Held, appeal allowed in part and cross-appeal dismissed. (1) The judge’s reasons did not support his conclusion that it had been Wednesbury unreasonable for the Secretary of State not to have provided, as at the date of the claimants’ challenge, immediately accessible digital proof of status for migrants on section 3C leave. Although the evidence established that where migrants with section 3C leave were unable to provide immediate proof of their status they might suffer prejudice which would in some cases amount to serious harm and/or financial loss, the evidence did not, and realistically could not, establish in how many cases that occurred; or, where it did, what the distribution of cases was along the scale from minor prejudice to serious harm. The uncertainty about the numbers of such cases was a relevant part of the picture. Furthermore, it was not part of the purpose of the various statutes to which the judge referred that migrants with section 3C leave should be able immediately to demonstrate their immigration status, and thus their access to the rights that depended on it, there being no reason to infer that Parliament had any intention that that should be the case. In circumstances where the legislation itself said nothing about the documentation of section 3C leave, the natural understanding would be that it would be a matter for the discretion of the Secretary of State in what way migrants with section 3C leave would be enabled to demonstrate their status, including the timescale within which they should be enabled to do so. She would in exercising that discretion be entitled to take into account all relevant considerations, including practicability. There was no reason to impute to Parliament an intention that she should exercise that discretion so as to provide for immediate demonstrability, as opposed to the kind of system which she in fact introduced. There was in any event a more specific reason against attributing any such purpose to Parliament. The judge’s unchallenged (and plainly correct) finding was that a physical document was incapable of providing immediate demonstrability of current immigration status: it could only be achieved by means of an immediately accessible online digital record of the eVisa kind. Yet there was no evidence, and no reason to think, that such systems were contemplated in 1999, when section 3C was introduced, or even in 2014 when the principal legislative components of the hostile environment were enacted. It could not be said to have been part of the legislative purpose on either occasion that the Secretary of State should provide for immediate demonstrability when no practicable means of achieving it were then available. Moreover, the judge was wrong to conclude that the fact that eVisas were already in the course of being rolled out for migrants with limited leave to remain was at least prima facie evidence that they, or equivalent digital proof of status, could forthwith be made available to everyone with section 3C leave, and that no reason had been shown why he should not draw that conclusion, when there was explicit evidence that the Secretary of State had decided to introduce eVisas gradually (paras 53, 54, 56–57, 59–60, 67, 103, 104, 105).

(2) The judge was correct that it was not appropriate to apply the Padfield principle in the present case, and even if it were, the approach taken by the Secretary of State to the provision of documentation to migrants on section 3C leave was not contrary to any statutory purpose ( paras 71, 74, 103, 104, 105).

(3) However, the challenge to the finding of breach of the duty under section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 would be adjourned for further submissions in the light of recent Court of Appeal authority( para 75, 103, 104, 105).