Mr Miller for the local authority; the mother appeared in person; Miss Carew for the child, by the children’s guardian; Mr Griffin for the prospective adopters.
The local authority had been granted care and placement orders under section 31 of the Children Act 1989 on 10 July 2012 in respect of CB, born in 2008, who had been placed with prospective adopters in May 2013 and who had last had contact with the mother in March 2013. The hearing had been listed for the determination of three applications: (a) an application under article 15 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 (“Brussels II revised”) for jurisdiction to be transferred to Latvia; (b) applications by the mother for permission to oppose the making of an adoption order under section 47(5) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 and also for contact under section 8 of the 1989 Act. The mother's applications were supported by the Latvian authorities. They were all opposed by the local authority, the prospective adopters and the guardian.
Applications dismissed. The application to transfer the proceedings to Latvia under article 15 failed because the Council Regulation did not apply to decisions on adoption or to measures preparatory to adoption: see In re J and S (Children) [2014] EWFC 4 and Nottingham City Council v LM [2014] EWCA Civ 152. The only application to which it might arguably apply was the mother's application for contact but it would clearly make no sense to transfer just that application, even if it was otherwise merited, which it was not. England was now clearly the more appropriate forum; in the circumstances, there was no basis for concluding that the Latvian courts would be better placed to make decisions concerning CB’s welfare. With regard to the section 47(5) application, the clear conclusion was that the mother had not demonstrated a sufficient change of circumstances; indeed, there was no real change from 2012 other than the passage of time. Furthermore, having regard to the earlier judgments and the evidence in the guardian's report for the applications, it was clear that the mother's prospects of success lacked any "solidity"; she realistically had no prospect of successfully opposing the adoption application. The decision had to be governed by an assessment of what was in CB's best interests throughout her life; there was no other option available to the court because every other option would introduce an element of instability which would cause CB significant harm. In the circumstances of the case there was no prospect of the mother being able successfully to oppose the adoption application and accordingly her application for permission to do so would be dismissed. Finally, contact would be contrary to CB's best interests; it remained the position that the risk of disruption which contact would be likely to cause was too great to permit it (105,110,117,122–124, 127–130).
Children Act 1989, ss 8, 31
Adoption and Children Act 2002, s 47(5)
Council Regulation (EC) 2201/2003, art 15