Held, claim allowed, save that the first claimant did not have standing to pursue the human rights claim. (1) The power being exercised by the coroner was akin to a power derived from statute and, accordingly, the principle of public law that a policy should not be so rigid as to amount to a fetter on the discretion of decision-makers applied. The defendant had breached that principle by imposing a blanket rule that, in taking decisions as to when and how to exercise her various statutory powers and for how long to retain custody of a body, she would not take into account the circumstances of any individual family where they had a religious basis, even where there would be limited (or even no) effect on her other work. The defendant accepted that some cases had to be given priority, for example, deaths which were the subject of homicide investigations and organ donations, so that not every case was dealt with by her office in strict chronological order. However, on its face, the policy precluded taking into account representations which had a religious basis and thereby excluded religious beliefs from consideration. There was no good reason for that exclusion and it was discriminatory and incapable of rational justification. If the policy precluded taking into account any individual circumstances of any kind, whether or not based on a religious faith, there was similarly no reason for that absolutist stance and the policy was incapable of rational justification (paras 83, 86–87, 89–92).

(2) A person’s right to manifest religion or belief under article 9 of the Convention could be subject to limitations. Article 9.2 made clear that any limitation had to be prescribed by law and necessary in order to serve a legitimate aim, including the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, on which the defendant could place reliance. However, for a limitation on a fundamental right to be “necessary”, it had to satisfy the principles of proportionality. There was no dispute that the right to manifest religion was in play, nor that the policy adopted by the defendant interfered with that right. Whilst the interference was not “prescribed by law” it did serve a legitimate aim, in particular, the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, for example those who might have an urgent need for a decision from a coroner but who did not have a particular religious faith. The fundamental difficulty with the defendant’s policy was that it did not strike a fair balance between the rights concerned at all. Rather, as a matter of rigid policy, it required the coroner and her officers to leave out of account altogether the requirements of Jewish and Muslim people in relation to early consideration of and early release of bodies of their loved ones. Reasonable people in society would not regard the need to grant expedition for some cases as “queue jumping” or otherwise unfair. The evidence indicated that it was perfectly possible to have a policy where cases were prioritised where there was need for the early release of a body, for any reason, be it secular or religious (paras 97–101, 105, 106).

(3) The principle of equality in article 14 of the Convention was one of the most fundamental in a democratic society and was certainly one of the most cherished rights in the Convention. Although the principle of equality required like cases to be treated alike, it was not always sufficiently appreciated that it also required that different cases should be treated differently. An important part of equality law was that in a discrimination case what had to be justified was not only the underlying measure but the discrimination. In the present case, even if the defendant’s policy could be justified under article 9 (which it could not), it was difficult to see what justification there could be for it. The need for a “bright line” was not sufficient, particularly where, even on the defendant’s own admission, the policy was not a strictly chronological one, so that some cases would have to be given priority even if they were not first in time, for example if there was a need for an organ donation. Limitations on resources were likewise insufficient to justify a policy whereby certain reasons for a request for expedition (religious ones) were excluded from consideration altogether. Accordingly, the defendant’s policy violated the principle of equal treatment in article 14 of the Convention (paras 114, 117, 119, 120–125).

(3) The challenge under the 2010 Act added nothing materially to the arguments under article 14 of the Convention, however there was considerable overlap and in the circumstances the court could and should consider the substantive merits of the claim. In order to give effect to the will of Parliament, the 2010 Act should be given a broad and generous interpretation so as to give full effect to its underlying purposes. In the circumstances, the claimants were entitled to rely on the concept of indirect discrimination in section 19 of the Equality Act 2010. Since the issue of proportionality which arose under section 19(2)(d) of the 2010 Act was in essence the same issue as that which arose under articles 9 and 14 of the Convention, there was also a breach of section 29 of the 2010 Act (paras 136, 137, 141, 142, 143).