreement between them as to the precise characterisation of the Claimant’s mental health condition, there is little between them as to the effect on him of the regime. I am referring in my analysis to their reports, and not that of Dr Cohen. I have found Dr Cohen’s reports to be of less assistance to the Court. First, I note that she is not a psychiatrist. Second, Dr Cohen’s reports present a more serious picture of the Claimant’s situation than both Dr Veisi or Dr Latham. For instance, Dr Cohen advises that the Claimant presented “an imminent suicide risk”, whereas Dr Latham stated that the risk of suicide was “significantly elevated”.

Dr Veisi states that there has been a reported deterioration in the Claimant’s mental health since the removal of cohorting.Dr Veisidescribes the Claimant as having symptoms that have consolidated into a pattern “consistent with Complex post-traumatic stress disorder. . . He experiences recurrent and distressing intrusive memories and nightmares, hyperarousal with panic attacks, emotional numbing, mistrust of others, exaggerated sense of threat, and re-living of past traumatic experiences when exposed to reminders. He describes voices and visions in this context, . . . these are better understood as intrusive trauma phenomena”. According to Dr Veisi, the Claimant’s “distress is real”. He has been prescribed mirtazapine: an anti-depressant. His presentation is most consistent with post-traumatic stress disorder with “associated depressive and anxiety symptoms”. Dr Veisi states that the conditions of segregation “have clearly exacerbated his distress”.

This is consistent with what Dr Latham has reported. Dr Latham describes the Claimant as suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder which has been triggered by new traumatic experiences including his increasing segregation, depressive disorder, symptoms of: anxiety and panic, voices/auditory hallucinations; paranoia, but not delusions. For Dr Latham, “The current segregation conditions are directly contributing to a worsening of his mental health. The restrictive conditions have likely contributed to worsening of symptoms associated with traumatic experiences from his past”. The segregation is “in part responsible for but certainly maintaining and worsening his mental ill health”. The segregation is increasing the Claimant’s distress.

The experts’ reports describe a greater impact on the Claimant than what Dr Afzal, the treating psychiatrist, has described. I am mindful of Miss Giovannetti’s submissions as to the limits of psychiatric assessment and the significance of the evidence from those treating the prisoner as well as those who have more frequent, including, daily interaction with him. Nevertheless, I note that even Dr Afzal was reported to have said that “there seems to be a decline in the Claimant’s mental wellbeing from what he has seen and (as compared to) the Claimant’s psychiatric and overall health records”. Furthermore, it is clear that Dr Afzal was sufficiently concerned about the Claimant’s condition that he prescribed him the anti-depressant mirtazapine. This is somewhat supportive of what both Dr Veisi and Dr Latham say.

In addition, when he met with the Claimant on 27 August 2025, Dr Afzal stated that although he did not believe the Claimant was psychotic, he wanted to see him again to explore his symptoms and background further. That had not been done by the time of the hearing, whereas both Dr Veisi and Dr Latham, who are both psychiatrists with considerable experience of treating prisoners have assessed him over a period of several hours. The experts’ assessment of the Claimant, taking place over a longer period than that of Dr Afzal should therefore carry real weight.

Furthermore, Dr Afzal stated that he told the Claimant “that his beliefs and experiences are likely to be explained by his cultural background, reported trauma history and current situation rather than a mental illness” (emphasis added). This indicates that Dr Afzal’s view, following his assessment of the Claimant, was that the situation – in other words, segregation — was probably causing the symptoms that he was experiencing.

Overall, looking at all of the evidence, and in light of the reports of both Dr Veisi and Dr Latham (amplified by the report of Dr Cohen), bearing in mind that when kept in conditions of isolation the Claimant no longer has available to him the various strategies and activities that had previously enabled him to manage his mental health vulnerabilities, I consider that the segregation regime has subjected the Claimant to “intense . . . mental suffering”, and the distress suffered by the Claimant has been “of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention”. The conditions in which the Claimant has been detained have done more than “exacerbated to a certain extent his feelings of distress, anguish and fear” (c.f. Kudla at [99]).

It is not necessary for me to resolve the dispute between the experts as to the impact of the segregation regime on the Claimant’s risk of suicide. Dr Veisi has noted that the Claimant has expressed suicidal thoughts and had engaged in acts of self-harm, but these were not accompanied by “persistent intent or by actions carrying high lethality”. In Dr Veisi’s view, the Claimant’s conduct at their assessment showed “episodic, self-harm used as a means of communication and protest in the context of his distress”. Dr Latham, on the other hand, whilst agreeing that the Claimant’s risk of suicide was to some extent “situational”, expressed the view that the situation was “undoubtedly increasing the risk of suicide” and that the Claimant’s mental state was “a driver” of his suicide risk. Both experts agreed, however, that the situation that the Claimant found himself in increased his risk of suicide.

