The claimant had since December 2021 lived at hostel premises within the defendant local housing authority’s jurisdiction in Tottenham, where she had a room of her own but shared bathroom and kitchen facilities. The accommodation was provided on half board terms. The claimant asserted that the housing authority had failed in its responsibilities under the Housing Act 1996. More specifically, she contended that her room did not amount to “suitable” accommodation and that it was not reasonable for her to continue to occupy it, with the result that she was “homeless” for the purposes of the 1996 Act. The claimant was refused permission to apply for judicial review of the defendant’s local housing authority's decision that the hostel accommodation it had provided was suitable and that it was reasonable for her to continue to occupy it. She also, in the County Court under section 204 of the Housing Act 1996, challenged the relevant review decision. The challenge was dismissed.
On the claimant’s further appeals—
Held, appeals dismissed. (1) Reasonableness and suitability were distinct concepts. There was no need to exclude the possibility of a person being “homeless” and so owed the main housing duty under section 193 of the 1996 Act despite having “suitable accommodation available for occupation” and “a reasonable prospect” of retaining it for at least six months within the meaning of section 189B(7)(a). The fact, however, that section 189B(7)(a) required “a reasonable prospect of having suitable accommodation available for occupation for at least 6 months” made that scenario much less likely. Typically, the matters rendering the accommodation potentially “suitable” for “at least 6 months” would also tend to make it such as “it would be reasonable … to continue to occupy” . The upshot was that, where a local housing authority duly brought its relief duty to an end pursuant to section 189B(5) and (7)(a) of the 1996 Act on the basis that suitable accommodation was available, that might not necessarily prevent the applicant from being owed the main housing duty as “homeless”. However, it had very often at least to be the case that a person for whom such suitable accommodation was available was not “homeless”. Where that was so, the condition specified in section 193(1)(a)(i) would not be met and so the main housing duty could not arise. The local housing authority would not need to make a “final accommodation offer” or “a final Part 6 offer” (as defined in section 193A) for the main housing duty to be inapplicable. The fact that the applicant was no longer “homeless” would of itself have the consequence that the applicant could not be owed the main housing duty. In the instant case, the claimant was not homeless and the relief duty could be brought to an end (paras 43, 46, 49, 65, 69, 70).
(2) The review officer was aware of the claimant’s medical circumstances and it had been accepted that she was disabled. The review officer had made relevant inquiries and there had been no need to make further medical inquiries. Further, the review officer had regard to the equality duty under section 149 of the Equality Act 2010. His decision that the relevant accommodation was “suitable” was not unreasonable, and there was no further duty lying on the housing authority founded on “homelessness” (paras 51, 53, 57, 65, 69, 70).
Per curiam. The procedures for review and appeal to the County Court for which sections 202 and 204 of the 1996 Act provided were an innovation aimed at transferring the main strain of the High Court’s task of judicial review of such cases to the County Court. However, the High Court retained a residual jurisdiction in such matters. Given the existence of sections 202 and 204, challenges to local housing authorities’ decisions relating to homelessness should generally be pursued under those provisions and not by way of judicial review (paras 66, 68, 69, 70).
Rea Murray (instructed by Lawstop) for the claimant.
Stephen Evans (instructed by Solicitor, London Borough of Haringey) for the local housing authority.