Judges S Rodin, D Šváby, K Jürimäe, N Piçarra (Rapporteur)
Advocate General H Saugmandsgaard Øe
The applicant passenger, who was then six years old, flew from Spain to Austria with her father, next to whom she was sitting. The journey was operated by an air transport company which had since become insolvent. During the flight, the father was served a cup of hot coffee which, while it was placed upon the tray table, tipped over onto his thigh and onto the passenger’s chest, causing her second-degree scalding. It could not be established whether the cup of coffee tipped over due to a defect in the folding tray table on which it was placed or due to vibration of the aircraft. The passenger, represented for legal purposes by her father, filed a claim on the basis of article 17(1) of the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air (1999) (“the Montreal Convention”) seeking that the now insolvent carrier be ordered to pay compensation for the harm caused to her. Under article 17(1), in order to engage the liability of an air carrier, the event causing the death or bodily injury of the passenger had to be classified as an “accident” and that accident had to take place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking. The defendant administrator of the carrier contended that, because there was no accident, the carrier not be held liable under that provision and that no sudden and unexpected incident led to the sliding of the cup of coffee and the spillage of its contents. According to the defendant, the concept of “accident” within the meaning of article 17(1) of the Montreal Convention required the materialisation of a hazard typically associated with aviation, a condition that was not fulfilled in the present case. The claim was allowed. The defendant’s appeal was subsequently allowed. On the passenger’s appeal, the Supreme Court, Austria, stayed the proceedings and referred to the Court of Justice of the European Union for a preliminary ruling a question on the interpretation of article 17(1) of the Montreal Convention.
On the reference—
Held, the ordinary meaning given to the concept of “accident” was that of an unforeseen, harmful and involuntary event. The states parties to the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air (1999) (“the Montreal Convention”) laid down a system of strict liability for air carriers which implied that an “equitable balance of interests” be maintained, in particular the interests of air carriers and of passengers. In order to maintain such balance, the Montreal Convention provided that, in certain circumstances, the carrier could be exonerated from its liability, or its obligation to pay compensation could be limited. The Convention provided for situations in which the carrier was to be wholly or partly exonerated from its liability to a passenger, where the carrier proved that the damage was caused or contributed to by the negligence or other wrongful act or omission of the passenger. Moreover, the air carrier could not exclude or limit its liability for damages arising under article 17(1) of the Convention where those damages did not exceed a certain compensation threshold. It was only above that threshold that the air carrier could exclude its liability by proving that the damage was not caused by its negligence or that it was caused solely by the negligence of a third party. Those limits enabled passengers to be compensated easily and swiftly, yet without imposing a very heavy compensation burden on air carriers, which would be difficult to determine and to calculate, and would be liable to undermine, and even paralyse, the economic activity of those carriers. It followed that making the carrier’s liability subject to the condition that the damage was due to the materialisation of a hazard typically associated with aviation or to there being a connection between the “accident” and the operation or movement of the aircraft was not consistent with the ordinary meaning of the concept of “accident” in article 17(1) of the Montreal Convention or the objectives pursued by that Convention. Accordingly, the concept of “accident” within the meaning of article 17(1) of the Montreal Convention covered all situations occurring on board an aircraft in which an object used when serving passengers had caused bodily injury to a passenger, without it being necessary to examine whether those situations stemmed from a hazard typically associated with aviation (judgment, paras 35–37, 39–41, 43, operative part).
G Rößler for the passenger, represented for legal purposes by her father.
U Reisch for the defendant, acting as administrator in the insolvency of Niki Luftfahrt GmbH.
A-L Desjonquères and I Cohen, agents, for the French Government.
B Majczyna, agent, for the Polish Government.
G Braun and N Yerrell, agents, for the European Commission.