Held, appeal dismissed. The test for bias involved a well-established two stage process. The court had to first ascertain all the circumstances which had a bearing on the suggestion that the judge was biased. It then had to ask whether those circumstances would lead a fair-minded and informed observer to conclude that there was a real possibility that the judge was biased. Where it occurred, judicial bullying was wholly unacceptable. It brought the litigation process into disrepute and affected public confidence in the administration of justice. However, it inevitably remained the case that situations of conflict between bar and bench would sometimes arise. In that connection: (i) counsel were sometimes obliged to object to, or be critical of, something said or done by the judge in the course of a hearing. Judges should, and almost always did, appreciate that that was a fundamental part of the advocate’s role and should entertain the objection with respect, even if they regarded it as ill-founded. However, respect went both ways, and it was important that any such objection or criticism was expressed, however firmly, in a professional way. The fact that most judges conducted hearings in a less formal manner than might have been usual in earlier generations was not a licence to disregard the particular position of authority which they necessarily enjoyed. (ii) Trials were a very intense environment. Even the best counsel might in the pressure of the moment express themselves in ways which they did not really intend or say things which they would not have said if they had had time for reflection—whether in the context of an exchange with the judge of the present kind or more generally. Judges should, and almost always did, recognise that. Many such lapses could simply be overlooked or corrected with a light touch. (iii) There would nevertheless be occasions when counsel’s conduct required explicit correction or admonishment. In such a case the judge should try to ensure that any rebuke was proportionate and delivered in measured terms, without showing personal resentment or anger. Even a merited rebuke might be unsettling for counsel; and it might also, even if unjustifiably, have an impact on the confidence of their client in the fairness of the hearing. That said, some such impact might be unavoidable, in which case it had to be accepted as a consequence of counsel’s behaviour. (iv) A statement by the judge that they were considering referring counsel to the Bar Standards Board (“BSB”) was a particularly strong form of admonition and was accordingly particularly liable to have an adverse impact. For that reason, it would rarely be appropriate for a judge to raise the possibility of referring counsel to the BSB in the middle of a hearing. In the great majority of cases, the better course would be to wait until the end of the hearing, which would avoid raising the temperature more than was necessary and would also mean that the judge could evaluate counsel’s conduct in the overall context of the hearing. In the rare case where an allegation of professional misconduct did have to be raised in the course of a hearing, the situation would require sensitive handling and the judge would be well advised to take time to consider carefully when and how to raise the matter. (v) Since judges were human, and hearings could be challenging for them as well as for counsel, they would sometimes lapse from those high standards, and incidents would occur which the judge should have handled better. However, such lapses did not necessarily amount to bullying; still less did it necessarily follow that in such a case the hearing would have been unfair or that the judge should recuse themselves from any further involvement. On the contrary, it was fundamental to the culture and training of a professional judge that they would decide each case according to its objective merits. If judge and counsel rubbed each other up the wrong way, whether or not it was the fault of either or both, that could be, and almost always was, put to one side in the decision-making process. Likewise, the professional training and experience of counsel should enable them to deal with criticism from the bench, even if they might believe it to be unjustified. In the present case, although the mother’s reference to bullying required the court to consider the judge’s conduct, the dispositive question on the application was not whether he was guilty of misconduct in relation to either instance but whether his conduct would give rise to a reasonable apprehension that he was biased against the mother, because of her counsel’s behaviour. On analysis, nothing said or done by the judge would have led the he fair-minded and informed observer to conclude that there was a real possibility that he was biased against the mother. Accordingly, there had been no basis upon which the judge had been required to recuse himself (paras 107, 122–128, 139, 141).