On the appeal—

Held, appeal dismissed. Judges should use descriptions that they consider appropriate to describe their findings and to convey their nature and relative gravity. The essential question was whether the judge was right to describe the child’s experiences, and her findings about the prevalence and accessibility of adult sexual material in both parents’ households, as sexual abuse. The finding of sexual abuse was a specific finding of a particular type of harm identified within the broader statutory definition of “harm’” and “ill-treatment”. There was a risk that the label “sexual abuse”, just like any other generic term, could be misunderstood by the lay parties, by the professionals in the case, or by those outside of this process who may nonetheless be told of it. If the finding was misunderstood it could itself cause upset and even harm. Much important context and detail was lost when judges and professionals used generic terms such as “sexual abuse”, or indeed “physical abuse” or “emotional abuse”, to describe a wide range of conduct, events, actions, and omissions on the part of parents. “Sexual abuse” might have more obviously brought to mind “contact” sexual abuse rather than “non-contact” sexual abuse, and in that sense it could be said to be potentially, inadvertently, misleading. But that was not a reason for judges to avoid using the term which statute had exceptionally provided. It was exceptional because (apart from the heading to paragraph 4 of Schedule 2, where it was used as a broad synonym for ill-treatment) it was the only appearance of the term in the text of the Children Act 1989, and it was, materially, included in that context. Judges in the family court were accustomed to making an evaluation of the evidence, and where possible reaching findings on the facts. Judges ought to think about whether describing the conduct alleged by reference to a generic label would add to an understanding of the facts. The issues raised by the present appeal had served well to underline that “non-contact” sexual abuse might be no less pernicious than “contact” sexual abuse. In a world where technology made ever easier the ability of children and young people to access online pornography and other adult sexual material, there was, perhaps, all the greater need to ensure that our language, and specifically the term “sexual abuse”, reflected the seriousness of the harm to which they were thus exposed. The judge, appropriately assisted by the guidance documents, had reached the clear conclusion that the facts supported a finding that O had been sexually abused, which in turn explained in a material way how the threshold had been crossed (paras 39, 40, 41, 42, 45, 46, 47, 48).

Per curiam. The definitions in the guidance issued by the Department for Education and the NSPCC are not intended to be legal definitions. They are not binding on the courts and they should not be construed as if they were legal documents. Nor do they purport to provide an exhaustive list of the wide range of activities which may constitute abuse (para 43).