Held, giving leave for the reference and refusing B’s application for leave to appeal, that the sentence passed on B for kidnap was unduly lenient. Since comments made in an earlier case, sentencing policy had clearly moved on, as had the understanding of domestic abuse and controlling and coercive behaviour: see for example, the sentencing guidance given by the Sentencing Council in the overarching principles on domestic abuse. It sufficed to say that all kidnapping offences were serious even if such offending inevitably varied as to the degree of seriousness. As the sentencing guidelines now made plain, the fact that an offence, including necessarily that of kidnap, occurred in the domestic context, and in particular, in the context of an abusive personal relationship, would be an aggravating factor; indeed it was likely to be a seriously aggravating factor, rather than a factor to be deployed or relied on in mitigation. Contrary to the suggestion therefore implicit in the use of language such as family tiffs or lovers’ disputes, it was not helpful or appropriate to classify cases with a domestic element as less serious or at the other end of the scale, or as "those offences which can perhaps scarcely be classed as kidnapping at all". The language used in the earlier case to describe cases of that nature and the classification of them, should no longer be followed. Instead, regard should be had to the general guidance on sentencing cases of kidnap given in a later case, and to the guidance given by the Sentencing Council, where relevant, including for example on domestic abuse. In the later case the court said that in relation to kidnap offences: (i) A close analysis of the facts and circumstances was required in every case; (ii) relevant factors in accessing the gravity of cases of that type included: (a) the length of the detention; (b) the circumstances of the detention, including the location and any method of restraint; (c) the extent of any violence used; (d) the involvement of weapons; (e) whether or not demands were made of others; (f) whether or not threats were made to others; (g) the effect on the victim and others; (h) the extent of the planning involved; (i) the number of offenders involved; (j) the use of torture or humiliation; (k) whether or not what was done arose from, or was in furtherance of, previous criminal behaviour; (l) and any particular vulnerability of the victim whether by reason of age or otherwise. The judge had erred in discounting the harm caused to L as an aggravating feature by his failing to reflect that, even if the jury’s verdicts on other offences implied that they were not sure that B had pushed her, the only other tenable explanation was that she jumped from the van out of fear. The judge had also made an excessive reduction on account of B’s age. A sentence of eight year upwards for the offence of kidnap would have been justified. No change would be made to S’s sentence. Accordingly, B’s sentence would be quashed and a sentence of 12 years’ detention substituted, the sentences for the other offences being made concurrent (see paras 22–23, 28–34).