The claimant, who had a history of mental health problems, was arrested on suspicion of causing grievous bodily harm but released on police bail after being seen by medical professionals. Shortly thereafter, while in a delusional state, the claimant attacked and killed three men in their homes, resulting in him being charged with murder. At trial he was found not guilty by reason of insanity, pursuant to section 2 of the Trial of Lunatics Act 1883, on the basis that although he had known the nature and quality of his acts he had not known that what he was doing was wrong. Acting in accordance with section 5 of the Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964 the court ordered that he be detained in hospital. The claimant brought a claim in negligence against two healthcare providers, the police authority and the local authority, seeking damages for personal injury, loss of liberty, loss of reputation and loss of dignity and an indemnity in respect of any claim brought against him as a consequence of his violence towards others in the days preceding the killings. An application by the healthcare providers and the local authority to strike out the claims on the ground of illegality was refused by the judge on the basis that the “special verdict” of not guilty by reason of insanity meant that the claimant had not known that what he was doing was wrong or unlawful, with the effect that his conduct did not have the element of turpitude necessary for the defence of illegality to apply to his claim.
On appeal by the healthcare providers and the local authority—
Held, appeal dismissed (Andrews LJ dissenting). The case law drew a coherent and bright line distinction between those who were criminally responsible for their acts, whether fully or partially, and those who were not responsible for their acts because they did not know what they were doing was morally and legally wrong. A special verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity was an acquittal, such that the law did not treat the accused as criminally responsible for his actions, and there was no inconsistency with either the criminal or civil law in allowing such a person to recover in civil proceedings for the loss that he had suffered in consequence of his actions. Further, as regards the “public confidence” principle that allowing a claimant to be compensated for the consequences of his own criminal conduct risked bringing the law into disrepute and diminishing respect for it, because that was an outcome of which public opinion would be likely to disapprove, it was necessary to go beyond instinctive recoil to consider what justice truly required in a situation that most humane and fair-minded people would recognise as far from straightforward. While those who were killed or injured always had to be treated as the primary victims, it was fair to recognise that the killer could also be a victim if they were suffering from serious mental illness and had been let down by those responsible for their care. Where, as in the present case, a person had been held not to be criminally responsible for his or her actions on the grounds of insanity, the common law ought not to deny that person the right to receive proper medical treatment and a remedy as a claimant. Nor was it proportionate to treat other public policy considerations as outweighing the public interest in claimants in insanity cases receiving due compensation for the wrong that they had suffered. Accordingly, the civil claims of the claimant in the present case did not fall to be struck out on grounds of illegality (paras 83–85, 87, 95, 96, 101, 102–105, 113–116, 118, 120, 138, 155, 156, 161).
Selena Plowden KC and Christopher Johnson (instructed by Clarke Willmott LLP) for the claimant.
Gurion Taussig (instructed by G4S Legal Department) for the first defendant.
Judith Ayling KC and James Goudkamp (instructed by DAC Beachcroft LLP) for the second defendant.
Andrew Warnock KC and Jack Harding (instructed by DWF LLP) for the third defendant.