A property in Trinidad was let to the defendant’s father in 1971. After he died his wife was served by the-then owners with a notice to quit, to expire on 30 April 1996, but she and her daughter, the defendant, continued to occupy the property. On 23 August 1996 the-then owners accepted outstanding rent for the period up to 30 April 1996. In 2002 the mother died and in 2012, with the defendant still in occupation, the claimant purchased the property. On 18 May 2012 the claimant commenced proceedings against the defendant in the High Court of Trinidad and Tobago to recover possession. The defendant counterclaimed for a declaration that she had acquired possessory title by means of over 16 years’ adverse possession, arguing that by section 3 of the Real Property Limitation Act 1846 any action to recover land had to be brought within 16 years of the date when the action first accrued, which was the date when the notice to quit had expired, namely 30 April 1996. The judge, however, in reliance on section 9 of the Act providing that any right of action “shall be deemed to have first accrued” at the last time when any rent payable in respect of the tenancy had “been received”, held that the claimant’s right of action had not accrued until 23 August 1996, when payment of the outstanding rent had been received, and so had been brought in time. He accordingly held that the defendant could not rely on adverse possession and ordered her to vacate the premises. The Court of Appeal of Trinidad and Tobago dismissed the defendant’s appeal.
On the defendant’s further appeal—
Held, appeal allowed. The Real Property Limitation Act 1846 was modelled on the Real Property Limitation Act 1833 enacted in England and Wales and the purpose of the deeming provisions in each Act (as well as in the latter Act’s successors) was to settle cases where there might be doubt as to when time started to run. Hence the deeming provision in section 9 of the 1846 Act provided a clear rule for cases where rent had not been paid under an oral periodic tenancy but no formal step had been taken to terminate the tenancy. Where, however, a tenancy had been terminated by a valid notice to quit, which under the general law took effect when the notice expired, there was no need to have recourse to a deeming provision. It followed that time had begun to run from the previous landlord’s termination of the tenancy on 30 April 1996 so that, by the time that the action was begun by the claimant on 18 May 2012, its right to recover the property from the defendant had been lost (paras 8, 11–15).
Navindra Ramnanan (instructed by Magna Mentes, San Fernando) for the defendant.
John Jeremie SC (instructed by Simons Muirhead & Burton LLP) for the claimant, by written submissions.