The defendant was charged with sexual assault contrary to section 3 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. A former police officer summoned to attend court for jury service (whose service had already been deferred once) wrote to the court and Central Jury Summoning Service to say having spent 30 years in the police force there would be a danger of bias if he performed the service being of the firm belief that any defendant the officers in the case and the Crown Prosecution Service considered there was enough evidence to charge was bound to be guilty and he would only try to persuade the other jurors of the defendant’s guilt so would be unable to come to an unbiased decision. He was selected to serve as a juror in the defendant’s trial and counsel agreed with the judge the appropriate course would be for the judge to question the juror in the absence of any other jurors. The judge reminded the juror about the contents of his letter, emphasised that jury service was an important civic duty, asked whether the juror was prepared to make the affirmation after reading him the words of the affirmation and give a true verdict according to the evidence. The juror twice stated clearly he was prepared to abide by the terms of the affirmation and return a true verdict according to the evidence. Despite defence counsel’s submission that he should not serve because of a real possibility of bias, the judge ruled that it was appropriate for the juror to serve as a juror, referring to the need for persons to abide by the public service commitment of acting as jurors and to his experience that many persons may approach jury service with preconceived ideas which they properly put to one side once they had taken the juror’s affirmation. After the jury was empanelled and the trial proceeded the defendant was convicted. He appealed against conviction on the ground that the conviction was unsafe because there was a real possibility of bias on the part of the juror and his bias might have contaminated and influenced other jurors.
On the appeal—
Held, appeal dismissed. No criticism could be made of the procedure the judge adopted to test whether there was a risk of bias. He correctly directed himself as to the applicable law and conducted a careful and thorough inquiry which gave the juror every opportunity to state if he could not abide by the juror affirmation or answer the judge’s questions in a manner which cast doubt on his ability to do so. An inquiry of that nature was fact-specific and would turn on the nature of the case, the issues in the trial and the nature of and reasons for the asserted or suggested bias. The judge was best placed to decide the reliability of the prospective juror's responses, the manner and tone in which the questions were answered and the strength or weakness of an asserted willingness and intention to abide by the juror affirmation. The judge had been entitled to reach the conclusion he did. The juror quickly acknowledged what his public duty required of him and expressed his willingness and ability to comply. By questioning him directly the judge had been able to observe and assess his response and was entitled to accept the answers given and conclude that the fair minded and informed observer invested with the judge’s knowledge and assessment of the inquiry would not think it a real possibility that the juror remained biased. None of the jurors raised any concern about the conduct of the juror during their evidence or deliberations and the conviction was safe (paras 18–22).
Robert Bryan (assigned by the Registrar of Criminal Appeals) for the defendant.
Efstathios Divaris (instructed by Crown Prosecution Service, Appeals Unit, Special Crime Division) for the Crown.