As for the management of the Claimant’s mental health condition, Dr Veisi expressed the view in his main report that the Claimant “remained appropriately managed under ACCT procedures with psychiatric and psychological input” . There is evidence that the Claimant’s health has been regularly monitored by professionals, including by Dr Afzal. It is clear, however, that no structured or formal assessment was carried out of the Claimant’s needs until he was seen by Dr Veisi on 10 September 2025, reporting on 16 September 2025, and yet this should have happened several months previously had the decision-makers acted reasonably in accordance with the Tameside duty.

My reading of the expert reports is that, by the time of the hearing before the Court, the Claimant had not been provided with the psychological input that was, and is, needed to address his trauma and symptoms of trauma. Dr Latham reported that no recognised psychological therapy was being offered to the Claimant. This was not disputed by Dr Veisi, and is also reflected in the evidence presented to the Court: the Claimant had been provided with “support” from psychologists, and has attended a number of sessions but no programme of treatment appears to have been offered or implemented. Indeed, Dr Afzal stated that the Claimant was advised that he “may benefit from trauma therapy and that I would ask my psychology colleague to consider assessing him in respect to this”, but there is no evidence that this assessment has taken place, let alone that this therapy is being provided to the Claimant.

In any event, even if this therapy had now started, it has not alleviated the Claimant’s trauma and symptoms. Dr Veisi wrote that the Claimant “has contact with [the] prison psychologist and over time this measure will be able to address his trauma and symptoms” (emphasis added). In other words, whatever support the Claimant was receiving from the psychologist had not addressed his trauma and symptoms so far.

In my judgment, the failure to obtain an assessment of the Claimant’s needs, and the lack of psychological treatment for the Claimant when it was clearly called for, distinguishes the present case from the facts of Kudla on which Miss Giovannetti relied for the Secretary of State, where the prisoner had received considerable medical attention during his detention, including psychiatric assistance, and the Strasbourg Court found no failure in the support that the prisoner had received.

In reaching a conclusion with respect to Article 3, I need to consider the Ahmad criteria in the round. Whilst the assessment under Article 3 is not one of proportionality in a strict sense, as would apply to Article 8 for instance, the legitimacy of the measure’s aim is, as the authorities make clear, an important factor in determining whether Article 3 has been contravened. It is, therefore, necessary to weigh in the balance the effects of the segregation regime on the Claimant with the regime’s aim: that is, the risk factors posed by the cohort of Separation Centre prisoners, pending the availability to prison staff of protective support to safeguard them in the event of a violent attack.

In my judgment, taking into account the cumulative conditions experienced by the Claimant over a period of six months to the date of the hearing, including over four months in which he has not been permitted to associate with any other prisoner, and in the context of a prisoner who has a history of trauma and where there was a failure to obtain an assessment of his needs even though he was known to have mental health issues, and a failure to provide him with any therapeutic treatment to address his trauma, a contravention of Article 3 is made out, notwithstanding the importance of the aim behind the segregation regime.

The suffering that the Claimant has experienced goes way beyond the inevitable element of suffering that is connected with segregation: an otherwise legitimate form of treatment. An individual who is segregated from others and deprived of the usual activities available to prisoners (education, work, communal prayer) will inevitably suffer isolation and an element of distress and anxiety. What the Claimant experienced was much more severe than that: he is suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder, brought on (at least in part) by the segregation. The mental health support provided to the Claimant has not mitigated his symptoms of trauma and distress, and will not do so for some time, if at all, if he remains within the full strictures of the segregation regime.

In my judgment, the impact on the Claimant of the segregation regime, and in particular the lengthy period in which he was removed from association with any other prisoner, has been so severe that this outweighed by some margin the rationale for that regime, including the risk that the Claimant was assessed as posing to staff and the fact that PBA was not available for all staff working at the Separation Centre at HMP Full Sutton until recently. The evidence before the Court did not demonstrate that it was impossible to relieve the Claimant of the stresses, or at least some of the stresses, of the segregation regime without unduly compromising the safety of the staff working with him.

My judgment with respect to the Claimant does not mean, however, that the same segregation regime would contravene Article 3 in the case of a prisoner with an ordinary level of resilience. The Claimant was not such a prisoner, given his history of trauma and associated mental health needs.

I find that the Claimant’s Article 3 rights were contravened from 21 August 2025, when the Claimant wrote to say that he would self-harm. By that time, the Claimant had been segregated for over 4 months, the majority of which time had been spent in isolation from other prisoners. By that time, the Claimant had already manifested many of the symptoms of distress. On that date, the threat to self-harm is to be treated, at the very least, as (in Dr Veisi’s words) “a means of communication and protest in the context of his distress”. The period continued until the date of the hearing before the Court. It was only after that date, that the Claimant was permitted to associate with another prisoner.

