The claimant’s husband (“the deceased”) died in New South Wales, where they were domiciled. The deceased left a will by which he appointed the claimant as his sole executrix. Probate of that will was granted to the claimant by the Supreme Court of New South Wales and, subsequently, the claimant purporting to act as personal representative to the estate of the deceased, issued proceedings against the defendants (the brother of the deceased, and his wife) in England and Wales in relation to land located in England. Thereafter, the grant of probate was re-sealed by the High Court in England and Wales pursuant to section 2 of the Colonial Probates Act 1892 so that the Australian grant of probate “thereupon, shall be of the like force and effect, and have the same operation in the United Kingdom, as if granted by that court”. The defendant brought an application for summary judgment or for the claim to be struck out, on the basis that at the time the claim was issued (before the grant was re-sealed) the claimant, as a foreign executor, had no legal standing and the claim was accordingly liable to be struck out as being void and a nullity. The district judge dismissed the application and that decision was upheld on appeal. On the defendants’ further appeal, they contended that (i) the judge erred in his interpretation of section 2 of the 1892 Act, since re-sealing operated only prospectively and so could not retrospectively validate the proceedings; and (ii) as a matter of principle, the position of a person named as an executor in the will of a testator domiciled abroad was not to be equated with that of someone so named in the will of a testator domiciled in this jurisdiction.
On the appeal—
Held, appeal dismissed. (1) Section 2 of the Colonial Probates Act 1892 nowhere stated that re-sealing the grant of probate was to have retrospective effect. Read naturally, the word “thereupon” signified just “upon that being done” and did not imply retrospectivity. Section 1 of the 1892 Act also used the word “thereupon” and there could be no question of “thereupon” producing retrospectivity in that context. Furthermore, it was hard to see why Parliament should have intended re-sealing under the 1892 Act to operate retrospectively when re-sealings as between England and either Scotland or Northern Ireland did not (para 30, 62, 63).
(2) The distinctions which the defendants sought to draw between a foreign executor and a domestic one appeared to be relatively insubstantial and there was no authority for the proposition that a foreign executor had no title or authority in relation to English assets unless and until probate was obtained in this jurisdiction. There was no sufficient reason for declining to follow, in the case of a foreign executor, the principle that an executor derived his title and authority from the will of his testator and not from any grant of probate. However, it remained to be considered whether that was to be applied in relation to all foreign executors or only where the law of the testator’s domicile, like that of England and Wales, treated an executor as acquiring title from the date of the testator’s death. The law of New South Wales, unlike that of England and Wales, did not consider an executor who had not obtained probate to have legal title to the testator’s estate. The question whether the claimant was to be considered to have acquired title to the deceased’s cause of action against the defendants as the executrix appointed under his will was properly characterised as one relating to the administration of a deceased person’s assets. The administration of a deceased person’s assets was governed wholly by the law of the country from which the personal representative derived his or her authority to collect them. It appeared that, notwithstanding that the claimant obtained a grant of probate in New South Wales, it was from the English jurisdiction that she derived her authority to collect assets here; after all, a foreign grant of representation was not without more recognised as having any force in England and Wales. That being so, the law of England and Wales was to be applied to the issue of whether the claimant acquired title to the deceased’s estate on his death and New South Wales law on the point was immaterial. On that footing, the claimant was to be regarded as having acquired title to the cause of action against the defendants on the deceased’s death. Accordingly, the claim had been properly issued (paras 40, 41, 47, 50–51, 61, 62, 63).
Per curiam. CPR r 3.10 is not applicable where the proceedings that have purportedly been brought are to be regarded as a nullity. CPR r 3.10 allows existing proceedings to be regularised, not the creation of valid proceedings. The bringing of a claim on behalf of an estate by a person who, at the time, lacks standing to represent it is not a mere “error of procedure”, but renders the proceedings a nullity. In such a case, CPR r 3.10 has no application and the proceedings should be struck out (paras 59, 60, 62, 63).
Philip Stear (instructed directly) for the defendants.
Rowena Meager (instructed by Irwin Mitchell LLP) for the claimant.