The claimant was a victim of the Windrush scandal, whereby 600,000 Commonwealth citizens who had come to the United Kingdom between 1948 and 1973 with the right to remain indefinitely had subsequently been refused re-entry to the United Kingdom because they had never been given any documentation to confirm their immigration status. Following the Secretary of State for the Home Department’s refusal to grant him British citizenship, the claimant brought a successful judicial review claim in which the court found that the decision had been unlawful. The claimant sought compensation of £307, 647.31 under the Windrush compensation scheme, which was designed to compensate voluntarily individuals who had suffered loss in connection with being unable to demonstrate their lawful status in the UK. The Secretary of State made an offer of compensation in the lesser sum of £103,501. At the claimant’s request a tier 1 review was carried out pursuant to the terms of the scheme but the decision was upheld. The claimant then sought a further, tier 2 review and also offered to accept £261,294.31 in full and final settlement. On the tier 2 review the first defendant upheld the tier 1 decision. The claimant then accepted the original offer, less payments already made, in full and final settlement of his claim. The claimant subsequently sought judicial review challenging the review decisions on the grounds, inter alia, that on a true construction of the scheme he was entitled to further payment notwithstanding the sums he had accepted by way of settlement. The issue arose whether the claim was precluded by the terms of the compensation scheme, including rule 9.3 which provided that a claimant accepting a “final payment” award accepted it as “full and final settlement of their claim and of any claim which they may have been entitled to bring under the scheme”.
On the claim for judicial review—
Held, claim dismissed. (1) There was no authority to support the proposition that public law claims could not be settled, before issue of proceedings, by agreement between the parties. It was not contrary to public policy that public law claims should be ruled out, between particular parties, in particular cases, by agreement between those parties. While no such agreement would bind the Crown, nor anyone who had not themselves been party to the agreement in question, there was no reason, in principle, why a person who had reached a full and final settlement for payment of a sum of money should not be precluded from applying for judicial review or being granted remedies in judicial review, even though the application would be brought in the name of the Crown. The settlement of disputes was in the public interest, and the parties had to make their own assessment of what was in their private interest. Accordingly, the court would not determine claims which had been settled, regardless of whether the court's decision, if made, would be more or less favourable, or identical, to the terms of the settlement. However, the settlement agreement itself would be actionable if payment was not made in accordance with it, or if the settlement was procured by misrepresentation, or under some other circumstance rendering the agreement itself open to question (paras 103–105, 107–110).
(2) While the purpose of the Windrush compensation scheme was to provide compensation, it did not require either the highest possible award or an award in a particular amount. It directed an award which was in accordance with the rules of the scheme but that did not mean that it would be contrary to the purpose of the scheme for the parties to agree on a binding settlement, even if it was for less than the claimant wanted. Binding settlement was built into the scheme rules, including rule 9.3, which did not limit the effect of a “full and final settlement” but, on the contrary, reinforced it by making clear that acceptance of an award would settle, not only the claim actually made, but also any claim (for example, for an additional element) which might have been made. The words “full and final settlement” were so clear and commonplace there was no ambiguity which required resolution by a purposive construction. The wording of the claimant's acceptance of the settlement, which was made in full accordance with the scheme, was clear and unambiguous and rendered the settlement binding and complete. The claimant had accepted the award in full and final settlement of his claim, and had thereby agreed that his claim was at an end, and that he would pursue no further claim, and that he was therefore not entitled to bring further proceedings (including judicial review proceedings) to challenge or increase the amount of the award. A contract of settlement was as binding as any other contract, and remained so even if the counter-party was a public body. It followed that the claimant no longer had standing to bring proceedings for judicial review because he had no further claim, and no interest in arguments which might provide others with a claim, and his judicial review claim was accordingly an abuse of process (paras 72, 87, 88, 90, 92, 95–97, 100).
Chris Buttler KC and Raza Halim (instructed by Duncan Lewis) for the claimant.
Edward Brown KC and Kathryn Howarth (instructed by Treasury Solicitor) for the Secretary of State.
The first defendant did not appear and was not represented.