Held, appeal allowed. The jurisdiction under CPR r 44.2(8) to order a payment on account of costs applied whether the underlying costs order had been made pursuant to the general discretion of the court expressed in CPR r 44.2 or, as in the present case, was deemed to have been made under CPR r 44.9. There was no reason why the power to make an order under CPR r 44.2(8) should be restricted to circumstances in which the court had physically made the order as opposed to circumstances in which an order of the court was deemed to have been made. In both circumstances, it was the court which had ordered the party to pay the costs and accordingly the circumstances fell within the wording of CPR r 44.2(8). A deemed order was no less an order of the court. The policy underlying payments on account of costs that a person entitled to costs should not be kept out of the portion of those costs to which he was plainly entitled pending detailed assessment applied equally whether or not the order was deemed to have been made. Nothing in CPR Pt 36 suggested that it was entirely freestanding and that all costs consequences of accepting a Part 36 offer were to be found within CPR Pt 36 itself. On the contrary, CPR r 36.13 expressly referred to CPR r 44.3(2) which explained “the standard basis for the assessment of costs” and to CPR r 44.9 which gave effect to CPR r 36.13 by providing for deemed costs orders. CPR r 36.13(1) entitled a party to its costs of proceedings on a particular basis and was complemented or supplemented by CPR r 44.2(8) which created the jurisdiction to order a payment on account of those costs. It followed that there was no conflict or tension between those two provisions. Accordingly, the court in the present case had jurisdiction to order an interim payment on account of costs and, in all the circumstances, it was appropriate that sich an order nb be made (17, 18, 32, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39).