Held, permission to bring contempt proceedings refused. (1) Disclosure of documents which related to family proceedings was generally proscribed by section 12 of the Administration of Justice Act 1960 although that general proscription was disapplied in many circumstances by rules of considerable complexity. Here consideration of case law, FPR rr 2.73, 12.75, and PD 12G—Communication of Information led to the conclusion that, although a party had the right to disclose to a specialist police officer working in furtherance of child protection any information about the section 8 proceedings, disclosure to a non-specialist police officer would fall outside that freedom, be a breach of section 12 and thus a contempt. It followed that the disclosures by the defendant amounted to a contempt although the seriousness of the breach was mitigated by the fact that, were such a disclosure to have been made by a party to a specialist police officer or by the Cafcass officer to a non-specialist police officer, it would not amount to a breach (paras 32, 55).

(2) There was a qualitative difference between, on the one hand, a misguided unlawful disclosure to the police in furtherance of seeking personal and child protection measures and, on the other, sending all the papers to a journalist or putting them up on social media platforms in order to harm the other party or to denigrate the legal system. That difference was properly to be reflected in the permission decision. When applying the permission test the strength of the case, public interest, proportionality and the overriding objective were of relevance. Relevant factors in the present case were that, inter alia, (i) the defendant would not have been in breach had she made the disclosure to specialist police officers, (ii) the claimant father did not seek any sanction against the defendant beyond an admonishment, (iii) the disclosure had been made by the defendant when seeking the assistance of the police for herself and the child and the ability of people in the position of the defendant to seek the assistance of the police ought not to be unduly inhibited by the spectre of facing contempt proceedings, (iv) it was not proportionate to allow the claimant to pursue the defendant for breach of section 12 where he himself had been guilty of doing the same thing, and (v) it would not be fair and just for contempt proceedings to go ahead on the footing that, whatever the result, the claimant would not be identified, but the defendant would, on a formal finding of contempt being made against her, be named in open court. In those circumstances, permission to bring contempt proceedings would be refused although the defendant would be admonished for her breach of section 12 of the 1960 Act (paras 75, 103–126).

Per curiam. (i) As it was absolutely forbidden for the defendant to show the (non-specialist) police officers any documents from the proceedings, other than judgments or orders, if she wanted to do more then she needed to obtain an order from the court allowing it (para 125).

(ii) It is hard to understand why this aspect of the law of contempt, which, given its nature, should be as straightforward and transparent as possible, appears to be so arbitrary and bereft of logic. It is respectfully suggested that the Rule Committee needs to take a serious look at the Byzantine rules covering what parties can lawfully disclose to the police. Parties to section 8 proceedings seem to be forced to walk across a minefield of potential contempts and crimes if they seek the assistance of the police while the proceedings are ongoing. It is unacceptable that something so important should be so obscure, impenetrable, arbitrary and illogical. The position whereby the 2015 Practice Direction continues in existence in Family Division, Family Court and Court of Protection committal proceedings but not in King’s Bench Division or County Court committal proceedings is equally obscure and bizarre, and likewise needs to be looked at urgently (paras 55, 129, 130).