Held, appeal dismissed. On the face of it, Supreme Court authority was conclusive against the Chief Constable’s case that she had no responsibility for the acts or omissions of the panel and the case could not be distinguished. It was submitted in the alternative that the decision was not binding because the Supreme Court proceeded on the basis of an incorrect assumption about the unavailability of any other remedy. The Chief Constable contended that in fact the claimant would have had a straightforward remedy against the panel by advancing a claim under section 29 (6) of the 2010 Act, which fell under Part 3 (“Services and Public Functions”), but unfortunately that point had not been drawn to the Supreme Court’s attention. The court accepted that it seemed clear that the Supreme Court did not consider the possibility that a claim under section 29 (6) could provide the claimant with an effective remedy which satisfied the equivalence principle, and in that sense it could be said to have “assumed” that the only means by which the claimant could be afforded a remedy was under Part 5. In the court’s opinion even if a claim could be brought under section 29 (6) it would not satisfy the equivalence principle, because claims under Part 3 of the 2010 Act had to be brought in the County Court (see section 114 (1) (a)) whereas claims under Part 5 had to be brought in the employment tribunal (section 120 (1) (a)). The right to pursue a discrimination claim in the County Court was not in the relevant sense equivalent to a right to pursue such a claim in the employment tribunal. There were material differences between the two jurisdictions. The most significant were as follows: First, even if the peculiarities of the police disciplinary system meant that issues of misconduct fell to be determined by an independent body exercising public functions, those functions nevertheless arose out of, and in the context of, the employment relationship. In the British system it was the employment tribunal which had the appropriate expertise for determining discrimination disputes in the employment field. Second, the costs regimes in the County Court and the employment tribunal were fundamentally different. Third, there were at the time that the proceedings were issued no fees payable for bringing a claim in the employment tribunal, whereas fees were payable for the initiation of County Court proceedings. Fourth, the employment tribunal had powers as to remedies in a discrimination case which a County Court did not. For those reasons the court did not believe that the right to bring a discrimination claim in the County Court under section 29 (6) could be regarded as equivalent to the right to bring such a claim in the employment tribunal under section 39 (2) (read with section 42 (1)). It might well be that for similar reasons it did not satisfy the principle of effectiveness either, but the court did not need to consider that. The Chief Constable submitted that if that were the court’s view, the difficulty could be resolved by reading down the statutory allocation of claims of that kind to the County Court. Section 120 (1) (a), however, could not be read down so as to enable a claim of discrimination against a police misconduct panel under section 29 (6) to be brought in the employment tribunal, which meant, that it was not equivalent to a remedy under section 39 (2) and that the decision of the Supreme Court was binding on the court notwithstanding that it did not consider the possibility of such a claim ( paras 26–27, 30–31, 32–40, 41–42, 46, 47–48, 49, 50).