In my judgment, there has also been a violation of Article 8. It is clear that the segregation regime interferes with the Claimant’s Article 8 right to a private life: he has been deprived of the normal associations that an individual would have in prison, as well as the opportunities for personal development that are ordinarily available to a prisoner, including those detained in the Separation Centres. For the reasons explained under ground one, for most of the period when the Claimant was segregated, the interference has not been “in accordance with the law” as the decision is ultra vires. Moreover, since 21 August 2025, the interference cannot be justified substantively. The impact on the Claimant’s private life, as discussed under Article 3, outweighs by some considerable margin the legitimate aim that the Secretary of State has sought to achieve.

Section 149(1) of the EqA provides that:

What the duty requires of a public authority has been well traversed in the authorities. In Bracking v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2013] EWCA Civ 1345, McCombe LJ summarised the principles established by the authorities at [26]:

In R (End of Violence against Women Coalition) v Director of Public Prosecutions [2021] 1 WLR 5829 at [86], Lord Burnett CJ held that:

The evidence before the Court is that equalities considerations are taken into account by those with responsibility for Separation Centres, and a focus on equality issues is embedded in the training delivered to staff and in the approach to the management of prisoners held within the Separation Centres. This is reflected in the detailed equality analysis produced by the National Offender Management Service with respect to the Separation Centres Policy Framework and the 2022 Separation Centre Operating Manual. The latter provides guidance to staff on how to refer, assess, select, manage and de-select prisoners to and from separation centres.

The equality analysis identified that at the time of completion all of the (then) 9 prisoners within the Separation Centre population were Muslim and male. Further, that “almost all individuals located in the separation centre since its opening were Black, Asian, Minority Ethnic, with most having predominantly an Asian background.” The equality analysis identified that the majority of those in custody for terrorism offences held Islamist extremist views (71%), and that “The fact that a majority of prisoners in custody for terror offences, and therefore in separation centres, identifies as Muslim is a reflection of the current nature of the terrorist threat, which according to government, police and intelligence sources is mainly arising from Islamist extremism”. It was noted that this could change as “the terrorist threat in the UK evolves”.

The equality analysis highlighted that active steps had been taken to “tackle prejudice and promote understanding” within the Separation Centres:

It was also noted that the policy framework for Separation Centres “specifies that operational staff must have regard to equality considerations and ensure that all services are provided without discrimination, having regard to the protected characteristics defined in the Equality Act 2010”, and all staff were required to act in accordance with instructions to advance equalities and ensure equality.

The equality analysis examined the various “protected characteristics” set out in section 149 of the EqA. With respect to “Religion or Belief”, it was stated that:

The evidence of the Claimant as to his experience in the Separation Centre at HMP Frankland before the incident on 12 April 2025 demonstrates that the regime was mindful of equalities issues, and arrangements were made for him to participate in the study of Islam and for Friday prayers. In his witness statement, the Claimant stated that:

The decisions to segregate the Claimant and to continue his segregation fall within the ambit of section 149(1) of the EqA as they are decisions taken “in the exercise of [a public authority’s] functions”. The fact that they are operational decisions based on risk assessments and evaluations does not mean that the PSED does not apply. The nature of the decisions may mean that, in substance, the outcome will not be affected by the PSED, but this does not mean that the implications of the decision and how it is managed cannot be affected by the PSED.

No document relating to the segregation decisions of the Claimant, or the other prisoners, presented to the Court makes specific reference to the PSED. There is no evidence before the Court that when taking the decision to segregate the Claimant or to continue his segregation, explicit consideration has been given to the PSED. There is no evidence before the Court that explicit consideration has been given to the PSED with respect to the segregation decisions overall, even though each of the prisoners concerned is Muslim and equalities issues are bound to arise.

The lack of such documentation or evidence is not determinative of the question as to whether, insubstance, section 149 of the EqA has been complied with. The segregation decisions are operational decisions. The context in which they arose is the attack on 12 April 2025 and the risk assessment associated with the cohort of Separation Centre prisoners and the real concern about the lack of equipment to safeguard prison officers in light of that risk. The further context is that equalities matters are embedded in the training provided to prison staff within the Separation Centres.

In this context, it is clear that “an elaborate structure of secondary decision-making” with respect to the equality duty was not required (c.f. R (End of Violence against Women Coalition) at [86]). It is also clear that the segregation regime enabled the Claimant to have access to an Imam and to a Qur’an, as well as media that provided him with programming about Islamic issues. This demonstrates that, in substance, the impact on the Claimant and his needs as a Muslim were not ignored.

