The Secretary of State decided that two decommissioned RAF airfields on Crown land were to be used to accommodate asylum seekers, in reliance on a deemed grant of planning permission for purposes in connection with an “emergency” under Class Q of the Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) (England) Order 2015. An emergency was defined in para Q.2 of the 2015 Order as “an event or situation which threatens serious damage” to human welfare or the environment in a place in the United Kingdom or to national security. In connection with that decision the Secretary of State prepared various documents including a statement outlining the nature of the “emergency” which was said to permit lawful reliance on the Class Q permitted development right, referring to the record levels of asylum seekers, which was not thought to have reached its peak; the statutory responsibility on the Home Secretary in that regard; the significantly increasing expense of, and difficulty in sourcing, block-booked hotels used as a short-term contingency when demand for accommodation temporarily exceeded capacity at existing sites in the United Kingdom; and the impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic on decision-making. A local resident and the relevant local planning authorities each sought judicial review challenging the Secretary of Stater’s decision on various grounds including that, in relying on the Class Q permitted development right, the Secretary of State had misinterpreted the definition of “emergency” or, alternatively, reached an irrational conclusion on that issue.
On the claims for judicial review—
Held, claims dismissed. The wording of paragraph Q.2(1) in Class Q of the Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) (England) Order 2015 indicated that the definition was intended to be comprehensive so far as it related to the application of Class Q. The term ought therefore to be understood in its stipulated sense and the court ought to take care not to apply a judicial paraphrase or other gloss on a statutory definition. The term “situation” as used in the definition contemplated something which might have occurred over a period of time and which was of a continuing nature and thus an emergency did not necessarily have to be something sudden, unexpected or unforeseen provided it gave rise to the threat of serious damage. The reference to “threatens serious damage” set the threshold for an event or situation, which threatened harm of one of the three specified categories, to become an emergency for the purposes of Class Q. The category of “human welfare” was defined exhaustively by the list in paragraph Q.2(2) and, in so far as that list included “homelessness”, the Secretary of State needed to be able to demonstrate the existence of an event or situation which threatened serious damage to human welfare in the UK by virtue of homelessness, which in the present case, related to asylum seekers. In addition to the requirement for a threat of serious damage, there were other limitations to the scope of Class Q which further required that the development be on Crown land and carried out by or on behalf of the Crown, and limited the development to 12 months duration. There being no dispute as to the matters identified by the Secretary of State in the statement, and the scale of damages caused by those matters being potentially significant, the situation threatened serious damage to human welfare which would arise in a place in the United Kingdom and the development proposed, which was development by or on behalf of the Crown, on Crown Land, constituted action taken to “reduce, control, or mitigate” the effects of the existing emergency or was “other action taken in connection with” that emergency within the meaning of Class Q. The application of Class Q did not require an investigation into the causes of the emergency, unless the reasons for relying on Class Q reached levels of irrationality which entitled a court to intervene. It followed that the Secretary of State had used the legally correct construction of “emergency” and her reliance on Class Q was lawful (paras 59–61, 64, 66–71, 120).
Per curiam. While not necessary to decide for present purposes, the better view is that the question whether there was a threat of serious damage by way of homelessness of asylum seekers requires the application of judgement which ought, primarily, to be a matter for the Secretary of State, subject to review on the usual public law principles (paras 67, 68).
Alex Goodman KC and Barney McCay (instructed by Deighton Pierce Glynn) for the claimant in the first case.
Richard Wald KC and Jake Thorold (instructed by Legal Services Lincolnshire, Lincoln) for the claimant in the second case.
Wayne Beglan and Jack Barber (instructed by Sharpe Pritchard LLP) for the claimant in the third case.
Paul Brown KC, Nicholas Grant and Harley Ronan (instructed by Treasury Solicitor) for the Home Secretary.
Richard Honey KC and Michael Rhimes (instructed by Treasury Solicitor) for the Secretary of State for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities.
Charles Streeten (instructed by Treasury Solicitor) for the Secretary of State for Defence, an interested party.