S, a national of Iran, arrived in the United Kingdom with his mother at the age of nine and was given indefinite leave to remain. Between the ages of 14 and 17 he was convicted of a number offences including a series of robberies or attempted robberies at knifepoint for which he was sentenced to three years’ detention in a young offender institution. The Secretary of State ordered his deportation as being conducive to the public good. S’s appeal against that order was allowed by the First-tier Tribunal but its decision was set aside by the Upper Tribunal for error of law, which itself reheard the appeal. The Upper Tribunal concluded that notwithstanding S having been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of his life, and socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom, there were no significant obstacles to his integration into Iran such as would bring him within the exception in section 117C(4) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 so as to override the public interest in the deportation of those who commit serious crimes. The Upper Tribunal also rejected S’s contention that dicta in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights mandated a requirement that, absent “very serious reasons” (connoting very serious offences), the expulsion of a settled migrant who had lawfully spent the major part of his childhood in the host country and had committed the offences underlying the expulsion measure as a juvenile would amount to a disproportionate interference in his rights under article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Accordingly, the Upper Tribunal dismissed S’s appeal, a decision which was upheld by the Court of Appeal.
On S’s further appeal—
Held, appeal dismissed. On a claim that the proposed expulsion of a settled migrant as a result of criminal offending would interfere with that person’s right to a family life within article 8 of the Human Rights Convention, the decision had to be in accordance with law, justified by a pressing social need and proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. In order to be proportionate it had to strike a fair balance between the appellant’s right to respect for his private and family life, on the one hand, and the prevention of disorder or crime, on the other. Where the proposed expulsion involved a young adult who had not yet founded a family, the court had to consider (i) the nature and seriousness of the offence committed by the person, (ii) the length of the person’s stay in the country from which he or she was to be expelled, (iii) the time elapsed since the offence was committed and the person’s conduct during that period and (iv) the solidity of social, cultural and family ties with the host country and with the country of destination. There was no warrant for imposing an additional requirement of “very serious reasons” to justify expulsion and no requirement in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights to such effect. Since the Upper Tribunal had given careful consideration to the four criteria and there had been substantial material to support its view that the interference with S’s private and family life was outweighed by the public interest in the prevention of crime, the challenge to the decision to remove him failed, although it would be open to S to challenge the decision afresh if the lapse of time since the tribunal’s decision had resulted in a relevant change of circumstances (post, paras 18, 20, 22, 28–30, 46, 49, 51–54, 56–65).
Raza Husain QC, David Chirico and Eleanor Mitchell (instructed by Elder Rahimi) for S.
Sir James Eadie QC and Julie Anderson (instructed by Treasury Solicitor) for the Secretary of State.