What was absent, however, was consideration at the macro level as to whether the segregation decisions had an impact on the equality duty. The evidence does not show any consideration by governors at the local level, or from the Centre, to examining the segregation decisions as a whole through the prism of the equality duty. Whilst it was mentioned at a meeting attended by Mr Worsman and senior officials on 29 April 2025 that “there would be vulnerabilities around (any perception of) collective punishment which would need working through”, there is no indication that this was considered as an equalities matter. A rigorous process of examining a decision and its consequences through the prism of the PSED would have called for consideration of the impact, both real and perceived, of a decision or set of decisions that would result in a cohort of prisoners who shared the same religion – Islam – being treated in a particular way. To that extent, therefore, I consider that the Secretary of State (through her officials) failed to comply with her duty under section 149 of the EqA.

I do not consider, however, that this would have made any difference to the outcome of the actual decisions that were made in the Claimant’s case. The primary focus of those decisions was, as I have already explained, on the risk assessment associated with the cohort of Separation Centre prisoners and the real concern about the lack of equipment to safeguard prison officers in light of that risk. Where there may have been a difference, however, was on the way in which the decisions were communicated to the Claimant, with a greater recognition that he may have perceived his treatment as a form of collective punishment as a Muslim.

I do not consider, however, that there was a breach of the PSED with respect to the more granular points made in oral argument by Mr James-Matthews. It is clear that the decision-makers, and officers, at the local level, were well aware of equalities matters and based on the training that they had been provided with (as reflected in the policy documents set out above), I have no doubt that they would have been sensitive to viewing the intelligence received, and their understanding of what the Claimant was doing (such as reading the Qur’an) through the prism of that training.

As a matter of principle, there is no doubt that the Claimant should have been provided with meaningful disclosure of the reasons for his segregation and that failure to do so would contravene basic principles of procedural fairness. This proposition was expressed and explained by Lord Reed in Bourgass, a case involving segregation of a prisoner following an incident with another prisoner. Lord Reed stated that:

In the instant case, the Secretary of State concedes that decisions made by Governor Jordan were procedurally unfair in that she took into account material gathered from the DRAM process when making the decision to continue his segregation, but did not disclose this to the Claimant. This meant that the Claimant had no opportunity to make meaningful representations about the reasons for his continued segregation. This concession was well made. The principles of procedural fairness, as articulated by Lord Reed, might have been satisfied if the Claimant had been provided with the “gist” of the intelligence material, but he was not provided even with the “gist”.

I reach the same conclusion with respect to the decisions made by Governor Clayden for the period in which the Claimant has been held in segregated conditions at HMP Full Sutton. Although Governor Clayden’s witness evidence is not as explicit as that of Governor Jordan, he does refer to the material received at the DRAM meetings that he attended, saying that “Weekly intelligence reports, and healthcare reports on the prisoner are also received during these meetings. This allows us to tailor our decisions relating to the Claimant’s risk based on the most up-to-date information”. I take the reference to “decisions relating to the Claimant’s risk” as including the decisions to continue the Claimant’s segregation. It also seems highly unlikely that Governor Clayden would have disregarded the intelligence reports entirely from his consideration as to the Claimant’s segregation.

I also consider that a further consequence of this procedural unfairness is that the submissions made by the governors to the Secretary of State (on the OTO30 forms) did not include the intelligence material about the Claimant that they had taken into account, and the response that the Claimant would have provided had that material been shared with him even on a “gisted” basis.

I do not consider, however, that the failure to provide the Claimant even with a “gist” of the intelligence information that was presented to the DRAM, and the concomitant failure to allow him an opportunity to comment and make representations on that material, would have made any difference to the outcome. Given the “central steer” and the reasons for it, there was nothing that the Claimant could realistically have said that would have altered the outcome, either at the local level of governor decision-making or at the central level of the Secretary of State’s authorisation for up to 42 days.

The Claimant’s baseline risk had already been identified when he was initially placed in the Separation Centre. There was nothing to suggest that the Claimant’s risk profile had diminished following his placement within the Separation Centre regime. There was also no evidence to suggest that the Claimant should be treated any differently to the remainder of the prisoners under that regime: that his beliefs, motivations and threat level could be disentangled from the remainder of the cohort and the group dynamic risk that they were seen to present. Even if, therefore, the Claimant would have been able to counter or mitigate any of the concerns raised by the intelligence about him, this would not have made any difference in substance.

In conclusion, therefore, I grant permission with respect to each of the grounds of challenge.

As for the substantive outcome for the different grounds: