Katy Chokowry for the wife; Francis Wilkinson for the husband.
The parties married in India in 2003. Both were Hindu nationals who had lived in England between 2007 and 2009 but were now living in India. The husband applied to stay the wife’s English divorce proceedings to enable the Indian divorce proceedings he had instituted there earlier to proceed and the further question arose that if the English proceedings were stayed what should happen to the wife’s application under section 27 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (“neglect to maintain”).
Granting the husband’s application, the judge rejected the wife’s submission that by virtue of Council Regulation (EC) 2201/2003 (“Brussels II Revised”) (OJ 2003 L 338, p1), Owusu v Jackson (Case C-281/02) [2005] QB 801 and Catalyst Investment Group Ltd v Lewinsohn [2010] Ch 218 the discretion to stay a petition given by paragraph 9 of Schedule 1 to the Domicile and Family Proceedings Act 1973 no longer existed so that, if grounds for jurisdiction under Brussels II Revised were met, the court had to hear the petition and could not decide some other jurisdiction was more appropriate. All that regulation 4 of the European Communities (Matrimonial Jurisdiction and Judgments) Regulations 2001 did was to add “other than proceedings governed by the Council Regulation” into paragraph 9. Those additional words called for a “narrow” construction such that the proceedings which were excluded were between two Convention countries and not proceedings where the competing jurisdiction was that of a non-Convention country. Adopting the reasoning and determination in JKN v JCN (Divorce: Forum) [2011] 1 FLR 826, para 149 that it was neither necessary nor desirable to extend the principle in Owusu to cases where there were parallel proceedings in a non-member state, or to proceedings for divorce or nullity, it was clear that India was the appropriate forum (paras 18–22, 24, 31). Since Council Regulation (EC) 4/2009 (the Maintenance Regulations) (OJ 2008 L 7, p1) did not create a freestanding substantive right it followed that any application for maintenance pending suit under section 22 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 was stayed with the petition (para 32). The section 27 application under the 1973 Act, currently stayed, was a freestanding application independent from the divorce but to perpetuate it by removing the existing stay would give rise to the difficulty of litigating an essentially Indian case from England; it would remain theoretically “in being” on the basis that it would come to an end when the decree absolute was pronounced in India (paras 35–37).
Domicile and Family Proceedings Act 1973, s 5(6), Sch 1, para 9 (as amended by European Communities (Matrimonial Jurisdiction and Judgments) Regulations 2001 (SI 2001/310), reg 4)
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, ss 22, 27
Council Regulation (EC) 2201/2003, arts 2, 3, 19
Council Regulation (EC) 4/2009